REVOLUTION CAMPAIGN

OVERVIEW
In 1997, when it was acquired by CKE Restaurants, Hardee’s Food Systems was a struggling chain in the Midwest and Southeast with a growing reputation for poor service and substandard food. By 2002 the chain had launched 10 different marketing campaigns in nine years, each designed to turn the chain’s business around. The campaigns met with little success. To try and carve out a niche somewhere between inexpensive fast-food chains and pricier ‘‘quick-casual’’ restaurants, as well as to win back customers, Hardee’s executives initiated the Hardee’s ‘‘Revolution’’ in select test markets. The rebranding effort included a scaled-down menu featuring the chain’s new premium Thickburgers, renovated restaurants, and a new emphasis on customer service.
In 2003 the ‘‘Revolution’’ program was expanded to the rest of the chain with a supporting marketing campaign created by Mendelsohn/Zein Advertising, an agency based in Los Angeles. Andrew Puzder, president and chief executive officer of Hardee’s, told Nation’s Restaurant News that the chain planned to devote all of its marketing energy in 2003 to the ‘‘Thickburger Revolution.’’ According to Nation’s Restaurant News the campaign had an estimated budget of $50 to $60 million. The commercials, which ran on television and radio, were honest and apologetic about the company’s slip into substandard food and service. Puzder was featured in some spots, where he admitted that the food the chain used to serve was bad. In other spots former customers stated why they no longer ate at Hardee’s. Although it seemed that Hardee’s was taking a risk by introducing higher-priced premium burgers at a time when competitors were slashing prices, the strategy paid off. In 2004, following the launch of ‘‘Revolution,’’ the chain’s fourth-quarter same-store sales increased 9.2 percent over 2003. In addition the ‘‘Revolution’’ campaign was awarded an EFFIE in 2005.

HISTORICAL CONTEXT
Hardee’s started out in 1960 in Greenville, North Carolina, as a simple walk-up counter business owned by Wilbur Hardee. It eventually grew into a small-town hero to hungry diners throughout the South and Midwest. The chain built a reputation for good quality, nontraditional fast-food fare such as roast beef sandwiches and ‘‘made from scratch’’ biscuits. For a brief time, before Hardee’s became known as the place to avoid if you were hungry for hamburgers, the chain bumped Wendy’s International from its number three spot. But by 1990 its downward spiral had begun. The chain’s food quality was unpredictable, and menu changes left customers confused, while poor service sent them running for the door. In 1997 CKE Restaurants, which already owned the burger chain Carl’s Jr., acquired Hardee’s with a plan to transition the entire chain to Carl’s Jr. restaurants. Hardee’s franchisees and executives bitterly rejected the plan. Hardee’s and Carl’s Jr. maintained their separate identities, but the former became known as Star Hardee’s and sported the Carl’s Jr. happy-star logo on its signs. The menu at Hardee’s also underwent changes to more closely match the offerings served by its sister chain, and stores were haphazardly remodeled to make their decor resemble that of Carl’s Jr. The changes did little to boost business for Hardee’s, and the brand slipped to number six among fast-food burger restaurants. In 2003 Puzder, who had become president of Hardee’s in 2000, determined it was time to reestablish the brand’s identity and to rebuild the neglected chain’s business and reputation. The Hardee’s ‘‘Revolution’’ was launched.

TARGET MARKET
Sister chain Carl’s Jr. had focused its energies on being the place for young men to go for big, juicy burgers, but the goal for Hardee’s was to appeal to adults by offering a broader range of menu items that included fast, tasty breakfasts and restaurant-style burgers for lunch or dinner. ‘‘The Hardee’s brand is broader—it has more breakfast business, it’s more adult,’’ Brad Haley, the company’s executive vice president for marketing, told Restaurants & Institutions.
The two brands not only appealed to different consumer groups but also were distinguished from each other by regional differences, which made it difficult to create a single marketing theme for both brands. Hardee’s was centered in the Midwest and Southeast, whereas Carl’s Jr. served the West. Haley said, ‘‘In the Southeast, Hardee’s is a very strong breakfast brand. In other regions it’s more a lunch/dinner [concept]. So when you’re looking at the brand, it’s not one-size-fits-all.’’

COMPETITION
While Hardee’s was taking a risk by offering customers the kind of thick burgers served at casual-dining restaurants and selling them at a higher price (about $4 for a burger), the chain’s key competitors, McDonald’s (the number one burger chain) and Burger King (the number two chain), were promoting discount prices to attract customers. The tactic was dubbed the ‘‘99-cent menu war’’ by Jim Kirk of the Chicago Tribune. He wrote, ‘‘With No. 2 burger chain Burger King preparing a major national marketing assault around 99-cent menu items, executives at McDonald’s are making their own value strategy a priority with franchisees.’’ McDonald’s launched a national marketing campaign focused on its ‘‘Dollar Value Menu’’ in October 2002. Burger King launched its campaign just a month ahead of that of McDonald’s. The Atlanta Journal-Constitution reported that, faced with complaints that fast-food restaurants were causing American obesity, the two chains had earlier ‘‘tinkered with their menus to add healthier choices and more sophisticated flavors. Now they’re turning to price to win back customers.’’ Individual items on the 99-cent value menu at McDonald’s included two sandwiches, fries, salad, and beverages; Burger King’s 99-cent offerings included hamburgers, tacos, and chili. For both chains the strategy behind the 99-cent value menu was to attract price-conscious consumers who were limiting their visits to restaurants because of the weak economy. Harry Balzer, vice president of the market research firm NPD Group, told the Atlanta Journal-Constitution, ‘‘The average cost of preparing a meal at home is $1.96, making it tempting to turn the cooking over to someone else for just a few pennies more.’’ The 99-cent value menu strategy produced mixed results and weakened profits for the dueling chains. As Burger King’s global marketing officer Chris Clouser noted during an interview with Time magazine, the problem with promotions offering deep discounts was that ‘‘you train customers to come only when there’s a blue-light special.’’

MARKETING STRATEGY
‘‘Revolution’’ was created to set the Hardee’s chain apart from other fast-food restaurants and to establish it as a premier-burger specialist, according to Jack Hayes, writing for Nation’s Restaurant News. The company was also trying to lure customers by carving out a niche somewhere between typical fast-food chains and higher-priced quick-casual dining establishments. To accomplish that, Hardee’s introduced a selection of Angus-beef burgers and eliminated about 40 percent of its lunch and dinner items. The breakfast menu, popular with customers, was left intact. In addition to a menu overhaul, the campaign included a series of television commercials that boldly tackled the chain’s reputation for bad food and poor customer service. One spot, which opened with a scene shot in black-and-white, featured a young man stating that, while Hardee’s ‘‘used to be cool,’’ he no longer went there because when he wanted a burger, he wanted a big, juicy one. The spot then switched to a color shot of a Thickburger and the tagline ‘‘It’s how the last place you’d go for a burger will become the first place.’’ Other commercials featured company president Puzder humbly agreeing with customer complaints that the food quality at Hardee’s had deteriorated and that service was substandard. The spots had been developed based on consumer research that included reviewing comment forms customers had filled out and left in suggestion boxes at Hardee’s restaurants.
The ‘‘Revolution’’ campaign also signified the chain’s shift away from the low-cost—and often low-quality—approach to fast-food menu items that had dominated the quick-service food arena almost since its beginnings. Puzder said that the chain’s new campaign was intended to set Hardee’s apart from the competition and to build its brand identity as the premium-burger specialist among fast-food restaurants. In an interview with QSR Magazine, he explained, ‘‘We not only made the burgers bigger and began using higher quality Angus beef, we also improved the quality of virtually every ingredient on the burgers . . . At a time when most of our competitors have turned to discounting tactics, Hardee’s is banking on America’s ongoing love affair with truly great burgers.’’

OUTCOME
After declining steadily for more than 10 years, Hardee’s experienced a swing in the other direction following the January launch of ‘‘Revolution.’’ The chain reported a 9.2 percent increase in same-store sales in the fourth quarter of 2003 compared to the same period the previous year. Sales growth continued, and Hardee’s reported same-store sales increases for eight consecutive months through March 2004 at stores open for one year or more. Haley told QSR Magazine, ‘‘This was a pure quality strategy and it’s very reassuring to see that fast food consumers appreciate what we have done.’’ The success of the campaign was enhanced when CKE, reversing its original strategy, applied the Hardee’s approach to sister chain Carl’s Jr. and introduced to the latter’s menu not only Thickburgers but also some of the Hardee’s breakfast items. Further recognition of the campaign’s success came in 2005, when it was awarded an EFFIE for meeting its goals of increasing sales, regaining consumer confidence in the brand, winning back the company’s core customers (men aged 16 to 34), and earning credibility as the best place to go for a great burger.

SNEAK A PEEK CAMPAIGN

OVERVIEW
With its ‘‘Sneak a Peek’’ advertising campaign, Hallmark Cards, Inc., hoped to convince consumers to insist on buying only Hallmark greeting cards and to check the brand insignia on the backs of cards they received. ‘‘This campaign hinges on the concept that there is only one thing consumers need to know: it’s Hallmark, cards that say what they think and feel, the brand they trust,’’ said Brad Van Auken, the company’s director of brand management and marketing. The television spots for the campaign featured a young married couple either exchanging greeting cards between them or picking out cards to give to others. The woman attempts to teach her husband the best techniques to discreetly check whether or not the cards he receives are from Hallmark. The campaign played on the company’s long-running slogan, ‘‘When you care enough to send the very best.’’ Hallmark, the dominant greeting card company in the United States, had a wholesome image and was known for its emphasis on excellence. The company had a long history of successful marketing endeavors, including the award-winning ‘‘Hallmark Hall of Fame’’ series of television programs. Hallmark and its two major competitors, Gibson Greetings, Inc. and American Greetings Corporation, branched out in 1997 by marketing their merchandise via the Internet and offering related products, such as cards that consumers could print at home on their computers. The ‘‘Sneak a Peek’’ commercials won an Effie Award and were popular among consumers, especially with women, who were the primary target market. The campaign was launched in 1996 and ran through 1997. As in previous years, Hallmark’s sales accounted for nearly half of the $7 billion in revenues generated by the greeting card industry in 1997.

HISTORICAL CONTEXT
The Hallmark company was established in 1910, when a penniless teenager named Joyce C. Hall arrived in Kansas City, Missouri, and began marketing his two shoeboxes full of picture postcards through a mail-order business. The business grew rapidly and was soon producing greeting cards, ornamental gift wrap, party decorations, and jigsaw puzzles. In 1984 the company acquired Binney & Smith, which manufactured Crayola products, Magic Markers, and Liquitex art supplies. By 1997 Hallmark Cards was a global firm employing more than 20,000 people, including hundreds of artists, designers, writers, editors, and photographers. In addition to the Hallmark brand, the company made Ambassador Cards, Shoebox Greetings, and several other lines. Hallmark products were sold at a chain of stores owned by the company but also at drug stores and other retail outlets. Since consumers wanted the convenience of finding Hallmark products wherever they shopped, the company launched a new line of cards, Expressions from Hallmark, in 1996. Unlike some other Hallmark brands, the Expressions line was available in supermarkets and other mass-merchandise stores. By encouraging consumers to check the insignia on the back of cards, the ‘‘Sneak a Peek’’ campaign helped call attention to the fact that Expressions was a Hallmark line.
Some of the company’s advertisements were tailored to promote specific products, such as Ambassador Cards. Others, like the ‘‘Sneak a Peek’’ campaign, were intended to generate awareness of Hallmark products in general. In 1951 the company had begun a long-term sponsorship of the popular and critically acclaimed ‘‘Hallmark Hall of Fame,’’ a series of television programs for family viewing. In 1997 alone Hallmark sponsored 87 films and miniseries for television, including Gulliver’s Travels and Larry McMurtry’s Streets of Laredo. In 1996 the company spent $23 million to publicize the Hallmark Hall of Fame and $102 million on advertising designed to draw consumers into Hallmark Gold Crown stores, which carried greeting cards and specialty items. The print and broadcast ads promised, ‘‘You’ll Feel Better Inside.’’ A Hallmark survey in the spring of 1997 showed a 93 percent approval rating for the programs and an 86 percent approval rating for the company’s advertising.
The ‘‘Hallmark Hall of Fame’’ broadcasts won numerous
Emmy Awards, and the Hallmark commercials that
accompanied the programs were recognized for their
tastefulness and creativity. Joyce Hall’s motto, ‘‘Good
taste is good business,’’ had helped the company establish
a wholesome image. The company’s slogan since 1944,
‘‘When You Care Enough to Send the Very Best,’’ was a
reference to Hall’s memoirs When You Care Enough. For
many years the slogan was incorporated into the company’s advertising. Consumers age 50 and over tended to be particularly fond of Hallmark’s sentimental, familyoriented advertising. In 1997 the company’s Internet site included a Nice-O-Meter, an interactive survey that allowed visitors to measure how nice they were.
TARGET MARKET
In 1997 the market for greeting cards, stationery, and other correspondence products was increasing steadily. Hallmark’s research showed that 29 percent of consumers were writing more than they had previously, 46 percent of grandmothers said they received correspondence from their grandchildren, and 58 percent of mothers said their children wrote them thank you notes. A poll in Adweek said nearly a third of the people in the United States planned to correspond more frequently than they had in the past. Consumers liked to give cards that expressed the feelings that they did not have the courage to say aloud. ‘‘If the message in a card rings true, people identify with it and see themselves in it,’’ said Ellen McKeever, manager of the Shoebox Greetings division of Hallmark. ‘‘If a character on a card reminds people of someone the know, or if they just like the character or find it funny, they will choose that card.’’ The perception was that the exchange of cards made people feel good and enhanced their relationships. The ‘‘Sneak a Peek’’ campaign played up these feelings by emphasizing that sending a Hallmark greeting was the ultimate demonstration of caring. The company had conducted extensive research to determine what its customers, who were 90 percent women, wanted in greeting cards. ‘‘From all the information we’ve collected directly from greeting card purchasers, three things are abundantly clear,’’ said Mark J. Schwab, the company’s vice president of strategy and marketing. ‘‘First, consumers want to find great products that are a good value . . . Second, the time-pressed consumer longs for a convenience-based greeting card offering from Hallmark, a company she knows and trusts . . . . Third, we have to make it crystal clear to the consumer that the card shop is simply the best place to shop for our category of products, an exciting, vibrant site from which to reinforce Hallmark brand equity.’’ The ‘‘Sneak a Peek’’ campaign encouraged consumers to have such faith in the Hallmark brand that they would not bother looking at anything else.

COMPETITION
Hallmark was the dominant greeting card company in the United States, with a market share that averaged about 42 percent, according to USA Today ’s Ad Track. American Greetings Corporation came in second with 35 percent, and Gibson Greetings, Inc., was third. In 1996 American Greetings had entered a small but expanding market—interactive entertainment for girls—by developing books and video games that featured several of the company’s popular characters, including Strawberry Shortcake, the Holly Hobbie Blue Girl, and the Popples. In 1997 the company worked with Avery Dennison Corp. to produce a line of greeting cards for inkjet printers. Television commercials and ads in women’s magazines were planned to target women 25 to 54 years old who had children less than 18 years old. American Greetings was involved in various other marketing endeavors during 1997, including advertising on the Internet site of Hearst HomeArts, which featured several magazines published by the Hearst Corporation. The World Wide Web offered vast opportunities for selling greeting cards, candy, and related merchandise, a market estimated to be more than $219 million in 1998. In December 1997 American Greetings tapped into the world of electronic commerce by promoting its cards, flowers, chocolates, and gifts via America Online at a site that had previously been known as AOL’s Card-o-Matic store. American Greetings invested $3 million initially, committed to the arrangement for three years, and agreed to pay millions more in the future. The venture, which had been announced in October, was launched at about the same time that Hallmark began an on-line marketing partnership with the company operating Yahoo!, an Internet search engine. Although some of Hallmark’s on-line cards were free, American Greetings charged for all its cards.
American Greetings was also one of 65 businesses that began marketing merchandise through Compu-Serve’s Electronic Mall on the World Wide Web in March. In addition, the company collaborated with SmarTalk TeleServices in an on-line promotion before Mother’s Day, from April 22 through May 11. Customers who purchased American Greetings merchandise were awarded free telephone time, and customers could follow a link to SmarTalk’s site on the Internet. American Greetings products were also featured at the redesigned Internet site of a third company that offered telephone services, MCI Communications Corp. Meanwhile, Gibson Greetings invested $6 million for an equity in Greet Street, an Internet site where the company could market its cards. Gibson also made an agreement with Firefly, a software company, to market cards through Firefly products. By the end of the year Gibson was preparing to launch its first television advertising campaign to promote its popular bean bag toys. The company had lost $28.6 million in 1994 but had made a profit of $900,000 in the first half of 1995. In that year Gibson wanted to sell either its greeting card business or its Cleo, Inc., gift wrap division. Although American Greetings expressed interest in merging with the greeting card division, Gibson would not agree to the arrangement because of possible antitrust complications.

MARKETING STRATEGY
One of Hallmark’s strongest selling points was the popularity and widespread recognition of the brand. In a 1995 survey by UPS Equitrend, consumers preferred the Hallmark brand more than 18 times as often as its closest competitor. When asked to name a brand of greeting cards, 91 percent of consumers mentioned Hallmark, and 84 percent mentioned Hallmark first. The company had built its brand equity by insisting on excellence, continually pushing its creative staff to be innovative, developing new ways to help Hallmark outlets and other retailers market the company’s merchandise, and conducting research to determine consumer response to the company and its products. ‘‘The marketplace is changing, and consumers’ needs are always evolving, but excellence remains at the top of our priority list,’’ said Hallmark’s Van Auken. ‘‘Through our products, our advertising, our retail environments, and even our World Wide Web site, Hallmark creates experiences to strengthen the tremendous equity of the Hallmark brand. So the real good news is, we’re on the right track, and consumers see it.’’
In 1996 Hallmark had begun to employ a new, multifaceted marketing strategy that included launching the ‘‘Sneak a Peek’’ advertising campaign to promote general awareness of the brand. Of the $175 million Hallmark spent each year for marketing, it budgeted $50 million for the ‘‘Sneak a Peek’’ campaign in 1996 and $44 million in 1997. The campaign, developed by the Leo Burnett USA advertising agency in Chicago, was intended to motivate consumers to act on their preference for the Hallmark brand when they purchased greeting cards and other personal expression products. The campaign centered on a consumer’s impulse to look at the back of a greeting card to see whether it was a Hallmark. ‘‘Sneaking a peek’’ was portrayed as a commonplace indulgence that required enviable adroitness. The broadcast commercials featured a young couple who verified that they ‘‘cared enough to send the very best’’ by glancing furtively at the backs of cards they received from each other. Celebrities appeared in some of the television commercials during 1997; one spot showed three women checking for the Hallmark insignia on the backs of Valentine’s Day cards they had received from singer Ray Charles. Another spot showed a baby in a bassinet looking at the ‘‘Hallmark’’ on a card. The commercials aired during popular prime-time television programs such as Friends, Frasier, Mad about You, and Home Improvement. The campaign also included advertisements in print media. These ads, which made the back covers of magazines such as Good Housekeeping and National Geographic look like the backs of Hallmark cards, ran in 115 publications in 1996 and 125 publications in 1997. Most of them featured a single line of text that was tailored for each magazine. Other ads on the backs of more than 100 magazines consisted of the Hallmark name only.

OUTCOME
The ‘‘Sneak a Peek’’ campaign received an Effie Award in 1996 for effectiveness and creativity in advertising. Hallmark’s research from the spring of 1997 indicated that 86 percent of consumers felt positive about the company’s advertising. In October 1997 Hallmark’s brand equity was ranked fourth among 282 national brands in a study by Total Research Corporation. The study analyzed how well consumers recognized each brand and their perception of the quality associated with it. In another survey USA Today’s Ad Track reported that 31 percent of respondents liked the ‘‘Sneak a Peek’’ campaign, compared with a survey average of 22 percent. The campaign was particularly popular with its primary target market; 36 percent of women liked the ads. In contrast, 21 percent of men liked them. Only 4 percent of the respondents said they disliked the ads, compared with a survey average of 12 percent. Consumers age 65 or older liked the campaign best; 37 percent gave it the highest scores for popularity. The Hallmark ads were among only a few in the survey to receive high marks for both popularity and effectiveness.
The company maintained its dominance in the $7 billion greeting card industry with sales of $3.4 billion in 1997, $3.6 billion in 1996, and $3.4 billion in 1995. The market remained strong and was expected to expand because the average age of the population was increasing, and older people tended to send more greeting cards. Additional sales were expected as card companies customized more of their products for target markets.

WORRIED ABOUT BILL CAMPAIGN

OVERVIEW
In 2000 the largest tax-preparation company in the Unites States, H&R Block, Inc., was venturing beyond the niche industry in which it had excelled for 45 years. After a series of acquisitions and changes in upper management, the firm known for preparing tax returns began touting its new mortgage and brokerage services, financial-planning services, and line of personal-finance software. The company’s executives also wanted to brand H&R Block as a financial service available to all Americans, not just high-profile businesses. Assimilating all of the company’s changes into one advertising message, H&R Block released its ‘‘Worried about Bill’’ campaign. Created by the advertising agency Young & Rubicam, ‘‘Worried about Bill’’ broke nationally on January 12, 2000. H&R tripled its advertising budget to finance the $100 million campaign, which employed television, radio, print, and outdoor advertisements. Most of the campaign’s 21 television spots featured the fictional character Bill, who, as the April 15 tax deadline approached, grew increasingly anxious while preparing his taxes. The commercials depicted the frazzled Bill becoming so obsessed with the task that he ignored his wife’s attempts at seduction, allowed his daughter to stay out all night, and eventually looked to his daughter’s boyfriend for financial advice. The campaign’s storyline culminated with Bill, delirious from reading his 1099 tax form, incinerating his financial records in the backyard barbecue.
The campaign collected the Best of Show and two Gold awards for the broadcast category at the 32nd annual American Advertising (ADDY) Awards. It also garnered two Gold awards in the television competition at the One Show’s 2001 ceremony. Besides its ad-industry success, the campaign helped H&R Block boost its 2000 sales 38 percent over the previous year’s sales. David Byers, the company’s chief marketing officer, explained to USA Today, ‘‘We’re very happy with the creativity. The feedback we’ve gotten from consumers has been that it’s been enormously successful for us.’’ Much to Young & Rubicam’s astonishment, H&R Block opened its advertising account up for review only a few months after ‘‘Worried About Bill’’ began.

HISTORICAL CONTEXT
Henry and Richard Bloch, brothers from Kansas City, Missouri, first offered their tax-preparation services in 1946 under the name United Business Company. The business quickly grew after the Bloch brothers franchised it. Wanting to change the name United Business Company but afraid that consumers would pronounce their last name as ‘‘blotch,’’ Henry and Richard renamed the business H&R Block in 1955. Later in the 1970s Henry appeared in television spots for the company and assured his audience that their taxes were safe with H&R Block.
In 1996 Young & Rubicam won the firm’s advertising account. Some of the agency’s early work for H&R Block included a 20-second radio spot titled ‘‘Proctor,’’ which stressed the importance of privacy by humorously featuring a street-corner proctology exam. The magazine Advertising Age deemed ‘‘Proctor’’ the best radio commercial of 1998. That year H&R Block spent an estimated $30 million on advertising. In 1999 the firm spent $28 million on advertising during the first nine months. Believing that his company could offer more services to its preexisting customers, newly elected H&R Block president Mark Ernst wanted to brand the business as more than just a tax preparer. In 1993 the company had purchased the personal-finance-software company MECA Software; to expand its mortgaging services H&R Block purchased Fleet Financial Group’s Option One Mortgage; and in 1999 the company expanded its brokerage services by acquiring discount brokers Olde Financial Discount. By late 1999 the firm wanted Young & Rubicam to unify its services under the H&R Block brand. The Delaney Report quoted H&R Block chief marketing officer David Byers as saying in 1999, ‘‘We’re going through a major transformation—moving from being a one product company to a financial services powerhouse. H&R Block is a brand that is ubiquitous. We want to capitalize on that as well as on the high degree of trust the consumer has in the brand.’’

TARGET MARKET
‘‘Worried about Bill’’ targeted its preexisting small and medium-sized business customers that trusted H&R Block for their tax preparation but that still relied on brokerages such as the Charles Schwab Corp., Morgan Stanley, and Merrill Lynch & Company for financial planning, mortgaging, and investing. In addition to businesses, the campaign also targeted individuals with similar financial needs. Differing from H&R Block’s advertising during the late 1990s, which suggested that H&R Block was the best firm for preparing taxes, ‘‘Worried about Bill’’ communicated to audiences that the firm offered a wider range of financial services. According to Greg Farrell of USA Today, the campaign attempted the transform ‘‘H&R Block from tax preparer to full financial services company for Middle America.’’ By early 2000 the surge of young entrepreneurs within the burgeoning technology sector had expanded America’s newly wealthy crowd. According to market researcher Spectrem Group, the number of U.S. households with more than $1 million in assets had doubled from 3.45 million in 1994 to 7.1 million in 2000. Spectrem Group also reported that 44 percent of this population felt overwhelmed by the amount of time needed to manage their assets. Sixty percent of the same population believed that there was too much information regarding financial planning. ‘‘Worried about Bill’’ suggested that using H&R Block’s services would make organizing their finances easier.

COMPETITION
The ad agency Emmerling Post released a series of print ads for the asset-management branch of financial holding company the Phoenix Companies in 2000. One print ad featured the text ‘‘Money. It’s not what it used to be,’’ above a picture of a queen dressed in ostentatious clothing beside another woman wearing black leather and a tiara. Other print ads stated, ‘‘Some people still inherit wealth, the rest of us have no choice but to earn it.’’ Specifically targeting an audience composed of the newly wealthy, a third print ad featured a casually dressed young man standing beside a dapper-looking gentleman with the copy, ‘‘New money is different than old money. For one thing, it’s younger.’’ Instead of repeating the trends of other asset-management firms that placed print ads in financial magazines, Phoenix Companies placed Henry appeared in television spots for the company and assured his audience that their taxes were safe with H&R Block.
In 1996 Young & Rubicam won the firm’s advertising account. Some of the agency’s early work for H&R Block included a 20-second radio spot titled ‘‘Proctor,’’ which stressed the importance of privacy by humorously featuring a street-corner proctology exam. The magazine Advertising Age deemed ‘‘Proctor’’ the best radio commercial of 1998. That year H&R Block spent an estimated $30 million on advertising. In 1999 the firm spent $28 million on advertising during the first nine months. Believing that his company could offer more services to its preexisting customers, newly elected H&R Block president Mark Ernst wanted to brand the business as more than just a tax preparer. In 1993 the company had purchased the personal-finance-software company MECA Software; to expand its mortgaging services H&R Block purchased Fleet Financial Group’s Option One Mortgage; and in 1999 the company expanded its brokerage services by acquiring discount brokers Olde Financial Discount. By late 1999 the firm wanted Young & Rubicam to unify its services under the H&R Block brand. The Delaney Report quoted H&R Block chief marketing officer David Byers as saying in 1999, ‘‘We’re going through a major transformation—moving from being a one product company to a financial services powerhouse. H&R Block is a brand that is ubiquitous. We want to capitalize on that as well as on the high degree of trust the consumer has in the brand.’’

TARGET MARKET
‘‘Worried about Bill’’ targeted its preexisting small and medium-sized business customers that trusted H&R Block for their tax preparation but that still relied on brokerages such as the Charles Schwab Corp., Morgan Stanley, and Merrill Lynch & Company for financial planning, mortgaging, and investing. In addition to businesses, the campaign also targeted individuals with similar financial needs. Differing from H&R Block’s advertising during the late 1990s, which suggested that H&R Block was the best firm for preparing taxes, ‘‘Worried about Bill’’ communicated to audiences that the firm offered a wider range of financial services. According to Greg Farrell of USA Today, the campaign attempted the transform ‘‘H&R Block from tax preparer to full financial services company for Middle America.’’ By early 2000 the surge of young entrepreneurs within the burgeoning technology sector had expanded America’s newly wealthy crowd. According to market researcher Spectrem Group, the number of U.S. households with more than $1 million in assets had doubled from 3.45 million in 1994 to 7.1 million in 2000. Spectrem Group also reported that 44 percent of this population felt overwhelmed by the amount of time needed to manage their assets. Sixty percent of the same population believed that there was too much information regarding financial planning. ‘‘Worried about Bill’’ suggested that using H&R Block’s services would make organizing their finances easier.

COMPETITION
The ad agency Emmerling Post released a series of print ads for the asset-management branch of financial holding company the Phoenix Companies in 2000. One print ad featured the text ‘‘Money. It’s not what it used to be,’’ above a picture of a queen dressed in ostentatious clothing beside another woman wearing black leather and a tiara. Other print ads stated, ‘‘Some people still inherit wealth, the rest of us have no choice but to earn it.’’ Specifically targeting an audience composed of the newly wealthy, a third print ad featured a casually dressed young man standing beside a dapper-looking gentleman with the copy, ‘‘New money is different than old money.
For one thing, it’s younger.’’ Instead of repeating the
trends of other asset-management firms that placed print
ads in financial magazines, Phoenix Companies placed