Marketing Campaign Case Studies

TARGET MARKET OF THE THE POWER OF DREAMS CAMPAIGN

2011-06-28T20:02:00.000-07:00

‘‘The Power of Dreams’’ targeted a large and diverse audience. While Honda wished to attract younger buyers, they were not the company’s only focus. With a wide range of car models, from the lower-priced Civic to the higher-end Accord, Honda could potentially appeal to drivers within all age groups and socioeconomic statuses. All potential new buyers, whatever their age, represented Honda’s target market. Thus, of the many different media that ‘‘The Power of Dreams’’ employed, television advertising, with its ability to reach a wide audience, was expected to be the most effective. Further, by portraying Hondas as hip and fun, the commercials appealed to a broad range of potential buyers. Honda’s new campaign mainly focused on raising public awareness of its cars—especially in Europe and the United Kingdom, where Honda was largely associated with motorcycles—and, in particular, getting new customers to visit Honda showrooms. There was also an emphasis on pleasing return customers. The company wished to improve communications with Honda owners and thus make them feel good about their choice of Honda; this in turn would convince them to buy a Honda the next time around.

HISTORICAL CONTEXT OF THE THE POWER OF DREAMS CAMPAIGN

2011-06-28T19:42:00.000-07:00

In April 1964 Honda spent $300,000 to sponsor the Academy Awards, becoming the first foreign corporate sponsor in the event’s history. With the tagline ‘‘You Meet the Nicest People on a Honda,’’ the Honda advertising campaign was a success, becoming one of the bestremembered advertising campaigns in the company’s history. Nevertheless, although the campaign promoted Honda’s motorcycles well, it did little to sell Honda vehicles. The reality was that Honda was better known for its motorcycles than it was for its cars. This long remained the case in most of the countries where Hondas were sold. In Japan, where big-splash promotional efforts for Honda’s cars were common, the problem was not so severe. The 1981 campaign to promote Honda’s model the City, for one, was omnipresent in Japan, incorporating large-scale TV, radio, and print advertising. There was even a variety of City novelty goods for sale and a specialty magazine called City Press. Meanwhile, in the United Kingdom, Honda automobile production had yet to begin. Honda cars had been available there as imports, but not enough units were ordered to establish a presence. Further, the prices of imported cars could not compete with that of vehicles manufactured within the country. Thus, at the time, any sales push in the area focused on Honda motorbikes. In 1992, when Honda automobile production began in the United Kingdom, the shift toward promoting Honda automobiles there began, albeit slowly. But the potential market for the new manufacturing plant was huge: located in Swindon, England, it was responsible for producing vehicles well beyond the United Kingdom, including mainland Europe, the Middle East, and Africa. As such, Honda felt the need to begin a major campaign within the United Kingdom. Eventually it happened. ‘‘The Power of Dreams’’ replaced the 1999 global tagline ‘‘Do You Have a Honda?’’ This earlier campaign employed print, radio, and television, and portrayed the dreams of Honda’s founder, Soichiro Honda, who envisioned providing the world with all the possible means of travel. Soichiro Honda himself had repaired and created bicycles and motorcycles as well as both road cars and racing vehicles. The ‘‘Do You Have a Honda?’’ ads thus incorporated images of all of these means of transportation as well as more creative means, including a hot-air balloon and a cable car. Although the ‘‘Do You Have a Honda?’’ ads spread worldwide, the United Kingdom was barely affected by the campaign. From 1998 to 1999 Honda automobile sales in Europe dropped from 240,000 to 235,000. The decline continued through 2002. In the United Kingdom, Honda auto sales began to drop in 2000. In 2002 ‘‘Do You Have a Honda?’’ was replaced with the campaign ‘‘The Power ofDreams.’’ Although the tagline was part of a larger global focus, the campaign, under the leadership of ad agency Wieden+Kennedy in London, centered on promotional efforts within the United Kingdom.

OVERVIEW OF THE THE POWER OF DREAMS CAMPAIGN

2011-06-28T19:39:00.000-07:00

In 2002 Honda Motor Company was the number-three Japanese automobile manufacturer in the world, behind Toyota and Nissan. While Honda’s automobile sales in Japan and the United States were considered strong, sales in the United Kingdom and mainland Europe were thought to be weak, even though automobile production in the United Kingdom had been ongoing for a decade. Further, Honda vehicle sales had been declining in these regions since 1998. In response to these problems Honda hired ad agency Wieden+Kennedy’s London office to create an advertising campaign that would directly address the issues.
‘‘The Power of Dreams,’’ released in 2002, was an omnipresent campaign in the United Kingdom and beyond, using television, direct mail, radio, posters, press, interactive television, cinema, magazines, motor shows, press launches, dealerships, postcards, beermats (coasters), and even traffic cones. It built upon Honda’s company slogan, ‘‘Yume No Chikara,’’ which was first endorsed in the 1940s by the company’s founder, Soichiro Honda. Translated into English, it meant to ‘‘see’’ one’s dreams. Wieden+Kennedy used this phrase as the basis of its question to consumers: ‘‘Do you believe in the power of dreams?’’ The global campaign, which centered on this tagline, included print and television components starring ASIMO, a humanoid robot developed by Honda. While the ASIMO ads gained widespread recognition, the 2003 television commercial called ‘‘Cog’’ was clearly a pinnacle of the campaign. In a single take with no special effects, more than 85 individual parts of the new Accord interacted in a complicated chain reaction. The spot won 37 advertising awards. Honda considered ‘‘The Power of Dreams’’ an advertising success. Worldwide sales of Honda vehicles rose dramatically from 2002 through 2005, from 2.6 million units per year to 3.2 million units per year. In the United Kingdom sales improved by 28 percent. In Europe sales in 2002 increased from 170,000 to 196,000, which rose to 217,000 in 2003. The campaign also won IPA Advertising Effectiveness awards, British Television Advertising awards, and even a 2003 Gold Lion at the Cannes International Advertising Festival.

OUTCOME OF THE IT’S NOT T.V. IT’S HBO CAMPAIGN

2011-05-31T09:12:00.000-07:00

HBO pronounced the ‘‘It’s Not T.V. It’s HBO’’ campaign an unequivocal success. In the company’s estimation, the campaign achieved its primary goal of elevating the brand’s image in the market. Extensive precampaign and postcampaign surveys indicated that the commercials had made viewers more aware of the HBO brand. According to the December 8, 1997, edition of USA Today, HBO’s membership increased from 21.1 million in 1996 to 22.7 million in 1997. But HBO stressed that it was difficult to correlate the number of subscribers with its high-profile ad campaign because of the variety of factors that influenced fluctuations in membership. For 25 years HBO had seen the number of its subscribers increase each year. The media and the advertising industry responded positively to the spots. On December 9, 1996, USA Today heralded the campaign as one of the ‘‘rare knockouts’’ in advertising. Trade publications such as Adweek and Shoot extolled the technical wizardry of the commercials. ‘‘Certainly there is something to be gained for an entertainment provider merely by being entertaining,’’ declared the November 4, 1996, Advertising Age. In September 1997 ‘‘Chimps’’ received the first ever Emmy Award for a commercial. It beat out other well-liked campaigns, such as those by Nike and Levi’s, to be named the best commercial of the year. Also in 1997 the ‘‘Chimps’’ spot received a Gold Clio Award. The Clios were international advertising awards presented annually in recognition of creative excellence and innovation in advertising. Viewers also responded well to the campaign. USA Today ’s Ad Track, a poll measuring the popularity and effectiveness of national campaigns, revealed that consumers consistently liked the HBO spots, often ranking them among the 10 best commercials. According to the newspaper, ‘‘the spots were especially effective with consumers aged 18–24.’’ Larry Gerbrandt, a senior analyst at Paul Kagan, told USA Today on December 8, 1997, that ‘‘the ads worked well for HBO. The name HBO is practically synonymous with pay TV.’’ Yet the campaign’s positive impact onHBO’s subscriber figures was less clear. Although 33 percent of respondents in the December 29, 1997, Ad Track survey declared that they liked the HBO campaign ‘‘a lot,’’ only 20 percent thought that the campaign was ‘‘very effective.’’ In a similar vein, Advertising Age criticized the campaign for not providing enough information about HBO’s actual programming. ‘‘Chimps’’ in particular generated a great deal of controversy. Many journalists were outraged that the basic premise of the spot was false. Goodall did not watch HBO; in fact, the pay channel was not available in the remote region of Africa where she lived. The spot drew more criticism when it was learned that the voice attributed to Goodall was not hers. HBO, however, felt the media were taking the commercial far too seriously, and the company itself was pleased with the results of its efforts. In 1998 the campaign was expanded to include print, radio, and direct mail. As the campaign morphed from a branding strategy for the network into its operating mantra in 1999, the marketing also shifted to specific programming. According to network executives, the strategy evolved based on the success of two of its shows—The Sopranos and Sex and the City—as well as of original movies that the network was producing and sporting events that it aired. The new marketing effort resulted in HBO being named Cable Marketer of the Year in 2000 by Advertising Age. The original ‘‘It’s Not T.V. It’s HBO’’ campaign was named to the Cable & Telecommunications Association for Marketing (CTAM) Hall of Fame in 2003, which, according to the organization, honored the ‘‘finest and most influential campaigns in the history of cable.’’

MARKETING STRATEGY OF THE IT’S NOT T.V. IT’S HBO CAMPAIGN

2011-05-31T09:10:00.001-07:00

HBO gave BBDO New York the project of creating a memorable campaign. After HBO briefed the ad agency on its specific needs and concerns, BBDO took over the creative aspects of the campaign. In a brainstorming session, Michael Patti, the vice chairman and executive creative director of BBDO, and Don Schneider, the agency’s senior creative director, hit upon a striking concept. The two envisioned a commercial in which a parrot would recite famous movie lines because it saw into a neighboring apartment, where a television was tuned to HBO. The idea quickly evolved into the award-winning spot featuring lip-synching chimpanzees steeped in movie lingo. The 1996 spot, titled ‘‘Chimps,’’ featured renowned primatologist Jane Goodall and a group of wild chimpanzees in the Gombe preserve in Africa. Frame-by-frame animation made it appear as though the chimps were actually speaking famous lines from classic Hollywood movies. The premise of the spot was the powerful impact HBO exerted on its viewers. The commercial opened with a proud chimp uttering lines spoken by Marlon Brando in The Godfather : ‘‘He never could have outfoxed Santino. But I didn’t know until this day that it was Barzini all along.’’
Another chimp replied with lines from Forrest Gump:
‘‘Mama says that stupid is as stupid does.’’ As a third chimp tossed a stick to the ground, he repeated a line from Network:
‘‘I’m mad as hell and I’m not going to take it anymore.’’ A father chimp spoke Darth Vader’s well-known line from Star Wars —‘‘The force is with you, young Skywalker’’—as he patted a small chimp on the head. After a group of chimps chanted, ‘‘Toga! Toga! Toga! Toga! . . .’’ from Animal House, the camera panned to a bewildered Goodall writing in her journal. Her voice-over said, ‘‘September 19: Their inexplicable behavior continues.’’ A chimp then bellowed, ‘‘Yo, Adrian, I did it,’’ a line from Rocky. The camera cut back to Goodall’s cabin, where her television was tuned to HBO, and she continued, ‘‘Got to go now. Braveheart is on.’’ A black screen followed with a graphic and the campaign’s tagline, ‘‘It’s Not T.V. It’s HBO.’’
Producing the spot proved to be quite a challenge, however. The chimpanzees were filmed at their feeding sites in the Gombe preserve. Frame-by-frame animation was then used to create the illusion that the animals were reciting movie lines. Sherri Margulies, a film editor who worked on the spot, told Shoot that, while other commercials had used similar effects, ‘‘the elaborate attention to detail . . . on this spot [was] completely unique.’’ All told, the special effects took approximately 20 to 30 hours per chimp, requiring the ad agency to work around the clock for a month.
In 1997 HBO followed ‘‘Chimps’’ with four new television spots, each intended to elevate the HBO brand. Using tongue-in-cheek humor, the spots attempted to convey the uniqueness of HBO’s programming. In ‘‘Haircuts’’ the men of an idealized American small town sported bizarre, patterned haircuts. It turned out that Carl, the town barber, had become engrossed in HBO’s programming as he cut his customers’ hair, the result being freakish haircuts. In another spot, ‘‘Roach Motel,’’ an enthusiastic pest exterminator was unable to rid a home of its roaches by using sprays or bombs. He succeeded only by luring the cockroaches into a roach ‘‘motel’’ with a neon sign that advertised ‘‘Free HBO.’’ The campaign’s ironic wit continued in a spot featuring a sadistic repairman who tormented an entire town by plugging in and unplugging their cable in the midst of a captivating HBO program. A final commercial, ‘‘Glee Club,’’ related the tale of a disgruntled neighbor who gave the local barbershop quartet free HBO in the hope of distracting them from practicing at all hours. In order to reach the maximum number of potential viewers, HBO aired the commercials during its own programming, on other cable channels, and, most notably, on network television. All five spots ran during prime-time network shows, including top-rated programs such as the 1997 World Series, Seinfeld, Chicago Hope, and ER. The network commercials were intended to reach both current HBO subscribers and those who had either never subscribed or had allowed their subscription to lapse. HBO hoped that the commercials would remind current subscribers of the quality and value of the channel’s programming, while at the same time reaching millions of other viewers who had not signed up for HBO. ‘‘We wanted to inform nonsubscribers of what they are missing,’’ said Parmet. In 1998 the network continued the campaign with two new spots, including one that debuted during a Monday Night Football game. HBO also reported that the spots would be shown on as many as 20 other cable networks. Like the original spots, the new commercials relied on humor and high production values to assure that they would stand out. One spot, ‘‘Guardian Angel,’’ showed a person hit by a falling piano when his guardian angel was distracted by a television in a store window. The mishap was explained by the campaign’s tagline, ‘‘It’s not T.V. It’s HBO.’’ The second spot starred actor George C. Scott serving as the general of an army of germs fighting for control of a television remote. The campaign’s focus shifted in 1999 from the original brand strategy. Although its emphasis remained on the central theme, ‘‘It’s Not T.V. It’s HBO,’’ the advertising spots became focused on marketing specific HBO programming.

COMPETITION OF THE IT’S NOT T.V. IT’S HBO CAMPAIGN

2011-05-31T09:02:00.000-07:00

In striving to establish a strong brand identity for HBO, the campaign had to differentiate the channel from its competitors. HBO’s most direct competitors were other pay television channels. Although it was by far the most watched pay television station, HBO faced stiff competition from other cable channels. Networks such as Showtime and TNT followed HBO’s lead in offering more original programming. ‘‘There was a time when HBO’s programming was the only thing worth watching on cable, but that’s not the case anymore,’’ a television industry analyst told the New York Times. HBO’s long-term success involved more than simply staying afloat in the premium channel television industry. The channel was also competing against different types of entertainment sources. HBO felt that it could not compare itself only to other TV channels. It had to get people’s attention. In an era in which the average person could choose to watch a sitcom on network television, tune in to CNN on a basic cable package, rent a movie from a local video store, drive to a nearby theater to see the latest Hollywood film, or pay for HBO’s movies and shows, the image ads were intended to equate HBO with entertainment. According to Parmet, ‘‘The ads needed to be cutting edge. We wanted to make the kinds of ads that people would talk about the next day at work.’’

TARGET MARKET OF THE IT’S NOT T.V. IT’S HBO CAMPAIGN

2011-04-30T06:00:00.000-07:00

With its huge base of subscribers, HBO had a diverse viewing audience. For that reason the ‘‘It’s Not T.V. It’s HBO’’ campaign did not target a narrow demographic group. HBO hoped to reach all segments of the American consumer market from ages 18 to 49. The image ads conceived by BBDO were considered an ideal means to reach this broad-based target. Because the spots did not focus on one aspect of HBO’s programming but instead tried to hone the overall image of the channel, the campaign could appeal to all viewers. ‘‘The campaign tries to convey that we are a total entertainment package—that there is something for everyone,’’ said Chris Donlay, HBO’s manager of corporate affairs. ‘‘We were not looking for a market share or Nielsen ratings,’’ said Nancy Parmet, HBO’s vice president of marketing, who oversaw the ‘‘It’s Not T.V. It’s HBO’’ campaign. ‘‘We were looking to break through the clutter.’’ USA Today acknowledged the competitive and multifaceted state of the entertainment industry when it declared that to thrive ‘‘HBO must remain top-of-mind with consumers.’’

HISTORICAL CONTEXT OF THE IT’S NOT T.V. IT’S HBO CAMPAIGN

2011-04-30T05:59:00.000-07:00

In its early days HBO primarily showed Hollywood movies and high-profile sporting events such as boxing. In the mid-1980s, however, HBO began to emphasize original productions, which included critically acclaimed made-for-HBO movies such as And the Band Played On and From the Earth to the Moon, comedy shows such as The Larry Sanders Show, and dramatic series such as Oz.
The shift toward original programming was fueled in part by the arrival of the VCR, which enabled viewers to rent at their convenience the same Hollywood movies broadcast by HBO. By the mid-1990s the network also offered original documentary films, animation specials, children’s and family programming, extensive sporting events and shows, and coverage of contemporary music concerts. At the time of the ‘‘It’s Not T.V. It’s HBO’’ campaign, 30 percent of HBO’s programming was original. By 1997 HBO reached roughly 23 million subscribers, approximately one-fourth of the viewing public. That same year it also won 19 Emmy Awards for its original films and shows, the most ever garnered by a cable television channel.
HBO’s programming was recognized for being innovative and daring. The New York Times lauded the channel’s ‘‘willingness to take a chance on unconventional programming and to allow writers and directors to operate with minimal interference.’’ HBO produced movies dealing with such issues as abortion, AIDS, and racism. As a pay television channel independent of advertisers’ pressures and demands, HBO had the flexibility for controversial and bold programming. ‘‘We’re not selling ads,’’ Jeffrey Bewkes, the company’s CEO, told BusinessWeek. ‘‘We’re not selling our audience to advertisers. We’re selling our programming service to you.’’ HBO’s mandate, and the key to its survival and profitability, was to continue to expand its subscriber base.
Like the cable industry as a whole,HBOwas subject to ‘‘churning,’’ the phenomenon of tremendous fluctuations among subscribers. Each month a huge number of viewers disconnected their HBO service for a variety of reasons. Some signed up for a specific event, such as a high-profile tennis tournament, and then disconnected the next month. Others subscribed to HBO only during the winter months, when they knew they would spend more time indoors, and canceled the service in the spring and summer. Some lost their jobs or suffered other financial hardships, and some disconnected when they moved. Despite the constant drain of viewers, however, an even greater percentage signed up either as first-time or repeat subscribers. There were other factors that made it challenging for HBO to attract and retain subscribers. Potential customers had a wide array of entertainment choices. Network and cable television, premium cable channels like HBO, Showtime, and the Disney Channel, and video rentals, movie theaters, and even chat rooms on the Internet—all vied for the consumer’s entertainment time and dollars. It was in this competitive situation that HBO developed the ‘‘It’s Not T.V. It’s HBO’’ campaign. The goal was not only to distinguish HBO from its competitors but also to reflect the originality of much of HBO’s programming. The commercials, with their quirky humor, compelling plots, and high-tech execution, were intended to encapsulate the strengths of HBO and keep the channel prominent in the consumer’s mind.

OVERVIEW OF THE IT’S NOT T.V. IT’S HBO CAMPAIGN

2011-04-30T05:56:00.000-07:00

Founded in 1972, Home Box Office (HBO) was the oldest and largest premium pay television channel in the United States. Unlike network television and most other cable channels, which raised revenue by selling advertising spots during programming, HBO relied exclusively on subscribers’ monthly fees to generate income. As consumers’ entertainment choices multiplied dramatically over the years, HBO strove to construct a distinctive niche for itself and to stand out amid competitors, which included other television channels, movies, home video rentals, and the Internet. In 1996 HBO launched an innovative $60 million television advertising campaign in an effort to draw attention to itself and to strengthen its brand recognition. The spots, conceived by ad agency BBDO New York, sought to reflect the spirit and the programming of HBO. Instead of previewing upcoming events or providing a traditional ‘‘tune-in’’ message, the ‘‘It’s Not T.V. It’s HBO’’ campaign attempted to present the viewer with a sample of HBO’s programming. The five spots making up the campaign deliberately strove to be humorous, creative, and original.
According to the company, based on surveys prior to and following the launch of the campaign, ‘‘It’s Not T.V.
It’s HBO’’ achieved its goal of increasing the network’s brand image and awareness among consumers. Further, the campaign earned praise from the media and advertising industries. ‘‘Chimps,’’ the first commercial of the campaign, was awarded the first ever commercial Emmy. In 1997 the ‘‘Chimps’’ spot received a Gold Clio Award in the Television/Cinema category. As the campaign continued, its focus shifted, and the slogan evolved into the network’s mantra, setting HBO apart not only from other pay television channels but also from all TV networks. The Cable& Telecommunications Association for Marketing (CTAM) named the campaign its Hall of Fame winner in 2003

OUTCOME OF THE IT HAPPENS AT THE HILTON CAMPAIGN

2011-03-30T09:10:00.001-07:00

The ‘‘Welcome to Hollywood’’ campaign was well received and resulted in numerous honors. Not only did the campaign garner several awards at the 40th annual Clio Awards Festival but the radio portion of the campaign received a gold award at the One Show, and several of the spots were recognized at the national Addy Awards. ‘‘Action’’ was named on Adweek’s ‘‘Best Spots of the Year—1998’’ list, and the campaign took honors at the 46th International Advertising Festival in Cannes, France. Cliff Freeman was selected as the Agency of the Year by both the Clio Awards and SHOOT. Hollywood Entertainment managed to open about one store per day in 1998, and by mid-1999 there were more than 1,300 Hollywood Video stores in 43 states;
Hollywood Video’s market share was about 10 percent. For the quarter ended September 30, 1998, Hollywood reported revenue of $184.1 million, a 48 percent increase from the same period in 1997. Same-store sales enjoyed an increase of 7 percent. For the first quarter of 1999 the company reported revenue of $260 million, up 53 percent from the same period in 1998. Same-store sales jumped by 18 percent, and net income climbed 92 percent. In October 1998 Hollywood purchased
Reel.com, Inc., a leading Web-based video retailer, thus expanding its distribution channels. As the company’s Web site indicated: ‘‘The past success of Hollywood Video is apparent and the future is bright. If the Hollywood Video story were a movie, the final frame of this action packed adventure would not read ‘The End,’ but rather ‘To Be Continued . . . ’ ’’

MARKETING STRATEGYWELCOME TO HOLLYWOOD" CAMPAIGN

2011-03-30T08:54:00.000-07:00

By the time Hollywood Video launched its ‘‘Welcome to Hollywood’’ campaign in mid-1998 the company had a strong first quarter under its belt—it had opened 88 new stores and reported revenue of $170 million, a 54 percent jump from the first quarter of 1997. The company also launched a new store design that emulated the allure of Hollywood to a greater degree—the bright lights and monitors were accompanied by Hollywood memorabilia and photos of movie stars. The campaign’s ads appeared in major U.S. markets and spotlighted Hollywood Video’s new releases, promotions, guarantee policies, and, as Wattles said in the Portland Oregonian, ‘‘that we love movies. . . . We are Hollywood.’’ Arthur Bijur, Cliff Freeman’s executive creative director, explained in SHOOT that the campaign was designed to show consumers that Hollywood Video ‘‘really gets Hollywood and everything about it, . . . to show that it’s more a place which is really all about movies.’’ To accomplish this, Bijur said, the spots focused on things that were uniquely and utterly Hollywood.
‘‘Action’’ was set in the action/adventure section of a Hollywood Video store. An older cowboy dressed in black attempted to teach two male employees how to throw a fake punch as customers looked on in curiosity. The employee practicing to hit ran into some trouble with the maneuver. The cowboy explained, ‘‘That was a good start, but we don’t actually want to hit the person.’’ The puncher tried again but was unsuccessful. On the third punch the second employee slumped to the ground as the cowboy exclaimed, ‘‘That was so close!’’ Another television spot, ‘‘Don,’’ lampooned movie trailers and featured Don LaFontaine, who actually provided voiceovers for many trailers. In the ad a couple approached the counter with a video and asked the employee to tell them a bit about the movie. The employee knocked on a cabinet underneath the counter and LaFontaine, dressed in a suit, emerged. The employee handed him the tape, and LaFontaine read in his instantly recognizable voice:
‘‘From Flesh to Steel. From Blood to Blade. From Man to Mutant. Evil has a new enemy. Justice has a new weapon. And the world . . . has a new hero.’’ LaFontaine then handed the tape back to the employee and crawled back into the cabinet. Cliff Freeman art director Matt Vescovo explained in SHOOT that ‘‘the whole idea is that Hollywood Video is totally Hollywood, and one of the things we associate with Hollywood is this guy’s voice. So what better guy is there to describe a movie to customers than this guy who’s an authority and knows everything about every movie and everybody has heard his voice a million times?’’ Other spots included ‘‘Birds,’’ which parodied Alfred Hitchcock’s movie of the same name, ‘‘Musical,’’ which featured two male employees dancing and singing about the store’s five-day rental policy, and ‘‘Credits,’’ which spoofed the final credits of a movie. The ‘‘Welcome to Hollywood’’ campaign also included several radio spots. All followed the ‘‘Sixty Second Theater’’ theme and provided a humorous glimpse into the plots of such popular movies as Tomorrow Never Dies, As Good As It Gets, Scream 2, and Good Will Hunting. In the ads the announcer began, ‘‘Hollywood Video presents Sixty Second Theater, where we try, unsuccessfully, to pack all the action and drama of a two-hour Hollywood production into 60 seconds.’’ A comical take-off of the plot ensued, complete with actors impersonating the celebrity voices. The Good Will Hunting spot ended with the announcer stating, ‘‘If this doesn’t satisfy your urge to see Good Will Hunting, and we can’t say we blame you, then rent it today at Hollywood Video, where Good Will Hunting is guaranteed to be in stock, or next time it’s free.’’

COMPETITION OF THE "WELCOME TO HOLLYWOOD" CAMPAIGN

2011-03-30T08:47:00.000-07:00

Generating three times as much revenue as the theatre arena, the home video market was extremely lucrative and, as a result, highly competitive. Number-one ranked Blockbuster Inc. (previously Blockbuster Entertainment Corp.), which was three times the size of Hollywood Video, had dominated the field for a decade and at the end of 1997 boasted 4,000 stores in the United States and 6,000 globally. Purchased by entertainment giant Viacom Inc. in 1994, Blockbuster enjoyed a commanding market share of 25 percent at the beginning of 1998. Hollywood, though expanding rapidly, had just fewer than 1,000 stores by Christmas 1997 and a market share of about 5 percent, according to the Portland Oregonian. Blockbuster was not invincible, however, and the company struggled in 1996 and 1997 as a result of financial and marketing blunders. Hollywood Video, meanwhile, enjoyed rapid expansion and healthy profits. Though media reports made much of the competition between Blockbuster and Hollywood, Wattles maintained that he did not view Blockbuster as a rival or an enemy. ‘‘[W]hile Blockbuster is certainly the Goliath, I would not describe us as the David at all. We are not out to slay Goliath,’’ Wattles said in the Wall Street Transcript in 1994. He referred to Blockbuster as ‘‘our friendly competitor’’ and insisted there was room in the market for both superstore chains. Still, the two appeared to be rivals—Hollywood claimed to have the largest number of titles, offered guaranteed availability of popular releases, and had aggressive pricing and rental strategies. Blockbuster, with a new CEO and renewed focus on video rentals, responded in late 1997 by lowering its prices, extending rental periods, providing incentives for returning rentals early, and offering more new releases. Blockbuster also launched a new advertising campaign in early 1998 with the theme, ‘‘Get your movie . . . and go home happy.’’
Blockbuster and Hollywood Video were the clear leaders in the video-rental market, but both companies had to contend with independent retailers as well as national and regional chains such as third-ranked Video Update Inc. and Suncoast Motion Picture Company. The independents, on the other hand, complained that they could not compete with video giants, which were capable of instituting revenue-sharing deals with movie studios that allowed them to purchase videos at much lower costs and thus offer larger numbers of popular titles—the Independent Video Retailers Group stated that independent stores located within three miles of a Blockbuster store suffered from an 11 percent decline in revenues during the first half of 1998.

TARGET MARKET OF THE "WELCOME TO HOLLYWOOD" CAMPAIGN

2011-02-25T02:54:00.000-08:00

More than 80 percent of households in the United States owned VCRs in the late 1990s, and these households were filled with potential Hollywood Video customers. As a result Hollywood’s target audience was quite broad. The company’s advertising agency indicated that Hollywood’s target market consisted of those aged 18 to 45 as well as suburban families with children. Wattles discussed the company’s consumer target in an interview in the Wall Street Transcript in 1994 and said, ‘‘ . . . when the advertising agencies ask what your demographic profile is, I say, ‘Alive.’’’ Nearly everyone, Wattles elaborated, enjoyed watching movies. ‘‘One thing that’s nice about our business is our demographic profile. It’s so simple. Obviously there are demographic profiles of people who watch more movies than others but the curve is very slight. We’re not just a teenage business, or a midlife business, or an X-generation business.’’ To appeal to this wide audience, Hollywood Video stores focused on the one thing all the customers shared—the love of movies. ‘‘Our store design, our marketing, and our advertising reflect the name and image of Hollywood,’’ he explained. ‘‘We try to create an exciting environment that is movie and/or movie star oriented.’’ Though Hollywood Video’s audience was sizeable, many viewers were growing increasingly distracted by new entertainment technologies and options, such as pay-per-view television programming, digital video disks (DVD), the Internet, and expanded offerings from cable television and direct broadcast satellite. Industry analysts labeled the video-rental market mature, with little growth left. According to a study for the Video Software Rental Association, total revenue from the rental market declined 4.2 percent in 1997. Tom Wolzien, an analyst with Sanford C. Bernstein, pointed to a 1996 poll of 1,000 households with satellite television programming that discovered a 70 percent drop in video rentals. Still, many believed an audience for video rentals remained. Roffman Miller Associates’ Marvin Roffman told the Los Angeles Daily News: ‘‘There were a lot of people on Wall Street that were giving the death knell to the industry . . . [b]ut it’s probably not going to die for a long time. Home video is still a very viable business.’’ Hollywood Video believed this as well, and to continue to attract customers the company implemented many customeroriented policies, such as lower rental prices, guaranteed availability of popular rentals, and five-day rentals on every video in the store. According to the Portland Oregonian, Wattles was not intimidated by new technologies or forecasts of doom; Hollywood Video would, Wattles stated, change with the times and with clientele tastes. ‘‘As long as interest in movies continues, . . . there will be opportunities,’’ Wattles vowed.

HISTORICAL CONTEXT OF THE "WELCOME TO HOLLYWOOD" CAMPAIGN

2011-02-25T02:53:00.000-08:00

Hollywood Video first opened its doors in 1988 with one store in Portland, Oregon, run by owner Wattles and his wife. From the outset Hollywood Video stores were large, brightly lit with an abundance of neon, and had 50 to 70 television monitors blasting the latest video offers. Employees dressed in red bow ties and cummerbunds. Every detail was designed to mimic the excitement and bright lights of Hollywood. And like Hollywood and the movie industry, Hollywood Video moved quickly and aggressively—only five years after its formation and with a total of 16 stores, the company went public. With the acquisition of Texas video-rental chain Video Central in 1994, the number of Hollywood Video stores rose to 100, and by 1995 the company was the third largest video-rental chain in the United States. By 1996 Hollywood had assumed the numbertwo position, and the company reported net income in 1996 of $20.63 million, a surge of 75 percent over net income in 1995, which was $11.79 million. The company had more than 500 stores in 29 states by October of 1996. Wattles told the Portland Oregonian, ‘‘In the third quarter [of 1996], we averaged better than a new store opening every 36 hours . . . and in the fourth quarter we plan on averaging over a new store every 24 hours.’’ In 1997 the company opened 356 new stores, and net income continued to rise—in the second quarter of 1997, Hollywood enjoyed an 83 percent increase in profits.

OVERVIEW OF THE "WELCOME TO HOLLYWOOD" CAMPAIGN

2011-02-25T02:45:00.000-08:00

Hollywood Entertainment Corporation hurtled into 1998 at a screaming expansion pace for its chain of Hollywood Video retail stores—the company planned to open more than 353 new stores in 1998 to bring the total number up to 1,260 by year’s end. The decade-old chain of superstores had quickly become the second largest video-rental chain in the nation, and chairman, founder, and CEO Mark J. Wattles believed that Hollywood Video had ample opportunity for growth. ‘‘[In 1993] we were a 15 store chain and embarked on a very aggressive store opening schedule.’’Wattles announced in a prepared statement. ‘‘Last week [April 13, 1998] we opened our 1,000th video superstore and we plan on opening our 2,000th within the next three years. With over 20,000 employees, and a very strong management team, we are not only focused on growth, but the continued improvement of our operations, as well.’’
To position Hollywood Video as the superlative entertainment store, Hollywood Entertainment launched its first major branding campaign in May 1998. Developed by
New York-based Cliff Freeman and Partners, an agency known for its creative, cutting-edge work, the ‘‘Welcome to Hollywood’’ campaign consisted of nine television spots and eight radio ads. The radio ads followed the theme ‘‘Sixty Second Theater’’ and provided humorous synopses of popular movie plots. The television ads were set in Hollywood Video stores and featured store employees in amusing behind-the-scenes situations. Wattles discussed the purpose of the campaign—estimated to have cost anywhere from $11 million to $20 million—at the company shareholders’ meeting in May 1998. ‘‘We want to be a brand so powerful that when you think of movies you think of Hollywood [Video],’’ he said. President and COO Jeff Yapp agreed. ‘‘We want our customers to think of Hollywood Video as their inside connection to Hollywood and the world of entertainment,’’ Yapp said in a prepared statement. ‘‘As our mission statement says, ‘We are Hollywood. We are entertainment.’ ’’

OUTCOME OF THE IT HAPPENS AT THE HILTON CAMPAIGN

2011-01-27T16:53:00.000-08:00

Hilton was delighted with the results of ‘‘It Happens at the Hilton.’’ Consumer surveys indicated that the campaign had performed well above expectations in reaching its target audience. Moreover, research revealed that Hilton had successfully negotiated the risks of incorporating famous personalities, according to Hilton’s vice president of marketing. Despite the company’s concerns, the campaign had remained rooted to the product it touted. Consumers understood that the celebrity photos were used to underscore the unique qualities of the hotel—that things ‘‘happened there’’—and did not feel put off by them. Hilton continued the campaign into 1999.
The company was so impressed with the effectiveness of ‘‘It Happens at the Hilton’’ that it extended the campaign for internal use. Just as ‘‘It Happens at the Hilton’’ signaled to consumers a new identity for the venerable old hotel, the company inaugurated ‘‘Hilton Pride Makes It Happen’’ to bring this same message to its staff. These posters strove to remind employees that the ‘‘new’’ Hilton was their creation and responsibility and that they should take pride in the hotels where they worked.

MARKETING STRATEGY OF THE IT HAPPENS AT THE HILTON CAMPAIGN

2011-01-27T16:50:00.000-08:00

Hilton’s challenge was to distinguish its brand from the numerous competing upscale hotel chains. It’s first objective was, therefore, to make ‘‘It Happens at the Hilton’’ stand out from other hotel advertising. ‘‘There is a lot of hotel advertising out there, but if you take the logo off, they are almost interchangeable,’’ a Bozell executive told Advertising Age on October 5, 1998. Using celebrities to represent the brand was essential to this agenda. But this approach was not without its danger. While ‘‘celebritydriven ad campaigns [were] immediate attention-getters’’ that could break ‘‘through the clutter,’’ of other advertising, the Chicago Tribune noted, Hilton’s effort ran the risk of having consumers confuse its brand with those of other companies the celebrities had endorsed in the past. Alternately, consumers might assume that Hilton was too exclusive, if the likes of Naomi Campbell lodged there. ‘‘We had been concerned that the creative concept featuring personalities might not be relevant to everyday guests,’’ Dirks said to Advertising Age International. To alleviate this risk, Hilton and Bozell conducted extensive pre-launch testing in key Hilton markets, such as Los Angeles, New York, and London, to ensure that ‘‘It Happens at the Hilton’’ was accessible to its target audience.
Having cleared this hurdle, Hilton’s next task was to bring the message of the campaign—that guests should expect a memorable experience when staying at the Hilton—to its chosen audience of elite business and leisure travelers. Print was the predominant medium used because of its ability to hone in on select niches. For instance, since frequent business travelers were a key market, Hilton erected poster versions of the spots at international airports and ran them in in-flight magazines such as American Way and Delta Sky. To address business people even when they were not on the road, Hilton also advertised in publications including the Financial Times, Business Week, Time, Newsweek, U.S. News & World Report, as well as major market newspapers, such as the Wall Street Journal, USA Today, and the New York Times. Moreover, Hilton utilized travel magazines so that it could connect with consumers planning leisure travel. Hilton placed ads in Travel & Leisure and Conde Nast Traveler as well as in family-focused magazines such as Family Fun and Travel & Leisure Family. Finally, Hilton pitched ‘‘It Happens at the Hilton’’ to meeting planners at large corporations by printing the pieces in meeting planner magazines. There was also a small portion of the campaign devoted to television. For the most part, Hilton would trade rooms for airtime on programs such as Entertainment Weekly and broadcasts of the Oscars and Grammys. These short 15-second spots employed the ‘‘It Happens at the Hilton’’ tag line.
The campaign was global in its scope, running on four continents. The first two print pieces broke not only in the United States and Canada, but also in Australia, the United Kingdom, Germany, and various Asian nations. Publications in each country were used, such as the Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung in Germany. The international focus was imperative if Hilton was to reach the growing market of American business people who traveled frequently, as well as international business travelers around the world. According to a company press release, Hilton wanted the campaign to be seen by more than three-quarters of international business travelers.

COMPETITION OF THE IT HAPPENS AT THE HILTON CAMPAIGN

2010-12-30T18:19:00.000-08:00

Hilton’s quest to forge a unified brand image occurred while many of its rival upscale hotel chains were striving to do the same. According to the Wall Street Journal, hotel occupancy rates in 1998 had reached a four year low because of overbuilding. At the same time, the industry was in the midst of a significant consolidation. Chains such as Marriott and Renaissance merged with each other to help bolster their presence on a national and global scale. The result of these agglomerations was a degree of industry-wide uniformity, as local or regional properties with their distinct characteristics, selling points, or histories, were folded into often generic multinational conglomerates. ‘‘If you ever stay in a three- or four-star hotel, they are increasingly offering more or less the same product and levels of comfort,’’ Greg Delaney, one of the creative forces behind ‘‘It Happens at the Hilton,’’ told Marketing Week. While hotels had once used such features as excellent service or a four-star dining room to differentiate themselves, by the mid-1990s, ‘‘these [were] standard in each sector,’’ noted Marketing Week. ‘‘The only way that hoteliers [could now] stand out [was] through brand building.’’
One of Hilton’s most formidable rivals was the Hyatt Hotels Corporation, which embarked on an updated global branding campaign in 1999. Created by agency Cramer Krasselt, these print ads targeted individual business and leisure travelers, meeting planners, travel agents, and corporate travel planners. While the campaign built upon Hyatt’s slogan from a pre-existing campaign, ‘‘Feel the Hyatt Touch,’’ it avoided the conventional formula of using service and traveler bonus programs as its focal point. Like Hilton, Hyatt acknowledged that ‘‘in the minds of our target audience, the difference between major hotel chains is becoming less and less apparent,’’ a Hyatt spokesperson told Advertising Age on October 19, 1998.
Another large hotelier, Holiday Inn Worldwide, had launched its first branding campaign in 1997 to support its Crowne Plaza chain of high-end hotels. This campaign, ‘‘Get to Know Us, We’ll Get to Know You,’’ used famous ‘‘business personalities . . . to give the somewhat stony corporation a relatable face,’’ explained the January 27, 1997, Brandweek. With agency Scaros & Casselman, Crowne selected celebrities who reflected the interests of its targeted guests to appear in its ads. For instance, Crowne used Armour Golf CEO Michael Magerman in a television spot that humorously showed hotel staffers so accustomed to Magerman’s indoor golfing that they gracefully avoid golf balls flying across lobby floors as a matter of course. ‘‘A lot of upscale hotel users’ principal hobby is golf,’’ Crowne’s marketing vice president told Brandweek. ‘‘Michael Magerman is an up-and-coming CEO, and, at 34, a prototypical Crowne Plaza user.’’ Other spots depicted various comparable business leaders.
Some of Hilton’s other competitors began to institute similar marketing programs as well. Marriott International, which had acquired Renaissance in 1997, consolidated its massive ad account in 1998 in order to better broadcast its message. Promus Hotels Corporation’s Doubletree and Wyndham Hotels and Resorts, on the other hand, continued to stress the traditional attributes of pleasant rooms and attentive service, according to the June 28, 1999, issue of Advertising Age.

TARGET MARKET OF THE IT HAPPENS AT THE HILTON CAMPAIGN

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According to Advertising Age International, ‘‘It Happens at the Hilton’’ strove to appeal to people between the ages of 35 and 50 who were ‘‘active achievers among business and leisure groups.’’ It would certainly be a challenge to attract an audience this broad within the confines of a single campaign. To do so, HHC opted to use a diverse array of photographs in the ‘‘It Happens at the Hilton’’ ads in the hope that this multifaceted approach would connect with consumers on various levels. For example, HHC chose to use images of celebrities from different generations at Hilton hotels both to grab people’s attention with the famous faces and to reinforce the notion that Hilton had a long and storied history. The use of political icons such as Nelson Mandela and Winston Churchill was intended to lend the campaign a particular gravitas, which was calculated to appeal to the elite business travelers Hilton wanted to reach. At the same time, the images of iconoclast John Lennon and supermodel Naomi Campbell ensured that the campaign would appear neither stuffy nor dated. In fact, the incorporation of celebrities such as these into the branding campaign let Hilton speak to a more statusconscious and upscale group of travelers. ‘‘The implied message to Hilton customers is, ‘If it happens for these people at Hilton, it can happen for me too,’ ’’ Dirks explained. In a period when affluent business and recreational travelers had a slew of hotel options, ‘‘It Happens at the Hilton’’ provided the hotel chain a certain cachet that played well to its more status-oriented guests. But Hilton was careful not to pursue this more upscale and business-oriented identity at the expense of other travelers. ‘‘We wanted consumers to know the hotel is accessible, not just for the rich and famous,’’ Ken Sakoda, a Bozell vice president, said in the October 5, 1998, issue of Advertising Age. The company therefore presented a variety of scenes of everyday people enjoying the Hilton’s amenities in order to balance the celebrity shots. Bozell also injected humor into these projects, and stressed the pleasure and convenience Hilton could bring to any vacation. In an ad for Hilton’s line of resorts, a couple is shown sprawled in lounge chairs on the beach. ‘‘Tailored vacations call for a fitting,’’ the tag line declared. By presenting reallife scenarios—such as weddings or stressed-out families in dire need of respite—Hilton made it possible for a whole other sector of consumers to relate to the scenes.

HISTORICAL CONTEXT OF THE IT HAPPENS AT THE HILTON CAMPAIGN

2010-12-30T18:15:00.000-08:00

The Hilton chain had come a long way from its beginning in 1925 when Conrad Hilton built the first hotel to carry his name in Dallas, Texas. By 1998 more than 400 Hilton hotels—ranging from resorts and casinos to airport business hotels—were operating in 50 countries. The company’s 1964 decision to spin off its global properties into a separate entity, however, impeded Hilton from developing a consistent worldwide image. After Hilton’s international wing was acquired by Trans World Airlines, HHC and HIC agreed not to develop their franchises in the other’s zones. Nevertheless, the erstwhile siblings bickered over trademarks. In the early 1990s HHC had struggled to forge an identity. Pernicious price wars among upper-class hotels led HHC, and its ad agency McCann-Erickson, to craft ads focused more on price and perks than on the chain’s own attributes. The result was a frequently chaotic marketing strategy that relied heavily on special promotions, often to the detriment of HHC’s bottom line. In an effort to rectify this situation, HHC severed its relationship with McCann in 1992 and hired Daley & Associates to develop a new ad campaign. The resulting ‘‘Take Me to the Hilton’’ effort helped the company overcome some of its difficulties, but HHC was still hampered by its inability to expand in overseas markets. The burgeoning travel market, both domestically and internationally, had generated a wave of consolidations in the industry, as hotel chains teamed up in order to offer broader options to consumers. As an industry insider explained in the January 16, 1995, issue of Brandweek, ‘‘just to be a domestic brand does not insure long-term visibility.’’ HIC faced similar limitations by virtue of its exclusion from the sizeable U.S. market. Recognizing the importance of presenting a more unified front to its rivals, HHC and HIC linked their advertising, sales, loyalty programs, and development strategies, and then sought to leverage this new alliance into enhanced business opportunities.

OVERVIEW OF THE IT HAPPENS AT THE HILTON CAMPAIGN

2010-11-30T08:01:00.000-08:00

Ownership of the Hilton Hotel brand had been split apart in 1964. As a result, the hotel chain was controlled by two distinct groups—Hilton Hotel Corporation (HHC), which held the rights to the brand in the United States, and Hilton International Company (HIC, a division of the Ladbroke Group PLC), which owned the brand abroad. Since their breakup, HHC and HIC had maintained separate marketing and public relations efforts. In 1997, however, facing intense competition in both domestic and international markets, the two companies formed the Hilton Alliance, which was committed to creating a single global image for the hotel chain. After changing the Hilton logo, the companies selected advertising agency Bozell Worldwide to produce a branding campaign that would differentiate Hilton from its competitors. The company wanted a unique message to position itself advantageously among the other massive global hotel chains competing for the patronage of business and leisure consumers. The result was the ‘‘It Happens at the Hilton’’ campaign, which debuted on October 5, 1998, and used photographs of celebrities and everyday travelers to ‘‘convey the strength of the Hilton name and its association with quality, achievement, innovation, and timeless style,’’ said Robert Dirks, the senior vice president of marketing for HHC.
Hilton allocated a budget of approximately $10 million for the first three months of the campaign, which was comprised mainly of print ads. ‘‘It Happens at the Hilton’’ sought to epitomize the Hilton experience for its audience. Unlike traditional advertising for major hotel chains, which typically focused on the nuts and bolts of the visiting experience—mainly rooms or services—
Hilton’s campaign used striking photos of past and present celebrities at various Hilton hotels. One spot featured ex-Beatle John Lennon and his wife Yoko Ono during their ‘‘Bed-in for Peace’’ at the Amsterdam Hilton. Political figures Winston Churchill and Nelson Mandela, as well as celebrities Larry King and Naomi Campbell, also appeared in ads bearing the ‘‘It Happens at the Hilton’’ tag line. To ensure that consumers were not alienated by a celebrity-laden campaign, however, Hilton also ran a substantial number of ads that portrayed average Hilton guests, ranging from CEOs and other business people to families on vacation. One print piece, for instance, depicted a family at a Hilton pool. ‘‘Relaxation now available in a convenient family size,’’ the copy chirped. The company’s goal was straightforward. ‘‘We want to show that so many things happen at the Hilton, from weddings to romance, and that Hilton is part of the community,’’ Dirks told Advertising Age International. Hilton declared itself pleased with the campaign’s result.

OUTCOME OF THE YOU + HP CAMPAIGN

2010-11-30T07:59:00.000-08:00

‘‘You + HP’’ was widely acknowledged as a key contributor to the ongoing transformation of the company’s image from, as Advertising Age put it, ‘‘well-regarded though stodgy into a brand akin to sexier rivals such as Sony Corp.’’ For the print insert that launched the campaign, which ‘‘cut through in a medium that HP’s rivals have dominated for decades,’’ Goodby was awarded Adweek ’s Media Plan of the Year for Best Use of Magazines. Goodby’s market research indicated that the inserts raised consumers’ likelihood to buy HP digitalimaging products by 8 percent. The 2004 television spots generated, according to Goodby and HP, more consumer feedback than either had ever gotten from an ad, and Adweek named ‘‘You + HP’’ its Campaign of the Year for 2004. TV Guide ’s praise went beyond the realm of advertising, claiming that the spot ‘‘Picture Book’’ was the best 60 seconds of television then on the air. In 2004 HP extended the ‘‘You + HP’’ concept to digital music, partnering with Apple to sell HP-branded iPods and offering iTunes software on its PCs. The iPod, an MP3 player that allowed consumers to mix and match music to suit their personalities, offered HP a further vehicle for connecting the personal-expression ethos to its brand image. A business-to-business campaign called ‘‘Change + HP’’ was likewise launched in 2004, using the company’s new cutting-edge image to appeal to information-technology decision makers in the rapidly evolving tech marketplace. ‘‘You + HP,’’ along with the umbrella ‘‘+ HP’’ idea and HP’s image, continued to evolve through 2005. Whether HP’s change in direction was a welcome one remained an open question, however, at least to the company’s board of directors. Fiorina was ousted as chief executive officer in February 2005.

MARKETING STRATEGY OF THE YOU + HP CAMPAIGN

2010-11-30T07:52:00.000-08:00

‘‘You + HP’’ was launched with a 20-page print insert in the October 2, 2003, edition of USA Today. The idea of spending $10 million on such an insert, designed to run in about a dozen publications, went against the grain of traditional print advertising for photography brands, which tended to focus on maximum coverage and frequency. Because the campaign was ‘‘more lifestyleoriented than anything else,’’ as Berg told Adweek, the company ‘‘had to find a way to stand out in unique environments’’ rather than take a blanket approach to print placement. Goodby’s creative team decided that the magazines in which the insert would appear after its launch should be ones whose editorial focus celebrated the power of photography; the team thus chose such titles as Vogue, the New Yorker, People, Entertainment Weekly, InStyle, ESPN: The Magazine, GQ, Travel + Leisure, and Conde´ Nast Traveler. The inserts put the consumer at the center of HP’s message, featuring the word ‘‘You’’ in a prominent position on nearly every page, employing vibrant photo collages and statements such as ‘‘You are a point-and-shoot revolutionary with an itchy shutter finger’’ and ‘‘You are the Van Gogh of pic files.’’ The ads featured the full range of HP digital-imaging products, pointing out the brand’s coverage of the entire picture-making process but forgoing the usual listings of technical specifications.
The campaign’s initial television spots, directed by Vogel and shot in Barcelona, further underscored the revolutionary nature of digital-photography technology. In both ‘‘You’’ and ‘‘Statue,’’ people in social settings and on city streets were frozen in still frames suggesting photographs, while the scenes’ action moved on briskly and a continuous stream of individual moments were framed before dissolving back into motion. The fluidity of the movement from human interaction to still frame, along with the profusion of photographic possibilities suggested, communicated the limitless options available to the digital-camera owner while dramatizing the integration of artistic expression and ordinary life. The arresting visual effects worked with the Cure’s moody 1989 hit song ‘‘Pictures of You’’ to create, as Adweek put it, ‘‘an emotional paean to digital photography.’’ In 2004 Goodby’s creative team planned a second series of television spots to be paired with the upbeat Kinks song ‘‘Picture Book.’’ This time the challenge was to go beyond illustrating picture-taking possibilities and find a visual method for dramatizing the ease of printing photos. In a test spot filmed as his bid to direct the new series, Vogel shot himself at his desk putting empty white frames around his head while coolly singing along to the Kinks song playing in the background. Vogel then tweaked the footage until it appeared that he was effortlessly creating a series of casual self-portraits from thin air. Not only did this test ad get him the job, but it was reshot with little alteration as the 30-second spot ‘‘Franc¸ois.’’ In the spot ‘‘Picture Book’’ the principle of picking photographs out of thin air was applied to crowds of people. At the start of the commercial, two rows of people held frames to their faces, after which the frames became pictures, and then the people traded these self-portraits with one another. In ‘‘Relay’’ the photographic frame was passed like a baton between groups and individuals. Photos transformed into dynamic real-life scenes and vice versa as the frame made its way through a hypnotic flux of distinctive people and moments.

COMPETITION OF THE YOU + HP CAMPAIGN

2010-10-31T01:47:00.000-07:00

Given its sprawling portfolio HP competed with a wide range of companies, but its ‘‘You + HP’’ campaign, while leveraging and further establishing its overall brand identity, directly pitted the company against other digitalcamera manufacturers. At the time of the campaign it was number six among digital-camera vendors in the United States, well behind segment leaders Eastman Kodak Company and Sony Corporation. Kodak’s success, according to Advertising Age, was chiefly attributable to its ‘‘century-long simple stance that Kodak equals pictures.’’ Though hampered somewhat by losses in the rapidly diminishing film-photography side of its business, Kodak could claim, like HP, to offer simple solutions to the entire picture-making process, especially as PCs became unnecessary for printing. Kodak had the industry-leading photo printer as well as the industry-leading online printing and storage site (called the Kodak EasyShare Gallery), and it had kiosks at major retail stores, such as Wal-Mart and CVS, that allowed consumers yet another outlet for printing pictures. Kodak’s digital-imaging ads therefore focused on ease of use while reinforcing the company’s history of photographic excellence.
Sony likewise made appeals to consumers based on its legacy, but that legacy was one of ‘‘quality technology and cutting-edge design,’’ according to Advertising Age, rather than one of film photography. This image merged neatly with the company’s digital-imaging marketing efforts, which drew attention to the convenient size and sleekness of Sony cameras. In 2005 Sony reinforced its image by unveiling the tagline ‘‘WorryFree Digital Products,’’ orchestrating a marketing push with partner retailers to head off the concerns of first-time digitalcamera buyers and assure them that its products were simple and easy to use.

HISTORICAL CONTEXT OF THE YOU + HP CAMPAIGN

2010-10-31T01:43:00.000-07:00

HP had a storied history of innovation and was a Fortune 100 company when Carly Fiorina took over as chief executive officer in 1999. Though the company was well known for its quality products and particularly for its printers, ‘‘it had become clear,’’ according to Advertising Age, ‘‘that HP had to do something to change its consumer image.’’ HP’s takeover of its rival Compaq in 2002—at a time when PC sales (the heart of Compaq’s business) were abysmal—raised further questions about the company’s direction in the precarious postbubble marketplace. Fiorina and Allison Johnson, HP’s senior vice president for global brand and communications, asked agency Goodby, Silverstein & Partners to answer these questions by showcasing the merger itself and then by focusing on other high-profile but previously unpublicized HP partnerships in a large-scale rebranding push that broke in the fall of 2002.
Ads touting the merger used an ‘‘HP + Compaq’’ graphic to show the strength of the partnership, and the ‘‘+’’ sign was then used as a unifying visual symbol in the larger branding campaign, which extolled HP’s contributions to an impressive array of corporate and institutional partners. The campaign was launched with ‘‘Anthem,’’ a television spot that, as Creativity magazine noted, ‘‘linked HP technology to bigger and cooler things—Dreamworks’ imagemaking, FedEx’s efficiency, BMW’s Formula 1 need for speed.’’ Other memorable ads were ‘‘Restore,’’ which brought figures from a Dutch master painting to life in order to illustrate the role HP played in restoring art for London’s National Gallery, and ‘‘The Next Shift,’’ which featured iconic toys—Slinky, Elmo, Spiderman, and others—commuting to work in Manhattan as a way of illustrating HP’s involvement in keeping Toys ‘‘R’’ Us stores stocked and ready for business. Creativity selected Goodby’s HP branding work as its campaign of the year for 2003, arguing that the spots had worked together to ‘‘render formerly square HP a magnetic new personality.’’
Meanwhile the rapid rise in popularity of digital cameras presented one of the few bright spots in the dismal technology sectors of the struggling American economy. As the 2003 holiday season approached, digital cameras were poised to overtake traditional cameras in yearly sales for the first time. Though HP was not known for its cameras, its wide portfolio of products meant that it was positioned to offer consumers an integrated system for home digital photography.

OVERVIEW OF THE YOU + HP CAMPAIGN

2010-10-31T00:58:00.000-07:00

Long known as a reliable but predictable maker of computer printers, Hewlett-Packard Company (HP) was, in 2003, engaged in a recasting of its moribund image, a project initiated by HP’s chief executive officer, Carly Fiorina, after a divisive 2002 merger with computer company Compaq. That year HP unveiled its most ambitious consumer advertising campaign ever. The new campaign, called ‘‘You + HP,’’ featured HP’s digital cameras and imaging products, a segment of the Fortune 100 company’s operations that was seen as a major growth opportunity.
‘‘You + HP’’ supplemented an ongoing enterprise campaign that had introduced the ‘‘+’’ graphic as a means of showcasing HP’s partnerships with other companies and institutions and that further positioned the old-line company as a forward-looking, glamorous company in tune with twenty-first-century lifestyles. Developed by HP’s main U.S. advertising agency, Goodby, Silverstein & Partners of San Francisco, the campaign broke in October 2003 with the risky use of 20-page print inserts, first in USA Today and later in trendsetting magazines, and went on to feature some of the most talked-about television spots of the time. Directed by Franc¸ois Vogel, the television spots dramatized the digital-photography revolution with visuals integrating still frames and live action, while catchy pop music by the Cure (in the campaign’s first year) and the Kinks (in the second year) played as the spots’ sound track.
The print and television portions of ‘‘You + HP’’ were well received by industry commentators as well as the general public, and the campaign was credited with effectively updating HP’s image for a new generation of consumers. The campaign continued to evolve, and the company’s broader marketing efforts kept the ‘‘+ HP’’ idea as their starting point. HP’s change in direction, however, was not welcomed by all; the company’s board of directors ousted Fiorina in 2005.

OUTCOME OF THE EXPANDING POSSIBILITIES CAMPAIGN

2010-09-29T03:43:00.000-07:00

Independent research showed that the ads were successful in changing the perceptions of consumers. According to Goodby, Silverstein & Partners, studies showed that the ads had helped Hewlett-Packard come to be perceived as a company that ‘‘empowers people to ‘make exciting things happen.’ ’’ People’s awareness that Hewlett-Packard made more than just printers also increased. In March 1998 the Business Journal of San Jose reported that Hewlett-Packard led the market as the top seller of workstations running off Microsoft Windows. It sold nearly 155,000 Windows-based workstations, or 42 percent of the market, in 1997. The journal attributed part of Hewlett-Packard’s success to the ‘‘Expanding Possibilities’’ campaign.
The original three ‘‘Expanding Possibilities’’ spots won two Icon Awards, and ‘‘Buck’’ won a silver Clio.

MARKETING STRATEGY OF THE EXPANDING POSSIBILITIES CAMPAIGN

2010-09-29T03:41:00.000-07:00

To demonstrate the excitement of its new campaign, Hewlett-Packard hosted a gala announcement event in San Francisco on November 11, 1997. At the kickoff event Hewlett-Packard chairman Platt described the company’s image as ‘‘a lab coat that was empty.’’ The company had excelled at engineering prowess but never at savvy self-promotion. The new campaign aimed to add to the company’s strengths a new spirit of excitement, creativity, and innovation. Along with the new advertising, Hewlett-Packard introduced new product packaging, in-store merchandising, and vending machines for its ink-jet printer supplies.
The introduction of the ‘‘Expanding Possibilities’’ campaign meant dropping Goodby, Silverstein & Partners’ award-winning campaign that used the tag line ‘‘Built by engineers. Used by normal people.’’ One reason for the switch was to dispel the notion that the company was dominated by engineers. ‘‘The consumer brand strategy and advertising campaign aim to make the HP brand more relevant to consumers by revealing the company’s dynamic side and dispelling the idea that HP is only a printer company,’’ said the firm’s Antonio Perez. ‘‘People used to say HP was a great stealth marketer,’’ said Jill Kramer, the company’s marketing communications manager, in Adweek. ‘‘There’s been growing recognition with HP that our brand is truly an asset and that is something we should be investing in. We are becoming more visible and more aggressive.’’ Part of the reason for a move toward consumers was the rapid pace of change. With technology and products evolving so quickly, consumers were easily confused and often felt behind the times. Executives at Hewlett-Packard felt that a finely honed brand identity might attract consumers looking for a guide through the digital and technology jungle. In addition, the company recognized that the market for traditional business products was expanding to include in-home and consumer use. Lower-cost, higher-quality printers, scanners, and all-inone machines made the products attractive outside the typical corporate or business setting. The campaign also called attention to Hewlett-Packard’s Internet products, something it had been producing for years but had never promoted to the public.
Hewlett-Packard sometimes referred to the new campaign as ‘‘the real life campaign’’ because the strategy was to shine the spotlight on people not usually associated with technology. Grandparents and children were highlighted, and they shared their stories in their own words. The intent was not just to show what people could do with Hewlett-Packard products but also to demonstrate what the products could help people achieve. Hewlett-Packard products were presented as engines for consumers’ creative thinking. Although Hewlett-Packard wanted to change its image with the ‘‘Expanding Possibilities’’ campaign, there were certain elements in its marketing effort and image that were retained. The company logo and the display of the Hewlett-Packard name with the logo remained the same. The company also maintained continuity with its advertising agencies. Goodby, Silverstein & Partners continued handling the ads for Hewlett-Packard printers and scanners and for the company’s other computer equipment. Saatchi & Saatchi Advertising continued the advertising for the company’s Pavilion line of personal computers, and Winkler Advertising continued to create the company’s ads for laser printer supplies.

COMPETITION OF THE EXPANDING POSSIBILITIES CAMPAIGN

2010-08-31T20:34:00.000-07:00

In 1997 and 1998 the consumer demand for sub-$1,000 computers continued to erode profit margins throughout the industry. Many major computer manufacturers responded by going after small and medium-sized businesses and by launching large-scale e-business ventures. The top marketers supported these moves with glossy multi-million-dollar brand advertising campaigns. IBM made the first and most dramatic move in this direction with a $130 million e-business initiative that targeted businesses using the Internet.
Among Hewlett-Packard’s other competitors were Compaq, Dell, and Apple. Compaq spent some $102 million on advertising in 1997 and planned to double the amount in 1998, when it launched its first global brand campaign. Dell spent $43 million on ads in 1997 and planned to double the amount in 1998 to brand itself as the originator and leader in selling directly to the consumer and in providing technical support services to its customers. Apple spent $47 million on its ‘‘Think Different’’ campaign, which aimed to link the company’s computers with Einstein, Picasso, and other creative people.

TARGET MARKET OF THE EXPANDING POSSIBILITIES CAMPAIGN

2010-08-31T20:33:00.000-07:00

The primary target of the initial ‘‘Expanding Possibilities’’ ads was families with children, but the company also wanted to become better known among small businesses, microbusinesses, and the owners of home businesses. Both business owners and workers were targeted. In Canada, Hewlett-Packard made a direct appeal to entrepreneurs and the self-employed. According to Statistics Canada, the latter group numbered 1.8 million, up 28 percent from 1991 to 1998.

HISTORICAL CONTEXT OF THE EXPANDING POSSIBILITIES CAMPAIGN

2010-08-31T20:32:00.000-07:00

Two Stanford University engineers, William Hewlett and David Packard, founded the company with $538 in a Palo Alto garage in 1939. Their first major customer, Walt Disney, bought oscillators to help make his film Fantasia. In the 1970s and 1980s Hewlett-Packard became known as an entrepreneurial high-tech company, and it has been credited with establishing Silicon Valley. For years it made the lists of America’s best-managed companies. By the late 1980s, however, the company seemed entrapped in a bureaucratic jungle, with burdensome decision making by consensus and other organizational problems. In 1990 Hewlett-Packard was reorganized, and cost-cutting measures included voluntary severance and early-retirement programs. The company’s single sales force was divided by product lines, and administrative and manufacturing areas were consolidated.
During its history Hewlett-Packard had always been much better known in the business community than among general consumers. It was the world’s second largest computer supplier and a leading provider of electronic products and systems for computing, measurement, and communications. But it did not use advertising to appeal directly to consumers. Lewis Platt, then the chairman, president, and CEO of Hewlett-Packard, said that 18 months of focus group testing showed that the public felt the company to be trustworthy and reliable but did not view it as innovative. Hewlett-Packard’s reputation stemmed from its engineeringdominated culture, and while people judged its products to be of high quality, they perceived the company as being technical and impersonal.
In addition, the company’s decentralized structure contributed to its fragmented marketing efforts and prevented it from taking full advantage of consumer interactions. For example, the owners of Hewlett-Packard’s 75 million ink-jet printers bought from two to five new cartridges a year, but the company did not have a plan to take advantage of these customer contacts. Hewlett-Packard’s vision of the future included a blending of consumer electronics, including PCs and communications and entertainment products, with new product categories emerging. The company’s goal was to prepare to become the largest consumer electronics supplier by the early 2000s. This would mean becoming much better known among consumers. As the technology battleground moved into the home, however, Hewlett-Packard had to prepare to compete with electronics and entertainment companies such as Sony and General Electric that already had a much higher profile with consumers and that were viewed in more positive terms.

OVERVIEW OF THE EXPANDING POSSIBILITIES CAMPAIGN

2010-07-31T08:50:00.000-07:00

Although it was widely known and respected in the business world for its solid engineering and reliable products, Hewlett-Packard, a huge company with 121,900 employees and revenues of $42.9 billion in 1997, found itself relatively unknown to the general public. Beginning in the late 1990s, Hewlett-Packard sought to expand its presence in the consumer market. To do so, the company initiated a $75 million consumer brand strategy that included an advertising campaign called ‘‘Expanding Possibilities.’’ It was the first time in Hewlett-Packard’s 60-year history that it had tried to shed its reputation as an engineering and business firm for a more consumeroriented image. In 1997 the consumer business accounted for only a quarter of Hewlett-Packard’s revenue, but the company saw this segment as being the place where growth would come most rapidly. As the general public became more focused on technology, Hewlett-Packard wanted to have a more prominent place in the consumer’s mind.
The ‘‘Expanding Possibilities’’ campaign first appeared in the United States on November 11, 1997, in the form of three television spots that featured color printing applications people could employ in everyday situations. The ads ran through January 1998. They were aired in prime time on CBS, ABC, NBC, CNN, A&E, and the Discovery Channel. In Canada the spots ran on the Hockey Night, Bravo!, Showcase, Discover, and Life Network channels. Goodby, Silverstein & Partners of San Francisco created the spots. The original ‘‘Expanding Possibilities’’ campaign was budgeted at $15 million for the United States and at $40 million globally.
The ‘‘Mason’’ spot showed a couple capturing their newborn baby’s wrinkled image on a Hewlett-Packard digital camera. The father downloaded the image onto a Hewlett-Packard computer, created a birth announcement, and E-mailed it to relatives. ‘‘Herta’’ featured a grandmother who took family photographs off the wall, scanned them into her Hewlett-Packard PC, and made a family history book for her children and grandchildren. ‘‘Buck’’ centered on a former Negro Leagues baseball player, Buck O’Neil, and a young friend who created their own baseball cards with O’Neil’s Hewlett-Packard scanner, PC, and printer and then sold them on the Internet.
In March 1998 Hewlett-Packard added a $12 million brand campaign with two more television spots and a print element, all created by Saatchi & Saatchi of San Francisco. The two 30-second spots ran during sports and news programs in the company’s top 10 regional markets in the United States. The schedule later included national exposure on CNN, ESPN, the Discovery Channel, and the Learning Channel. This round of the campaign, unlike the original ads, was aimed toward businesses. In one spot, for example, an airline maintenance worker discovered that it would take five months to produce a revised manual telling workers not to remove the plug in a plane’s oil pan. As an alternative, he quickly updated the manual via the Internet. The print ads appeared in the Wall Street Journal for a month. A third group of ‘‘Expanding Possibilities’’ ads that were released in October 1998 used print media, on-line services, and radio to reach corporate customers, small businesses, home users, and students.

OUTCOME OF THE “BUILT BY ENGINEERS, USED BY ORDINARY PEOPLE” CAMPAIGN

2010-07-31T08:49:00.000-07:00

The ‘‘Built by Engineers, Used by Ordinary People’’ campaign was pronounced an unqualified success by the company. Post-campaign quantitative research showed that the campaign had been very effective in reaching the desired targets. Those assessments were confirmed by the number of awards the campaign won during 1996 and 1997.
At the ICON Awards, sponsored by Marketing Computers and Business Week to honor excellence in high technology marketing and advertising, ‘‘Built by Engineers’’ won 1996 Best of Show ICONs for ‘‘Babysitter,’’ ‘‘Room,’’ and ‘‘Mower’’; platinum in the best advertising campaign, broadcast category; and gold in the best advertising/television campaign category. At the international Clio Awards, which recognize excellence and creativity in consumer advertising, ‘‘Babysitter,’’ ‘‘Room,’’ and ‘‘Mower’’ won best national campaign certificates, and ‘‘Baby-sitter’’ was also a certificate winner. In addition, Adweek, which publishes an annual list of the 10 best spots of the year, declared ‘‘Baby-sitter’’ to be one of the best spots of 1996. The spots won other awards as well, both in local advertising industry shows, such as the San Francisco Show, and in New York-based shows, such as The One Show.
In Europe the campaign also won a Directors and Art Directors Silver Pencil Award in London for ‘‘Babysitter.’’ Finally, ‘‘Baby-sitter’’ won a Silver Lion at the Cannes Advertising Festival.
The Red Sky interactive ad also garnered acclaim, in this case from critics of Internet advertising. Microscope, a weekly online Web ad review magazine, rated the banner ad ‘‘a perfect 10’’ and called it ‘‘the most attentiongetting ad on the Web.’’ PC World followed suit, awarding it the number one position in PC World ’s Top 10 Advertiser Achievement Awards. The ad went on to win a Platinum Award in the 1997 Marketing Computers/Business Week ICON Award for the multimedia category.

MARKETING STRATEGY OF THE “BUILT BY ENGINEERS, USED BY ORDINARY PEOPLE” CAMPAIGN

2010-07-31T08:48:00.000-07:00

The Hewlett-Packard advertising account had been held since 1988 by Saatchi & Saatchi in San Francisco, but the company decided against asking them to carry out the new campaign. According to the San Jose Business Journal, this was partially because of a 1995 print campaign that cost more than $30 million but failed to leave any lasting impression on consumers. Arlene King, peripherals-advertising manager at Hewlett-Packard, had another explanation for the move. ‘‘We wanted to get more visible advertising than we did in the past. We had been with Saatchi for eight years and we were becoming too alike.’’ In May 1996 HP chose Goodby Silverstein & Partners in San Francisco to head the $40 million printer advertising account (Saatchi did, however, retain the PC portion of the Hewlett-Packard account). Goodby Silverstein & Partners had previously been known for creative and popular campaigns such as the ‘‘Got Milk?’’ ads for the California Milk Processor Board.
In consumer research, Goodby Silverstein found that most people associated Hewlett-Packard with technical strength and reliability. Therefore, the new campaign needed to link Hewlett-Packard’s heritage as an engineering company and its reputation for building reliable products with the usefulness of HP products in ‘‘ordinary’’ situations. In short, the challenge was to humanize the face of technical prowess by giving complicated engineering a human face.
The $10.5 million Goodby Silverstein campaign for Hewlett-Packard, ‘‘Built by Engineers, Used by Ordinary People,’’ solved the dilemma by poking gentle fun at its own engineers while illustrating the excellence of HP products, particularly the 693 DeskJet printer, for use in the home, and the LaserJet 5si Mopier (multiple originals copier), a network printer for large-scale commercial use.
The year-long campaign was two-pronged, targeting both individual consumers and corporate entities. It featured television spots that ran from late November 1996 through late February 1997 on CNN and national networks. Those were supplemented by print ads in publications like Newsweek, the Wall Street Journal, Business Week, Fortune, PC Magazine, PC Week, and PC Computing that ran beyond the close of the television segment. In addition, the San Francisco-based interactive ad agency Red Sky developed an interactive ad that could be viewed on the Internet though the end of February 1997.
The Goodby Silverstein television spots showed both the ordinary and the extraordinary uses to which Hewlett-Packard printers can be put. In ‘‘Mower,’’ the first of the ‘‘corporate side ads,’’ a nerdy-looking announcer sporting a bow tie lists what a Mopier can do (print, staple, collate) and then jokes that the only thing it cannot do is mow the lawn. That serves as enough of a challenge to HP engineers, who immediately begin reconfiguring the printer. In the next scene the Mopier is turned on its side charging around an overgrown field, having been transformed by the company’s engineers into a lawnmower.
In a second spot, ‘‘Translation,’’ the interviewer asks an HP engineer to explain exactly how a Mopier works. The engineer answers in highly technical jargon, which is translated for the layperson in a running voice-over. In both of these spots the engineers were actual Hewlett-Packard employees.
In the consumer-oriented spots, the usefulness of HP products in personal situations was demonstrated. In the ‘‘Baby-sitter’’ spot, an elderly man babysitting his infant granddaughter panics when she wakes up and begins to cry for her mother. Suddenly he has a brilliant idea: he grabs a picture of the mother and turns on his DeskJet printer. When the mother returns, she sees the grandfather—with a color print of the mother pasted on his face—holding the peacefully sleeping baby. In a similar ad (‘‘Room’’), a teenager whose mother checks up on him through the key hole on his bedroom door fools her into thinking he has finally cleaned his extremely messy room by making a color printout of a picture of the room in a pristine state and positioning it just beyond the key hole.
The interactive ad developed by Red Sky was an extension of the television and print campaign into the electronic medium. It carried on the playfulness of the television spots but was also very different, using as it did the interactive capabilities of online advertising. As Joel Hladecek, Red Sky’s chief creative director, told the San Francisco Business Times, ‘‘There are two rules of advertising in this medium. The audience has the ability to choose what it’s interested in, and people will avoid advertising if they can.’’
Red Sky responded by burying the advertising message within entertainment. Their 1997 Pong advertising banner for Hewlett-Packard, promoting the LaserJet Mopier, played off the print and television tag line. Viewers used Shockwave technology to play games of Pong with an engineer named Jerry. They were initially drawn to the ad by the familiar sound of a ping-pong game. They then discovered that the ad was more than just a banner: it was an interactive game in which they could use their mouse to actually play along. The ad ran through February 1997 at various sites.

COMPETITION OF THE “BUILT BY ENGINEERS, USED BY ORDINARY PEOPLE” CAMPAIGN

2010-06-29T18:38:00.000-07:00

Although Hewlett-Packard remained the market leader for printers, its largest competitors—Canon, Xerox, and Lexmark—were making strenuous efforts to narrow the gap. Also, as high technology moved into people’s living rooms, the company saw that other makers of computers and electronic goods—such as Microsoft and Apple, among others—had been able to position themselves as interesting and cutting edge while Hewlett-Packard was viewed by consumers as reliable but stodgy. Canon, the giant Japanese maker of business machines, cameras, and other optical products, presented a formidable challenge to Hewlett-Packard with its line of laser and BubbleJet printers. Marketing its products under the tag line ‘‘You can with a Canon,’’ the company experienced strong growth in its printers during 1997. Canon targeted businesses with such products as the Digital GP215, a multifunctional digital device for networked workgroups that printed, faxed, copied, and scanned. The company also introduced the MultiPASS L90, another multifunctional system, and a new color laser printer, the CLBP 360PS. The BubbleJet continued to defend its market share with a very small and light personal model, the BJC-50, weighing only 900 grams. Xerox Corporation, which introduced the first (manually operated) commercial xerographic product in 1949 and the first automatic office copier in 1959, made its first laser printer in 1977 and by 1991 was developing an extensive printer line. To highlight the company’s evolution from copy machines to a wide range of business products, Xerox in 1994 adopted the tag line ‘‘The Document Company, Xerox’’ as its new corporate signature. As a document company, Xerox in 1997 introduced an array of specialized printer products for business, including a color printer for signs, banners, and billboards; a printer designed specifically for engineering needs; and the Xerox Productivity Centre System, which allowed users to scan, store, manage, electronically collate, distribute, print, and copy wide-format documents such as those used by architects, mapmakers, and graphic artists. Lexmark brought up the rear in this august assemblage, but it was able to chip away at the other companies’ lead during 1997. Lexmark, based in Lexington, Kentucky, was smaller than its competitors and had a narrower product range. It concentrated on laser, ink jet, and dot matrix printers and associated supplies that were comparable but lower-priced than Hewlett-Packard models. In November 1997 Lexmark won the first Annual Peripherals Excellence Award for network laser printers, beating out Hewlett-Packard and Apple.

TARGET MARKET OF THE “BUILT BY ENGINEERS, USED BY ORDINARY PEOPLE” CAMPAIGN

2010-06-29T18:35:00.000-07:00

Although Hewlett-Packard held its position as the world’s leading supplier of hard-copy products (LaserJet and DeskJet printers, DesignJet large-format printers and plotters, ScanJet scanners, OfficeJet printer-fax-copiers, CopyJet color printer-copiers, and HP FAX facsimile machines), the company became concerned in 1996 that it projected an image too cold and technological for the home-electronics user to relate to. Since HP had a growing customer base of individual consumers, it decided to focus on making its technology seem more accessible.
The resulting television and print advertising in the ‘‘Built by Engineers, Used by Ordinary People’’ campaign targeted two audiences: families with children and business professionals, particularly corporate executives, management information system (MIS) experts, and end users. Creative elements were designed to appeal to low-end users while at the same time showing off the products’ high-tech features to viewers well versed in information technology.

HISTORICAL CONTEXT OF THE “BUILT BY ENGINEERS, USED BY ORDINARY PEOPLE” CAMPAIGN

2010-06-29T18:31:00.000-07:00

Like many pioneering companies of the 20th century, Hewlett-Packard was born in a garage. It was founded by engineers David Packard and Bill Hewlett in 1938. At the time the mission was to develop and market a resistance-capacity audio oscillator that could be used to test sound equipment. Hewlett and Packard’s $538 in founding capital carried them through until the Walt Disney studios ordered eight of their devices. Then in 1941 the United States entered the Second World War, and an immediate overwhelming need for HP’s instruments was created. After the war ended, the company lost its mainstay government orders and decided to seek clients in the private sector. Hewlett-Packard introduced its measuring devices into the flourishing post-war electronics industry. In 1972 the company pioneered personal computing with the world’s first handheld scientific calculator, and it then went on to introduce the first desktop mainframe (in 1982) and the LaserJet printer (the first and most prominent of a line of printers for business and home), as well as copiers and scanners.

OVERVIEW OF THE “BUILT BY ENGINEERS, USED BY ORDINARY PEOPLE” CAMPAIGN

2010-05-30T22:13:00.000-07:00

In early 1996 the Hewlett-Packard Company began to rethink its role in the electronics products industry. Undisputedly the market leader for printers and other electronic products, Hewlett-Packard (HP) nevertheless saw the competition at its heels. Even more important, as technology became more ‘‘personalized’’ and accessible to the average person, the company was not sure it could rely solely on its history as a purveyor of electronic goods to businesses and institutions.
Hewlett-Packard turned to the San Francisco advertising firm Goodby Silverstein & Partners to create an ad campaign that would give it a more human face and present it as a company responsive to the needs of its customers. Goodby Silverstein designed ‘‘Built by Engineers, Used by Ordinary People,’’ a campaign focusing on the new Mopier business printer and the 690 series of DeskJet printers for the home. The campaign, which ran from late 1996 until about the middle of 1997, was designed to appeal to both HP’s core customers—businesses—and to recreational or home users of electronics. The consumer ads showed people in situations that could easily be made simpler by the use of Hewlett-Packard products, while the business ads showed the imagination and flexibility of HP’s engineering capacity.

OUTCOME OF THE “THERE’S NO WRONG WAY TO EAT A REESE’S” CAMPAIGN

2010-05-30T22:12:00.000-07:00

The effectiveness of the ‘‘There’s No Wrong Way to Eat a Reese’s’’ campaign was demonstrated in tracking and copy tests conducted by ad agency Ogilvy & Mather. ‘‘It’s run for almost ten years, and it’s a campaign that really worked. Consumers identify with it,’’ said Amy Robertson, an account executive with the agency. The tests showed that people remembered the advertisements, related to them, and associated them with the Reese’s brand.
With a growth rate of 5.4 percent, the retailconfectionery category was one of the most rapidly expanding food markets in the United States in 1997. Hershey had record net sales of about $4.3 billion, up from about $4 billion in 1996, and the company said that its candy business in North America was the chief contributor to the increase in earnings. At the end of 1997 Hershey was preparing a new television and print advertising campaign, coupons, and a sampling promotion to introduce another line extension, ReeseSticks wafer bars, in February 1998.
After a successful 15-year run, in 2002 the ‘‘There’s No Wrong Way to Eat a Reese’s’’ campaign was replaced. A new campaign created by Ogilvy & Mather had the theme and tagline ‘‘Get Lost in a Reese’s.’’ It targeted young men ages 18–24 who typically enjoyed candy on the run, but it also appealed to consumers in other age groups. In addition to the new campaign, to help the brand stay relevant to consumers the company updated its product packaging and introduced another line extension: FastBreak candy bars. ‘‘Get Lost in a Reese’s’’ supported the launch of FastBreak.

MARKETING STRATEGY OF THE “THERE’S NO WRONG WAY TO EAT A REESE’S” CAMPAIGN

2010-05-30T21:44:00.000-07:00

Previous marketing had first stressed the two main ingredients of Reese’s—chocolate and peanut butter—as individual elements. Next, the combination of the two was emphasized. In 1987, however, the company’s research revealed that consumers could not replicate Reese’s by combining chocolate and peanut butter at home. The product’s unique taste was identified as a key selling point. In addition, the research showed that many consumers had peculiar ways of eating Reese’s peanut butter cups. The ‘‘There’s No Wrong Way to Eat a Reese’s’’ campaign featured the humor that consumers expected of the brand, and they were strongly focused on the product.
The first six commercials in the campaign began airing in 1988, and additional spots were released in waves. Five of them ran in 1997. The campaign initially consisted of television commercials and included print ads after 1994. One print advertisement showed a Reese’s peanut butter cup with four holes that made it look like a button. The caption read, ‘‘I make my own special alterations. (William Hamilton, Tailor).’’ In another print ad the candy had been nibbled into the shape of the United States. The caption said, ‘‘I start in Seattle and work my way around. (Miss Moore, Geography Teacher.)’’ A third showed a vampire leaving two fang marks where he had sucked the peanut-butter center out through the chocolate shell. The campaign featured a lively cast of additional characters, including a barber, a dragon, a secret agent, a private detective, a golfer, an Internal Revenue Service agent, a postal worker, and a mentalist. Television spots included one that began with an announcer saying, ‘‘How domino champ Charlie Armstrong eats a Reese’s Peanut Butter Cup.’’ A drum roll accompanied a close-up of a little boy peering around a row of carefully balanced candy packages. To the sound of falling dominoes, the boy tipped over the first package, and the camera followed the rapidly falling Reese’s across the table until the last package flipped one piece of candy into the boy’s hand. The boy said, ‘‘Yeah.’’ Clapping and cheers were heard in the background. As the camera zoomed in on two peanut butter cups and their wrapper, the announcer concluded, ‘‘There’s no wrong way to eat a Reese’s.’’ Another began with an announcer saying, ‘‘How librarian Harriet Causbie eats a Reese’s peanut butter cup.’’ The words also appeared on the screen in gold letters against an orange and chocolate-brown background, the trademark colors of Reese’s candies. The scene then shifted to a library, where a serious woman in a gray suit sat at her desk. A sign over her head said, ‘‘Quiet please.’’ She held a piece of candy and shook her finger at the camera as she whispered, ‘‘I eat them as quietly as I can.’’ At that moment the sign fell with a crash, but she continued eating her candy. The commercial ended with a view of two peanut butter cups and their wrapper against an orange and brown background. A voice-over stated, ‘‘There’s no wrong way—Shhh—to eat a Reese’s.’’
In March 1997 Hershey began promoting a new product in the Reese’s line, Reese’s Crunchy Cookie Cups, with an estimated $10 million advertising campaign that appeared in print media and on television. Reese’s Crunchy Cookie Cups consisted of peanut butter, milk chocolate, and a chocolate cookie, which gave the product an interesting texture. In April the company distributed 50 million coupons and 8 million free samples of the new product. Later in the year the cookie cups were included in the ‘‘There’s No Wrong Way to Eat a Reese’s’’ campaign. Another line extension, the Reese’s Nutrageous candy bar, had been introduced in 1994. It received $9.5 million for advertising in 1995 and $5.4 million for the first six months of 1996. In comparison, the company spent $16.2 million to advertise regular and crunchy Reese’s peanut butter cups in 1995 and $9.2 million for the first six months of 1996.

COMPETITION OF THE THERE’S NO WRONG WAY TO EAT A REESE’S CAMPAIGN

2010-04-26T19:23:00.000-07:00

In the 1990s the U.S. retail chocolate industry was worth $13 billion annually, according to the Chocolate Manufacturers Association, and most of the top-selling chocolate candies were made by either Hershey or Mars, Inc., a private company owned by one of the nation’s wealthiest families. Hoover’s Company Capsules placed the value of the Mars company at $13 billion. The Arizona Republic reported that Mars had more than $1 billion in annual sales in 1997. The company’s products included M&M’s, Snickers, Three Musketeers, Milky Way, Skittles, and Starburst candies; Twix snacks;
Uncle Ben’s rice; and several brands of pet food. Hershey led the overall candy market in the United States, and Mars was second. According to Candy Industry Magazine, Reese’s peanut butter cups were the fourth most popular chocolate candy bar in 1997, with 9 percent of the market. M&M’s Chocolate Candies were the leading chocolate candy worldwide and had 16 percent of the market in the United States. Hershey’s chocolate bars had 10 percent; Snickers bars had 8 percent;
Butterfinger bars and York Peppermint Patties each had 4 percent; Crunch bars, Three Musketeers bars, and Russell Stover chocolate bars each had 3 percent; and Reese’s Nutrageous bars had 2 percent. Hershey’s Kisses and Kit Kat bars, made by Hershey, were also popular. The top-selling Mars brand and Reese’s main competitor, M&M’s, had a series of enormously successful campaigns. In the past the brand had been marketed with the tagline ‘‘M&M’s Melt in Your Mouth, Not in Your Hands.’’ In a 1996 promotion consumers had voted to replace tan M&M’s with blue. Advertising in 1997 featured animated M&M characters named Red, Yellow, and Blue to represent the three main colors of M&M’s. Mars also designed its Internet site to look like a tour of a movie studio where each animated character had a trailer full of photographs and other fanciful possessions. In 1997 Mars responded to consumer suggestions and added a female Green character, and the ads featuring her played on the old myth that green M&M’s were an aphrodisiac. The campaign featuring these characters included celebrities such as Dennis Miller, B.B. King, and Tia Carerre playfully interacting with the M&M’s. The celebrities helped draw the attention of adult audiences, but the animated characters took center stage in the commercials. In a 1996 survey by USA Today ’s Ad Track the commercials ranked second out of more than 60 campaigns in the poll, with 45 percent of respondents saying they ‘‘liked the ads a lot.’’ In a 1997 survey by the American Marketing Association, fifth-grade students in Dallas listed spots for M&M’s among their favorite commercials. Competitive Media Reporting calculated that Mars spent about $20 million on television commercials for M&M’s during the first half of 1996. The other top-selling Mars candy, Snickers, also had a popular campaign attached to it. Snickers had long been advertised as the perfect snack to satisfy hunger, but since 1995 the message had taken on a more lighthearted slant. A strategy revolving around the tagline ‘‘Hungry? Why Wait?’’ was developed to target males 18 to 22 years old, and more commercials were aired during sports programs on television. In one spot an elderly man had just finished painting a giant-size logo of the Chiefs football team between a pair of goalposts when a player commented, ‘‘Hey, that’s great. But who are the Chefs?’’ The painter stared at the misspelling, muttered ‘‘Great googily moogily!’’ and took comfort in a Snickers bar as he resigned himself to the fact that the entire logo would have to be repainted. A voice-over said, ‘‘Not going anywhere for a while? Grab a Snickers.’’ In another spot a coach informed a football team, ‘‘Listen up. This year we gotta be a little more ‘politically correct’ with the team prayer.’’ A priest began the prayer, but the coach interrupted him to let a Rabbi take over, then a Native American shaman, a mystic from India, an Eastern Orthodox priest, and a long line of other religious leaders. ‘‘Not going anywhere for a while?’’ asked the announcer. ‘‘Grab a Snickers.’’ The ‘‘Team Prayer’’ spot was among the 10 most popular ads of 1997, according to a survey by USA Today ’s Ad Track. Nearly a third of respondents said they ‘‘liked the ad a lot,’’ and 26 percent said it was effective. About 40 percent of consumers with household incomes of at least $50,000 said they liked the campaign. Advertising Age reported that Snickers generated sales of $277 million from March 1997 to March 1998, an increase of 2.3 percent from the previous year. Competitive Media Reporting estimated that the 1996 advertising budget for Snickers was $42.2 million.

TARGET MARKET OF THE THERE’S NO WRONG WAY TO EAT A REESE’S CAMPAIGN

2010-04-26T19:21:00.000-07:00

Because advertisements for candy had to appeal to consumers of all ages, they tended to be amusing and offbeat. A catchy jingle that children would sing at school was part of many successful campaigns. According to some experts, adult consumers were most apt to buy candy that was advertised humorously regardless of the price or taste of the product. The ‘‘There’s No Wrong Way to Eat a Reese’s’’ campaign used humor to emphasize the fact that peanut butter cups were different and more complex than some other types of candy and that they could be eaten in various ways. In fact, the company had discovered that many consumers had formed a strong emotional attachment to Reese’s peanut butter cups and often ate them ritualistically. The act of consuming a rich, flavorful candy with a variety of textures could be a highly satisfying experience. The advertising campaign emphasized this individuality and self-indulgence in a lighthearted way. In 1995 the United States ranked eighth in the world for total annual chocolate consumption. Americans ate a total of 3.1 billion pounds of chocolate in 1996. The average American ate 11.7 pounds of chocolate that year, up from 9.7 pounds in 1983. The average per capita consumption of all candy was 24.3 pounds, up from 17.9 in 1983. Candy sales climbed during the Halloween, Christmas, Easter, and Valentine’s Day seasons.

HISTORICAL CONTEXT OF THERE’S NO WRONG WAY TO EAT A REESE’S CAMPAIGN

2010-04-26T19:15:00.000-07:00

Reese’s peanut butter cups were invented in the 1920s by Harry Burnett Reese, who had worked at the dairy of Milton S. Hershey, the founder of Hershey Foods Corporation. Inspired by Hershey’s success, Reese quit his dairy job and founded the H.B. Reese Candy Company. Reese’s peanut butter cups, the company’s most popular product, were shells of Hershey’s milk chocolate filled with specially processed peanut butter. In 1963 the company was sold to Hershey for $23.5 million. The Reese’s brand grew steadily and was expanded to include Reese’s Crunchy Peanut Butter Cups, Reese’s Pieces, Reese’s Nutrageous candy bars, peanut butter Easter eggs and Christmas trees, peanut butter in a jar, baking bits, and peanut-butter-puffs cereal. Reese’s became the top seller among the Hershey brands, which included Hershey’s Kisses, Kit Kat chocolate bars, York Peppermint Patties, and Twizzlers licorice. In 1996 Hershey also acquired Leaf North America, which made Jolly Rancher, Milk Duds, Whoppers, and PayDay candies. In addition, Hershey sold chocolate syrup, ice-cream toppings, baking products, pasta, peanut butter, milk products, and other foods.
From 1969 to 1988 the tagline in two advertising campaigns for Reese’s peanut butter cups was ‘‘Two Great Tastes that Taste Great Together.’’ Commercials

OVERVIEW OF THE THERE’S NO WRONG WAY TO EAT A REESE’S CAMPAIGN

2010-03-26T09:59:00.000-07:00

The Hershey Company acquired the H.B. Reese Candy Company in 1963, and with the acquisition came a popular peanut-butter-filled, chocolate-coated candy, Reese’s peanut butter cups. The Reese’s brand expanded over time to include Crunchy Peanut Butter Cups, Reese’s Nutrageous candy bar, and Reese’s Pieces, which in 1982 were made famous as the preferred treat of a lovable alien in the movie E.T. the Extraterrestrial. For almost 20 years, from 1969 to 1988, Hershey promoted its Reese’s peanut butter cups with the familiar tagline ‘‘Two Great Tastes that Taste Great Together’’ and with humorous television spots. That changed after research revealed that people had developed various methods of eating Reese’s peanut butter cups.
After reviewing the research, the company’s ad agency, Ogilvy & Mather of New York, created a series of humorous TV spots and print ads that emphasized the unique character of peanut butter cups and the people who ate them. Themed ‘‘There’s No WrongWay to Eat a Reese’s,’’ the campaign began in 1988, with new advertisements introduced each year through the 1990s. Some played up the shape or composition of the candy, while others hinged entirely on the traits of the person eating the peanut butter cup. One print ad depicted four Reese’s peanut butter cups with bites taken out of them to make them look like the four phases of the moon. The caption said, ‘‘I eat them in phases. (Richard Chandler, Astronomer).’’ The positive reactions to the new campaign showed that, while its long-running predecessor was a success, consumers had been ready for a change. As the ‘‘There’s No Wrong Way to Eat a Reese’s’’ campaign continued what would become a nearly 15-year run, studies conducted by the agency revealed that consumers enjoyed the ads, related to them, and connected them with the Reese’s brand. In the late 1990s an agency executive commented that, even after 10 years, the campaign ‘‘really worked.’’

MARKETING STRATEGY OF THE CRISP YOU CAN’T RESIST! CAMPAIGN

2010-03-26T09:57:00.000-07:00

Hershey originally picked ReeseSticks as the most promising contender among a field of four new products made with wafers and peanut butter. The company spent three years conducting focus groups, distributing free samples in locations such as shopping malls, and surveying several hundred consumers as it adjusted the recipe to achieve the most popular balance of chocolate, peanut butter, and wafers. Hundreds of names, including ‘‘Reeskies,’’ were considered before the product was christened. The New York office of Ogilvy & Mather created advertisements that emphasized the new line extension’s taste, texture, and connection to the familiar Reese’s Peanut Butter Cups. In a 15-second television commercial called ‘‘Sawmill,’’ the blade of a buzzsaw—shaped like a round Reese’s Peanut Butter Cup on its side—sliced a crisp wafer in half. The chocolate and peanut butter of the blade melted in the process and coated the divided wafer to form two ReeseSticks. The commercial included the tag line ‘‘The Crisp You Can’t Resist!’’ The Los Angeles Times said that during the week of April 13-19, commercials for ReeseSticks aired 16 times on daytime network television, placing the message in 70 million homes. In addition to television commercials, the national launch of ReeseSticks in February 1998 was supported by advertisements in magazines such as People, and Sports Illustrated. More than 10 million samples of the product were given away at retail outlets, and 40 million coupons were either attached to the product’s packaging or inserted in Parade magazine in April. Standard packages of ReeseSticks sold for about 50 cents, but to encourage consumers to sample the new candy, trial-size ReeseSticks were priced at 25 cents for a short time after the product’s launch. Beginning in April some of the product’s packaging featured a tie-in to the motion picture Godzilla, which was scheduled for release on Memorial Day. When the National Football League season started, Hershey included ReeseSticks in its second annual $1 Million Kick promotion, which offered consumers an opportunity to kick a field goal during the Super Bowl. ‘‘The Crisp You Can’t Resist’’ ad ran in conjunction with the popular ‘‘There’s No Wrong Way to Eat a Reese’s’’ campaign, which promoted Reese’s Peanut Butter Cups and the Reese’s brand in general. Hershey sometimes alternated the two campaigns in consecutive issues of magazines such as Reader’s Digest. Advertising Age reported that Hershey spent $86.2 million to advertise its candies in 1998, up from $84.5 million in 1997, with $60.6 million going toward television commercials and $23.3 million going toward print ads. Hershey budgeted an estimated $15 million for ‘‘The Crisp You Can’t Resist!’’ in 1998.

COMPETITION OF THE CRISP YOU CAN’T RESIST! CAMPAIGN

2010-03-26T09:55:00.000-07:00

Hershey led the U.S. candy industry in 1997 with sales of $4.3 billion. Its closest rival was Mars, Inc., which owned brands such as M&M’s Chocolate Candies, Snickers, Twix, 3 Musketeers, and Milky Way. In third place was Nestle´ SA, a company based in Switzerland, with brands that included Baby Ruth, Butterfinger, and Crunchbars. The chocolate-covered cookie and wafer category was valued at $155 million that year. Information Resources, Inc., reported that Reese’s Crunchy Cookie Cups had sales of $20 million and controlled 12.9 percent of the category. Reese’s Crunchy Cookie Cups Halloween Candy generated an additional $7 million in sales. Hershey’s Kit Kat brand had sales of $61 million, and Twix had sales of $49.9 million. For the year ended November 8, 1998, all Reese’s products had sales of $108.9 million; Kit Kat had $60.5 million, and Hershey’s Mr. Goodbar had $9.5 million, according to Brandweek. From mid-August 1997 through mid-August 1998 Twix had sales of $70.5 million in grocery stores, drug stores, and mass merchandise outlets.
Advertising Age reported that Mars spent $67.3 million to advertise its products in 1998. Of that amount, $58.9 million went for television commercials and $7.2 million went for print ads. A large percentage of Mars’ marketing budget was used to promote M&M’s, a popular product that came in two styles—chocolate and chocolate-covered peanuts—with multicolored candy coatings. An M&M’s Crispyline extension was launched late in 1998 with a $40 million advertising campaign. During the first half of 1998 Mars spent $11.9 million to promote another popular brand, Twix chocolatecovered wafer, with the tag line ‘‘Two for me, none for you.’’ The print ads and television commercials revolved around the idea that although Twix was sold in packages of two, the product tasted so good that people were not willing to share it. One commercial showed a man who had just been awarded two expensive vehicles in the brand’s ‘‘Double or Nothing’’ instant-win game. As he wondered what he would do with identical Jeep Wranglers, his companion mused, ‘‘Maybe give one to your best friend.’’ Television commercials in the campaign aired during programs for young people, including Buffy the Vampire Slayer and Party of Five. Hershey’s other primary rival, Nestle´ promoted its Butterfinger brand with an advertising campaign that starred cartoon characters from the popular television program The Simpsons. Ads for another crunchy candy, Baby Ruth, used the tag line ‘‘This baby gets you going!’’ to position the brand as a source of energy for active people. In 1997 Nestle´ spent about $5 million on advertising to support the launch of White Crunch, a bar of white chocolate with crisped rice and peanut pieces. Nestle´ also introduced four varieties of a new brand, Treasures, which consisted of milk chocolate shells filled with peanut butter, Butterfinger Bits, the crisped rice used in Crunch bars, or caramel. An advertisement in People magazine featured the headline, ‘‘This would read even better if you were curled up with some Nestle´ Treasures.’’ The tag line ‘‘From you to you’’ suggested that Treasures were a good choice for consumers who wanted to indulge themselves.
Another rival, Russell Stover Candies, launched Russell Stover Peanut Butter & Jelly Cups. Sold two to a package or individually wrapped in large bags, the product consisted of round chocolate shells with a peanut butter filling and either grape jelly or raspberry jam. One advertisement featured the tag line ‘‘Gushing with Flavor’’ in type that looked as if it had been written with purple and red jelly. The text said, ‘‘For the first time
ever, Russell Stover combines the world’s most popular flavors: peanut butter, jelly, and milk chocolate.’’ The ad included a coupon that could be redeemed for 50 cents toward the purchase of the product and another coupon that consumers could redeem for a free sample

TARGET MARKET OF THE CRISP YOU CAN’T RESIST! CAMPAIGN

2010-02-25T08:18:00.000-08:00

Targeting a broad audience of people who enjoyed the taste of creamy peanut butter and rich milk chocolate together, ‘‘The Crisp You Can’t Resist’’ appealed to consumers who enjoyed Reese’s Peanut Butter Cups but who wanted to try a line extension with a new texture and slightly different taste. Hershey intended the new product to move beyond the candy market and compete with cookies and cakes in the snack market. Lisa Kronmuller, new products manager of Hershey’s marketing department, said in a news release: ‘‘Consumers love the taste of peanut butter and chocolate together. ReeseSticks provide a unique combination of sweet and salty tastes with an extra crispy texture—a perfect snack item for chocolate candy, cookie, and snack cake lovers.’’ The ads emphasized the similarities and differences between ReeseSticks and Reese’s Peanut Butter Cups. The campaign’s lighthearted tone entertained the audience and conveyed the message that candy was a fun, enjoyable treat. The ads also showed that ReeseSticks were more complex than some other candies, since they contained three ingredients assembled in layers.

HISTORICAL CONTEXT OF THE CRISP YOU CAN’T RESIST! CAMPAIGN

2010-02-25T08:09:00.001-08:00

Hershey traced its roots to Lancaster Caramel Company, founded in 1886 by Milton S. Hershey. A subsidiary, Hershey Chocolate Company, opened in 1894. Milton Hershey retained the chocolate business when he sold the caramel operation for $1 million in 1900. He used the money to open what would become the largest chocolate factory in the world. He also founded a utopian community named Hershey, Pennsylvania, for the company’s workers, and he established an orphanage and ensured that it would continue to receive a large percentage of the firm’s profits after his death. By the 1990s the company was called Hershey Foods. It manufactured ice cream toppings, chocolate syrup, chocolate chips and other baking products, milk products, and various brands of pasta. The company led the U.S. candy industry with brands such as Hershey’s milk chocolate bars, Hershey’s Kisses, Hershey’s Nuggets, Kit Kat chocolate bars, Cookies ’n’ Creme white chocolate bars with cookie bits, York Peppermint Patties, and Twizzlers licorice. In 1996 Hershey also acquired Leaf North America, which made Jolly Rancher, Milk Duds, Whoppers, and PayDay candies. In 1998 Reese’s was the largest and most popular of Hershey’s brands and was valued at $350 million, according to Advertising Age.
Reese’s Peanut Butter Cups were launched in 1928 by Harry Burnett Reese, the founder of H.B. Reese Candy Company. Hershey acquired the firm for $23.5 million in 1963 and began marketing Reese’s Peanut Butter Cups nationally. The product consisted of specially processed peanut butter in a disk-shaped, milk chocolate shell with fluted edges. It was packaged in bright orange wrappers that contained two peanut butter cups. The first line extension, Reese’s Crunchy Peanut Butter Cups, was launched in 1976. Other line extensions introduced over the years included small candies called Reese’s Pieces, peanut butter Easter eggs and Christmas trees, peanut butter baking bits, peanut butter in a jar, peanut butter ice cream, and peanut butter puffs cereal. According to Brandweek, Hershey’s total advertising budget for all its Reese’s products was $33 million in 1997, up from $22.6 million in 1996.
From 1969 to 1988 Reese’s Peanut Butter Cups were promoted with the tag line, ‘‘Two great tastes that taste great together.’’ In 1988, after market research showed that consumers had developed individual, ritualistic ways of eating Reese’s Peanut Butter Cups, the company launched a humorous campaign called ‘‘There’s No Wrong Way to Eat a Reese’s’’ that was still running in 1999. The new ads highlighted the candy’s unique qualities and the many eccentric ways it could be eaten. One magazine advertisement that ran in 1998 showed two miniature peanut butter cups above two captions that both said, ‘‘‘I eat them just like my brother.’’’ A second line of text explained, ‘‘(Don and Dan, identical twins.)’’
In 1995 Hershey supported its recently introduced Reese’s Nutrageous candy bar—a crunchy combination of chocolate and peanuts—with a $9.5 million advertising campaign. In 1997 the company spent an estimated $10 million to launch another line extension, Reese’s Crunchy Cookie Cups, which contained peanut butter, milk chocolate, and a chocolate cookie. The promotion included the distribution of 50 million coupons and 8 million free samples of the product. Later in the year Hershey began selling ReeseSticks wafer bars in limited markets. The ‘‘The Crisp You Can’t Resist!’’ campaign was launched early in 1998 to support the national introduction of ReeseSticks.

OVERVIEW OF THE THE CRISP YOU CAN’T RESIST! CAMPAIGN

2010-02-25T08:07:00.001-08:00

Hershey supported the launch of ReeseSticks wafer bars with a campaign that emphasized the product’s connection to its predecessor, the popular Reese’s Peanut Butter Cup. ReeseSticks had a different texture and taste because they contained crisp wafers in addition to the creamy peanut butter and milk chocolate found in peanut butter cups. A television commercial featured a round peanut butter cup in the form of a buzzsaw, cutting a wafer in half and covering it with chocolate and peanut butter. An advertisement in Reader’s Digest in May 1998 simply showed two Reese’s Peanut Butter Cups above the word ‘‘original’’ and two ReeseSticks above the words ‘‘new extra crispy.’’ One of the ReeseSticks was broken apart to reveal that it contained layers of peanut butter between wafers, all coated in milk chocolate. The tag line ‘‘The Crisp You Can’t Resist!’’ was centered below a picture of the new product in the trademark orange Reese’s wrapper. ReeseSticks were the latest in a series of innovative line extensions that had helped make Reese’s the company’s most successful brand. Reese’s was one of the first widely popular candies that combined chocolate and peanut butter. Competing with Hershey, the industry leader, other confectioners introduced their own crispy chocolate-and-peanut butter candies. Advertising for ReeseSticks was so effective, however, that demand exceeded supply shortly after the product was launched nationally in the spring of 1998. ‘‘The Crisp You Can’t Resist!’’ campaign of television commercials and print advertisements was created by the New York office of Ogilvy & Mather. It was introduced in print and broadcast media early in 1998 and continued into 1999.

IT’S ALL ABOUT THE BEER CAMPAIGN - OUTCOME

2010-01-28T06:17:00.000-08:00

Heineken’s U.S. sales grew consistently with the introduction of ‘‘It’s All About the Beer.’’ The brand’s estimated sales were at 35 million cases in the mid-1990s; by 1999 that figure had grown to 47 million cases, and in 2000 Heineken saw another 10 percent increase, with sales of 54 million cases. The sales increases were seen as directly tied to Heineken’s new brand image, and the brew’s measured-media spend of an estimated $34 million in 1999 grew to $50 million by 2001. Additionally, Lowe Lintas was tapped, in 2000, to adapt the concept of the campaign for Heineken markets worldwide. Hillary Chura noted in Advertising Age, ‘‘Heineken’s game plan—to broaden the brand’s appeal—allowed the lager to break records, shatter stereotypes and register consecutive years of healthy growth.’’ Gerry Khermouch of Brandweek said of the campaign, paraphrasing Heineken’s Steve Davis, ‘‘It clicked on all three requirements for a winning campaign: it broke through, was entertaining and offered a provocative, relevant message . . . By contrast, even the best work on Bud and Miller often clicks on just the first two criteria.’’
In 2002 Heineken moved its advertising account from Lowe Lintas to D’Arcy Masius Benton & Bowles, because Lee Garfinkel, the most instrumental figure from the outset of the campaign, had himself taken a job at D’Arcy in January of 2001. Heineken waited for Garfinkel’s non-compete clause to expire before moving its account to his new agency. D’Arcy continued the ‘‘It’s All about the Beer’’ campaign in work that paired the established beer-centered theme with holiday subject matter. Heineken changed agencies again in 2003, enlisting Publicis New York, but stayed on message, extending ‘‘It’s All About the Beer’’ in well-received TV spots as well as outdoor ads and radio spots in the following years.

IT’S ALL ABOUT THE BEER CAMPAIGN - MARKETING STRATEGY

2010-01-28T06:16:00.001-08:00

‘‘It’s All About the Beer’’ premiered two weeks before the 1999 Super Bowl, during telecasts of the National Football League (NFL) conference championship games. This choice of venue was a strategic move by Heineken to counteract Anheuser-Busch’s dominance in Super Bowl advertising by achieving comparable visibility for a fraction of the cost, while effectively taking center stage as the only advertiser offering Super Bowl–quality spots during those earlier games. Further, for the big game itself Heineken skirted Anheuser-Busch’s Super Bowl exclusivity agreement with the Fox network, which prohibited other brewers from buying national airtime during the big game, by buying time on selected local affiliates. Heineken spots ran during the Super Bowl in markets that included New York, Los Angeles, Chicago, and Atlanta, cities accounting for 70 to 80 percent of the brand’s American sales.
In its bid to appeal to a younger and more down-toearth audience, Heineken took calculated risks of various types in the campaign’s individual spots. Commercials that broke in 1999 and ran through 2000 included ‘‘Mood Swing,’’ in which a fan in a basketball arena was shown doing something that had been unthinkable in an earlier era’s Heineken advertising: drinking the brew from a plastic cup. The dramatic crux of the spot came when the fan’s enthusiasm for his team caused him to spill his Heineken. Another spot, ‘‘The Weasel,’’ showed a man bringing a Budweiser-like beer to a house party and then filching another guest’s Heineken from the refrigerator. ‘‘Premature Pour’’ showed a man and woman pouring Heineken while eyeing one another seductively; excited, the man poured too much beer too quickly, and spilled it. ‘‘The Male Bonding Incident,’’ meanwhile, parodied heterosexual men’s hang-ups about homosexuality. The spot showed two sports-watching men accidentally holding hands while passing a Heineken bottle, before both recoiled in horror. While the sexuality and humor of these spots was in keeping with the tone of much beer advertising of the period, Heineken was almost alone among industry competitors in linking such human situations explicitly to its product. Each of the ‘‘beer moments’’ dramatized in the campaign, regardless of the human behavior exhibited, hinged on the presence not just of beer but of Heineken. Later executions of the ‘‘It’s All About the Beer’’ theme included a group of spots keyed to Heineken’s introduction of a keg-shaped can. In ‘‘The Envy,’’ which ran through 2002, two men stood next to one another at public urinals. Both set their beers on top of the receptacles, but one of the men could not stop looking at the other’s keg-shaped Heineken can. The Heineken drinker, rattled by the attention, left the restroom abruptly. In ‘‘The Poachers,’’ two friends in the checkout aisle of a supermarket stealthily moved the grocery divider on the conveyor belt so that another customer’s case of Heineken would be included among their own purchases.

IT’S ALL ABOUT THE BEER CAMPAIGN - COMPETITION

2010-01-28T06:14:00.000-08:00

In its push to broaden its market in America, Heineken necessarily took aim at beer-industry heavyweights such as Anheuser-Busch and its flagship brew, Budweiser. Anheuser-Busch, in addition to possessing an almost 50 percent market share of the country’s beer market, had an advertising budget far larger than those of its nearest competitors. Despite declining sales of Budweiser, the brewer continued to support the ‘‘King of Beers’’ with blockbuster ad campaigns in the late 1990s and early 2000s. Budweiser commercials featuring talking frogs that croaked ‘‘Budweiser’’ in combination with one another gave way to a competing cast of lizards and an evolving swamp-creatures storyline, and then Budweiser made an even bigger splash with ‘‘Whassup?!’’ a campaign featuring a group of friends who greeted one another using the idiosyncratic, slang question that gave the campaign its name. A true measure of Heineken’s success, in the eyes of industry commentators, was the fact that, during this time, Anheuser-Busch used a ‘‘Whassup?!’’ spot to poke fun at stereotypical Heineken drinkers, thereby acknowledging its much smaller competitor as a threat. In the commercial, preppy types greeted each other with a hyper-articulate rendering of ‘‘How are you doing?’’ while drinking beer from green bottles clearly meant to suggest Heineken. Corona Extra doubled its share of the American import market between 1995 and 2000, going from a 13.5 percent market share to 27.3 percent and overtaking Heineken as the country’s best-selling import. The brand’s marketing strategy, which attempted to make the Mexican beer synonymous with seaside relaxation and escape from the everyday, was widely credited with providing fuel for such rapid growth. Taglines such as ‘‘Miles Away from Ordinary’’ and ‘‘Go Someplace Better’’ ran in concert with beach scenery, as Corona extended its tried-and-true advertising formula into the early years of the millennium.

IT’S ALL ABOUT THE BEER CAMPAIGN-TARGET MARKET

2009-12-29T05:33:00.000-08:00

Heineken’s effort to expand the U.S. market for its beer depended on appealing to younger drinkers. As Beverage Industry noted, ‘‘a 25-year-old averages 65 gallons of beer per year, while a 55-year-old sips 15 gallons.’’ Among 21 to 35 year olds Heineken particularly focused on urbandwelling trendsetters, ordinary but sophisticated beer drinkers. Davis told Brandweek that Heineken’s ideal consumers were younger people ‘‘who tend to be opinion leaders. They are visible, self-confident, and risk-takers.’’ The brewer also needed to counteract these drinkers’ perception that Heineken was a beer strictly for special occasions in bars and restaurants but not for everyday, off-premise consumption. To thus broaden its appeal, the brand had to strike a delicate balance between its hard-won image as a superior product and its desire to appear more ordinary.
‘‘It’s All About the Beer’’ accordingly used irreverent humor while showing the product, in television spots, being consumed in settings far less rarefied than those traditionally associated with the brand. The campaign focused on universal ‘‘beer moments,’’ occasions when the presence of Heineken significantly affected otherwise ordinary behavior. This approach enabled the brand to show its lighter, more populist side, while also managing to keep the focus on the high quality of its beer.

IT’S ALL ABOUT THE BEER CAMPAIGN - HISTORICAL CONTEXT

2009-12-29T05:32:00.000-08:00

The first barrels of Heineken reached the United States in the 1880s, and by 1972 the brand had become America’s top imported beer. Heineken’s fortunes in America improved even further in the 1980s, as it, like other luxury items, was a prime beneficiary of the conspicuous consumption for which that decade was known, a cultural trend that was especially pronounced in Heineken’s biggest market, New York City. Heineken likewise adapted, in the 1980s, to the emerging light-beer phenomenon, introducing Amstel Light and imbuing it with an upscale image similar to that of its older sibling. Marketing on Heineken’s behalf had long been geared toward making the brand a status symbol and identifying it as the beer of choice for urban sophisticates.
Heineken’s pedestal positioning did not serve it as well in the 1990s, however. Sales slumped, and the company struggled to craft an up-to-date image for the beer that would make it relevant to a new generation of younger drinkers. ‘‘We had an aging franchise,’’ Heineken’s senior vice president of marketing, Steve Davis, told Beverage Industry. ‘‘We didn’t conjure up in consumers’ minds much energy and excitement, and we were becoming kind of ‘your father’s Oldsmobile.’ We got high marks from everybody saying we were a great beer; what they weren’t saying is that we were a great beer for them.’’ The company recognized that, if it were to increase its U.S. market share, it needed to mute its elitist image and win over young domestic-beer drinkers. After an unsuccessful marketing campaign designed to make the red star on Heineken’s label an icon comparable to Nike’s ‘‘swoosh’’ symbol, Heineken initiated an agency search, dismissing Wells Rich Greene and hiring Lowe & Partners of New York (which later merged with Ammirati Puris Lintas to become Lowe Lintas & Partners), whose chief creative officer, Lee Garfinkel, had previously helmed an effort that successfully recast Mercedes, in much the way Heineken hoped to reinvent itself, as a more approachable brand.

IT’S ALL ABOUT THE BEER CAMPAIGN- OVERVIEW

2009-12-29T05:30:00.000-08:00

In the 1990s Heineken beer (imported from Dutch parent company Heineken NV and sold in America by Heineken USA Inc.) had an outdated image. An icon of 1980s luxury and excess, Heineken had not adapted to changing trends in the United States. Heineken USA understood that its future growth hinged on making the brand more approachable in the U.S. market and on connecting with the beer industry’s all-important audience of 21 to 35 year olds. The company also wanted to maintain its reputation for superior beer. Enlisting agency Lowe & Partners (later called Lowe Lintas & Partners), Heineken in 1999 launched an advertising campaign that balanced these prerogatives while reinventing the brand’s image.
‘‘It’s All About the Beer’’—the central component of Heineken USA’s estimated measured-media spend of $34 million for 1999—focused on so-called ‘‘beer moments,’’ situations in ordinary life that became dramatic or otherwise noteworthy because of the presence of Heineken. With irreverent humor and down-to-earth backdrops, the new television spots took Heineken off its pedestal and communicated an updated, youthconscious sensibility. At the same time, as the campaign’s tagline and theme suggested, the commercials’ focus was solidly on the quality of the beer itself.
The campaign helped fuel consistent increases in Heineken sales and was credited with positioning the beer for healthy long-term growth. These successes were likewise reflected in increased ad spending, as the brand’s measured-media budget grew to an estimated $50 million by 2001. Despite changing agencies twice in two years, Heineken stuck with the ‘‘It’s All about the Beer’’ concept and tagline and continued to target a youthful audience in the following years.

OUTCOME of THE BOOK OF HARLEY-DAVIDSON CAMPAIGN

2009-11-26T07:40:00.000-08:00

Judging the Harley-Davidson campaign by the most common measure—sales figures—would be somewhat misleading, given that the company could have sold every motorcycle it built with or without advertising. Indeed, Harley-Davidson exceeded its goal of selling 10 percent more bikes in 1997, reaching 13 percent, for a total of 96,216 units. But this was due to, if nothing else, a 13 percent increase in production. Had the factory turned out 50 percent more Harleys, the company could have reported a 50 percent sales increase. Yet, based on its own extensive polling of its customers and on the market, management considered the campaign a success. Based on its data, the ‘‘perception of Harley-Davidson as ‘a strong and appealing brand’ increased by sixteen percent during the campaign,’’ according to an agency press release. At the same time the number of core riders who described the company as ‘‘selling out’’—admittedly small to begin with—fell by more than half. Positive publicity continued to generate itself as the media rushed to align itself with the Harley phenomenon, always a sure sign that a brand was hot. In the area of creativity, one of the dealer television spots won a Gold Lion at the Cannes International Advertising Festival, one of advertising’s most coveted honors.

MARKETING STRATEGY of THE BOOK OF HARLEY-DAVIDSON CAMPAIGN

2009-11-26T07:39:00.000-08:00

Harley’s strategy for the campaign flowed quite naturally out of the company’s unique history and place in the market. The shape of the campaign, however, was determined primarily by the need to reassure the core ridership that the company had not ‘‘sold out,’’ in the words of Craig Rowley, account supervisor at Carmichael Lynch Spong. The campaign’s theme, ‘‘The Book of Harley-Davidson,’’ was devised by a team led by creative directors Kerry Casey and Jim Nelson. They relied primarily on print media because of its ability to reach the target market most cost-efficiently. Although two television spots were shot for the campaign, they were designed to be used by dealers and not broadcast nationally. The print ads consisted of spreads, each purporting to be a chapter from ‘‘The Book of Harley-Davidson,’’ although only three actual chapters were represented in the campaign. These chapters were supplemented by a series of similar spreads selling parts and accessories, although not in chapter form. Headlines in the series said, for instance, ‘‘She’s a full-figured gal,’’ referring to a fully decked-out Electra-Glidecruiser, and ‘‘Drop the wrench. Stand back and look. Laugh evilly,’’ over a gorgeous shot of a Heritage Softail Classic. The ads ran in media catering to motorcycle enthusiasts, including Harley Woman, and also in national general-interest men’s magazines such as Men’s Journal, Rolling Stone, and Sports Illustrated, a sure indication of the company’s focus on the large secondary market of non-Harleyowning men.
It should be noted that the campaign was supplemented by Harley-Davidson’s exceptionally thorough dealer support programs, which included a catalog that was virtually a collector’s item among Harley enthusiasts. Rowley reported that many dealers would not give a catalog to a prospective customer until he bought a bike, the catalog then serving as a surrogate until his motorcycle was delivered two years later. The company also earmarked a significant portion of its marketing budget in support of its owners groups, known as HOGs, or Harley Owners Groups, a practice that Harley-Davidson had pioneered long before Saturn automobiles, for instance, began announcing picnics for owners and related support programs.

COMPETITION of THE BOOK OF HARLEY-DAVIDSON CAMPAIGN

2009-11-26T07:28:00.001-08:00

Any company that owned 50 percent of its category, as Harley-Davidson did of cruiser motorcycles, might easily be thought of as not having serious competition. Yet because demand was exceeding supply and creating a remarkable two-year waiting period for buying a Harley, the door was open to a handful of competitors, each looking to increase its share of the market at Harley-Davidson’s expense. Foremost among these were the four big Japanese motorcycle manufacturers—Honda, Yamaha, Kawasaki, and Suzuki—each of which had begun building its own heavy cruiser motorcycle in the previous three years. These Harley clones were characterized by big engines and an authentic look. Each could be mistaken by a non-Harley novice for the real thing. Unlike the real thing, however, these motorcycles were ready to be driven away from the showroom. More troubling in some ways were a pair of companies preparing to offer an alternative American bike right in Harley’s own neighborhood. In Minneapolis, Excelsior Henderson, a classic American motorcycle company that had failed, was threatening to come to life again and produce its own, truly authentic line of bikes. At the same time Polaris, a large manufacturer of snowmobiles, had plans—and the resources—to market a moderately priced cruiser in the $8,000 to $10,000 range. Against this background Harley-Davidson was not content to rest on its laurels, even if it could still sell many more bikes than it actually produced.

TARGET MARKET of THE BOOK OF HARLEY-DAVIDSON CAMPAIGN

2009-10-27T04:31:00.001-07:00

Harley-Davidson’s core rider had always defined its primary target market. That rider was most likely to be a male (91 percent), although his mate, if he had one, tended to be as enthusiastic about the bike as he was. He rode the motorcycle and lived the lifestyle. Yet, unlike consumers of many other high-ticket products, Harley owners spanned a broad socioeconomic spectrum. Visitors to the massive Harley-Davidson meets that took place in Sturgis, South Dakota, and in Daytona Beach, Florida, encountered riders from every strata of American life. But all of them embraced, if only for a weekend, the Harley credo of freedom, self-reliance, and individualism. The advertising invariably addressed itself to those riders who lived the credo, who in fact already owned a Harley. Jack Supple, for many years the executive creative director on the account at Carmichael Lynch Spong, described bluntly the tight focus Harley-Davidson’s advertising maintained on the core rider: ‘‘We don’t pander to the broader public.’’
Yet there was a secondary target market the advertising also reached, the segment of the broader market that was interested in Harley-Davidson motorcycles because of their reputation. In many ways this segment was every bit as important as the primary group, for it was from this group that increased sales came. Existing Harley owners might buy a new bike from time to time, but they would never fuel 10 percent or higher annual growth. This market also tended to be predominantly men who had grown up with the Harley legend in some form or other but who did not own one. It was a tribute to the company, the advertising, and the motorcycle itself that these men did not need to be convinced of the superiority of the product, as they might if they were shopping among Japanese bikes. They merely needed to be exposed to the legend frequently enough.

HISTORICAL CONTEXT of THE BOOK OF HARLEY DAVIDSON CAMPAIGN

2009-10-27T04:29:00.000-07:00

Founded in 1903, the Harley-Davidson Motor Company was among the original companies building and selling motorcycles to racers and other thrill seekers. Among a crowded field of starters, it had the distinction of being the only motorcycle company to survive the next 80 years, and thus it came by its legendary status honestly. During the late 1970s, however, the company was troubled by a reputation for poor quality, lagging innovation, and serious competition from abroad, most notably from Japanese manufacturers. During an unfortunate period of ownership by AMF Corporation, the company even produced Harley-Davidson golf carts. Finally, after a group of investors bought the company back, it began a remarkable turnaround. In 1979 the company hired the Minneapolis ad agency Carmichael Lynch Spong to help reverse some of the negative perceptions that were plaguing it. Jud Smith, group creative director of the agency team that worked on the account at the time, said in an Adweek article, ‘‘The image was that it [the motorcycle] was owned by dirtballs and decidedly uncool.’’ Although Harleys were seen as distinctively designed, honest machines, many of the competitors were offering more user-friendly motorcycles, especially for less-experienced riders. Easier to maintain, some of the other bikes were even faster than the legendary Harley. Still, Harley-Davidson had developed a near fanatical following of riders whose deep emotional attachment to their bikes had already crept into American culture. Harley ‘‘Hogs’’ were perceived as simple but tough and as embodying the rebellious facet of the national character.
By 1984 Harley-Davidson had turned an important corner under its new management, introducing a new line of bikes while significantly improving quality. The advertising began to communicate the changes, and at the same time it drew upon the passion the motorcycle inspired in its core riders with themes like ‘‘Things are different on a Harley’’ and ‘‘Harley through and through.’’ The advertising even broke with its rule of always making the bike the hero of the ad by employing high-profile—and highly passionate—Harley riders like Malcolm Forbes, Jay Leno, and Mickey Rourke, who agreed to do the ads for a dollar if it would help their favorite motorcycle company. By the 1990s an improved product and savvy marketing had turned Harley-Davidson from the motorcycle of ‘‘dirtballs’’ to the choice of free-spirited American individualists. Along with them came a legion of consumers who wanted to own part of a legend and could afford to pay as much for a bike as most people paid for a car. Despite the long waiting period, sales edged ever upward.

OVERVIEW of THE BOOK OF HARLEY DAVIDSON CAMPAIGN

2009-10-27T04:15:00.000-07:00

As a symbol of brawny industrial power, no-nonsense technological prowess, and pure American individualism, it would be difficult to surpass the Harley-Davidson motorcycle. Even as flagship Americans products, from automobiles to television sets, were overtaken, outdesigned, and outmarketed by competitors from Asia and Europe, the Harley stood defiantly apart, refusing to give an inch, much like its famous champions, the Hell’s Angels-style bikers of modern legend. At least that was the image most people held after nearly two decades of ambitious product development by the company, helped along by generally inspired advertising from its agency. And as demand for the highpriced motorcycles exceeded supply, the company launched a line of ‘‘genuine’’ Harley-Davidson accessories and clothing, including cigarettes and cologne. These marketing successes, however, came at a cost. Potential Harley buyers, unable to ride away on the bike they wanted and unwilling to wait the average two years until it became available, were turning to Japanese brands. Japanese companies had begun marketing a line of Harley clones, heavy cruising bikes designed to capture the low-slung style of the classic Harley, sometimes with more power and features. At the same time,Harley’s very success in selling to a wider market was causing some of its core riders to question the company’s commitment to its values. Company research found that ‘‘a small but vocal group of core riders are saying that Harley is ‘selling out.’’’ To counter this trend, a new advertising campaign was launched in 1997. The campaign, dubbed ‘‘The Book of Harley-Davidson,’’ was designed to remind core consumers that the company that ‘‘wrote the book’’ on Harley was not about to stray from its principles. In this way the campaign hoped to reinforce positive brand perception among new buyers, while reversing any negative perceptions core riders might have. The company had ambitious sales objectives as well, for it hoped for a 10 percent increase over 1996 figures. Sticking mostly to print advertising, the campaign presented a series of spread ads in national men’s magazines as well as in books for enthusiasts. Each ad was a ‘‘chapter’’ that sold the romance of both the motorcycle and the American road. For example, chapter 5, which sold touring bikes, was titled ‘‘Waking Up in Strange Places,’’ while chapter 8 was called ‘‘Is That Thing Street Legal?’’ an appropriate headline for an ad touting racing bikes. By all measures, the campaign succeeded inmeeting its objectives. By 1998 unit sales had increased, positive perceptions by new buyers had improved, and negative perceptions by core riders had been cut in half.

OUTCOME of TURNOUT CAMPAIGN (Gill Foundation)

2009-09-26T17:56:00.000-07:00

Making its mark in the ad industry, the campaign in 2004 snagged a Clio Award in the Integrated Campaign category. At the 51st Annual Cannes Lions International Advertising Festival, the ‘‘TurnOut’’ television spots won 5 of the 89 available awards. According to postcampaign surveys, unaided awareness for ‘‘TurnOut’’ increased more than 50 percent with exposed populations—meaning that most people who saw the spots remembered them. Data also showed that individuals exposed to the campaign were more receptive to discussing LGBT rights, one of the campaign’s main objectives. Nadine Smith, executive director for the advocacy group Equality Florida, told Business Wire, ‘‘Encouraging greater civic involvement around LGBT issues is critical for any positive, lasting change to occur.’’
Election results in 2004 were more daunting. Many candidates who supported LGBT rights were replaced by conservatives who did not. Nonetheless DDB and the Gill Foundation felt that the campaign was a success in that it educated its audience and encouraged wider public participation in LGBT issues, two achievements that were necessary for the expansion of civil rights.

MARKETING STRATEGY of TURNOUT CAMPAIGN (Gill Foundation)

2009-09-26T17:50:00.000-07:00

When the Gill Foundation awarded DDB its advertising work, it presented the ad agency with research. One study showed that more than 80 percent of Americans believed that discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation should not be tolerated in the workplace. Making this statistic its starting point, DDB, in collaboration with director Doug Pray of the production company Oil Factory, filmed minidocumentaries to expose work-related discrimination. According to Gutierrez, ‘‘TurnOut’’ had been originally slated for early 2004, but after San Francisco’s mayor stirred up media attention by issuing marriage certificates to same-sex couples in February, DDB and the Gill Foundation delayed the launch. The foundation feared that the political climate had become too volatile for ‘‘TurnOut,’’ the intent of which was to encourage a more cerebral discussion of LGBT issues.
With the November election approaching and the media fervor about LGBT issues showing no sign of abating, the Gill Foundation finally aired the first ‘‘TurnOut’’ television spots on July 5, 2004. The minidocumentaries appeared on TV in states that allowed employees no legal recourse if they were discriminated against because of their sexual orientation. Modeling the campaign after past civil-rights cases, DDB wanted to portray real people coming out in the face of opposition. Finding volunteers to do it was difficult but necessary, according to Pray, who filmed the spots. Gutierrez told Advertising Age’s Creativity, ‘‘In our concepting phase, we realized there’s probably no moment in the Civil Rights era that better illuminated white folks than the Rosa Parks bus incident. Her small act of courage served as a great national commercial for civil rights.’’ Detroit native Herrera came out by setting a picture of her girlfriend on her work desk. Calhoun, another subject for ‘‘TurnOut,’’ sent a note that explained to his bosses that he was gay and about to be in a commercial. The six television spots then directed viewers to http://www.TurnOut.org to read about the outcomes of the employees’ actions. All six employees received a range of responses. Kimya Ayodele was fired after she came out. According to the Denver Post, her tires were also slashed, and coworkers verbally abused her after she dated someone from work. Herrera had a different experience. ‘‘More people would come up and talk to me,’’ she told the Denver Post. ‘‘Everyone is more helpful. It’s more like a team now. I don’t feel like the outside person.’’ Once people visited http://www.TurnOut.org, they were exposed to a wider range of issues regarding LGBT rights. One bullet read, ‘‘Did you know . . . Forty-six states have failed to enact laws that address crimes motivated by prejudice against gender identity?’’ Other campaign efforts involved sending voter-mobilization tool kits to more than 250 organizations with a collective audience of 4 million voters. Three different print ads appeared, featuring copy such as, ‘‘For gays and lesbians, America is 14 states that recognize our right to live free from job discrimination, and 36 states that don’t.’’ The campaign’s website went offline after the election.

COMPETITION of TURNOUT CAMPAIGN (Gill Foundation)

2009-09-26T16:53:00.002-07:00

Focus on the Family Action (FOTFA), a political lobbying organization spearheaded by James Dobson to ban same-sex marriage and abortion, targeted the Evangelical Protestants that made up 23 percent of the U.S. electorate in 2004. Frustrated by previous Supreme Court decisions, Dobson began endorsing political candidates he thought would galvanize his religion-charged agenda. He appeared on TV talk shows such as ABC’s This Week and on Fox News to express his distaste for same-sex marriage, claiming that it exacerbated what he referred to as a ‘‘culture war.’’ Despite Dobson’s influence, President George W. Bush refused to screen Supreme Court appointees according to their position on same-sex marriage. Bush also condoned civil unions if the state law allowed it.
Leading up to the election, FOTFA organized mass voting drives intended to register at least 1 million voters. Latinos were targeted with paid radio programming that aired across Spanish radio. FOTFA sponsored groups called ‘‘family policy councils,’’ which operated in 35 locations throughout the United States. One such group based in Ohio even sponsored the initiative that eventually banned same-sex marriages in that state. Dobson’s personal efforts included barnstorming the battleground states in the months before the election. He urged Christians to ‘‘vote their values’’ at a rally titled ‘‘Mayday for Marriage’’ that FOTFA organized in Washington, D.C. More than 13 thousand Hispanic churches were sent mailers that outlined how the congregation should vote. Also the group donated some $60,000 to support an Oregon measure banning same-sex marriages. Many analysts credited FOTFA for Bush’s reelection, the placement of congressmen opposed to same-sex marriage, and the ousting of Democratic Senate Minority Leader Tom Daschle, who had previously blocked a vote on an amendment prohibiting gay marriage.

TARGET MARKET of TURNOUT CAMPAIGN (Gill Foundation)

2009-08-26T07:00:00.000-07:00

According to Eric Gutierrez, a creative director at DDB, ‘‘TurnOut’’ targeted voters who ‘‘might be open to a discussion about rights in the workplace.’’ Polls conducted by the Gill Foundation showed that, out of a wide range of LGBT issues, equal rights in the workplace was considered highly important; more than 80 percent of straight people felt that everyone should have such rights. These findings prompted DDB to center the campaign’s most prominent aspect, the television spots, on this issue. Rodger McFarlane, executive director of the Gill Foundation, told Business Wire, ‘‘Numerous studies, including our own, reveal that a majority of ‘straight’ people are appalled when they know that non-discrimination protections don’t exist for many lesbian, gay, bisexual and transgender citizens.’’ The campaign was also aimed at the 56 percent of Colorado voters who did not support gay issues.
The ‘‘TurnOut’’ television spots showed six real people dissatisfied about hiding their sexual orientation from coworkers. Filmed as minidocumentaries, the spots featured the employees coming out at work. Lisa Herrera, for example, ended five years of silence about her personal life by placing a picture of her girlfriend on her desk. Steve Calhoun, a prototype tester at Detroit’s Ford Motor Company, said his coworkers were not supportive when he came out. Each person also lived in a state that permitted employers to fire people for being gay, lesbian, bisexual, or transgender. Gill Foundation volunteers told the Rocky Mountain News that the biggest challenge for ‘‘TurnOut’’ was getting straight, like-minded voters, specifically those under the age of 35, to vote. Even though volunteers felt that they could make a bigger impact by talking to voters oneon-one, ‘‘TurnOut’’ allowed the Gill Foundation to make gay-rights issues visible inside voters’ homes.

HISTORICAL CONTEXT of TURNOUT CAMPAIGN (Gill Foundation)

2009-08-26T06:59:00.000-07:00

In 1992 Colorado voters passed an amendment to their state constitution that negated the power of laws protecting Americans from sexual-orientation discrimination. Four years later the U.S. Supreme Court struck down the amendment. The issue, remaining relatively undisturbed for years, exploded in 2004 when San Francisco’s mayor allowed the city to issue marriage licenses to same sex couples.
In 2004 Colorado Republicans Musgrave and Allard proposed an amendment to the U.S. Constitution that banned same-sex marriage. If passed the amendment would affect survivor benefits for children and spouses
in same-sex families. At the time, same-sex families were also denied more than a thousand federal benefits that opposite-sex families qualified for. At the state level only three states granted same-sex marriages the same rights and responsibilities bestowed upon so-called traditional marriages.
The Gill Foundation, which had been founded by software tycoon Tim Gill in the 1990s, reacted by rallying voters to support same-sex marriages and antidiscrimination laws. As part of the ‘‘TurnOut’’ campaign, voter-mobilization tool kits were sent to some 250 organizations around the country, encouraging voters to elect candidates such as Colorado’s Stan Matsunaka, who did not support the proposed amendment. Ted Trimpa, a Colorado attorney and gay-rights lobbyist, told the Rocky Mountain News that it was time to politically ‘‘go after people who go after us.’’ Many in LGBT communities feared that if the wrong candidates were elected, they could hinder the rising momentum of the gay-rights movement. ‘‘We can’t afford to lose,’’ Trimpa continued in the Rocky Mountain News. Gill Foundation organizers were telling volunteers to encourage similar-minded voters to ‘‘vote like your civil rights depend on it.’’ Television spots for the ‘‘TurnOut’’ campaign focused on antidiscrimination issues, specifically in the workplace. At the time, only 14 states protected citizens from being fired because of their sexual orientation. Surveys conducted before the campaign indicated that mainstream voters felt sympathetic about the problem of workplace discrimination.

OVERVIEW of TURNOUT CAMPAIGN (Gill Foundation)

2009-08-26T06:52:00.000-07:00

In 2004 the issue of same-sex marriage catapulted into the media spotlight when San Francisco’s newly elected mayor, Gavin Newsom, allowed city officials to issue marriage licenses to same-sex couples. Colorado became a focal point for the issue after two of its politicians, U.S. Representative Marilyn Musgrave and U.S. Senator Wayne Allard, proposed an amendment that banned same-sex marriage. Also based in Colorado, the Christian group Focus on the Family Action began campaigning to preserve what it considered ‘‘traditional’’ marriage. In response Denver-based Gill Foundation, America’s largest contributor to lesbian, gay, bisexual, and transgender (LGBT) organizations, launched the ‘‘TurnOut’’ campaign to drum up voter support for same-sex marriages and sexual-orientation antidiscrimination laws. Between 1994 and 2004 the Gill Foundation invested nearly $54 million in LGBT-related issues, and in 2003 it contracted advertising agency DDB Seattle to create the ‘‘TurnOut’’ campaign for the months preceding the 2004 presidential elections. Television and print advertising appeared in July and targeted cities that had no laws to protect Americans from losing their jobs because of their sexual orientation. Six television spots played like minidocumentaries, showing real people coming out in their workplaces. These employees described what it was like to keep their personal lives secret at work and explained how they planned to disclose their sexual orientation to coworkers and management. The spots ended by directing viewers to http://www.TurnOut.org, a website that revealed the results of each person’s effort and explained other key LGBT issues.
Although Musgrave was reelected in 2004 and Allard was reappointed to serve as a deputy majority whip in 2005, a survey showed that, by the end of the ‘‘TurnOut’’ campaign, its audience felt more receptive to same-sex marriage issues. From an ad industry standpoint ‘‘TurnOut’’ was highly successful; it won five awards at the 51st Annual Cannes Lions International Advertising Festival as well as a Clio Award.

START SOMETHING CAMPAIGN

2009-07-27T22:07:00.000-07:00

OVERVIEW
Once the crown jewel of the General Motors Corp. (GM), the Oldsmobile division had fallen on hard times. As a result, GM went so far as to contemplate terminating the venerable Oldsmobile nameplate, but it opted to reinvent the division instead. Beginning in 1994 Oldsmobile introduced new cars designed to appeal to younger consumers and help win back sales from competitors. Moreover, GM designated Oldsmobile as its import-fighting wing. To this end Oldsmobile created the Alero, a compact car designed to take on such best-sellers as Honda Motor Co.’s Accord and Toyota Motor Corp.’s Camry. With a planned launch date of September 1, 1998, Oldsmobile turned to its longtime ad agency, the Leo Burnett Company, to create a campaign that would generate excitement about the Alero. For this $80 million kickoff campaign, Oldsmobile adopted the tagline ‘‘Start Something.’’ The commercials were unlike anything Oldsmobile had ever done before. In both the 15-second teaser commercials (which debuted August 3, 1998) and the 30-second commercials (which began on September 1), quick-cutting images were set to a pulsing electronic sound track, scenes of screaming teenagers were interspersed with shots of the Alero, and red ovals spelled out such commands as ‘‘Start to Scream’’ and ‘‘Stop Commuting. Start Driving.’’ Every spot closed with the ‘‘Start Something’’ moniker. Leo Burnett also created print pieces and savvy Internet ads. The Alero and its supporting marketing campaign were deemed a success by General Motors executives as well as industry insiders. The campaign also managed to reach its target audience of younger consumers. GM predicted that 1999 sales of the Alero would reach or surpass 100,000 vehicles. Based on its success, the campaign was continued in 1999 and expanded to include the entire Oldsmobile line of vehicles. Early in 2000 the tagline ‘‘Start Something’’ was modified depending on which vehicle was being promoted in the specific spot. The initial success of the Alero was brief, however, and by the end of 2000 Oldsmobile sales were again on the decline. In December 2000 GM announced that it was ceasing production of Oldsmobiles.

HISTORICAL CONTEXT
Oldsmobile had once been perceived as a ‘‘status’’ car, a high-powered American car for the stylish executive with a family, said an article in the July 15, 1991, Adweek. Between 1983 and 1986 the division sold more than one million cars per year. In 1987, however, Oldsmobile’s fortunes waned. GM’s policy of ‘‘badge engineering’’ resulted in Oldsmobile’s vehicles becoming indistinguishable from other GM lines, diluting the brand’s cachet. In addition, the company was slow to introduce new products that kept up with consumers’ tastes. Although Oldsmobile’s 1988 campaign, ‘‘This Is Not Your Father’s Oldsmobile! This Is a New Generation of Olds,’’ was lauded by ad critics and popular with consumers, it did little to bolster the brand’s sinking sales. By 1996 Oldsmobile’s share of the U.S. car market had reached an all-time low of 2.2 percent (down from its 1995 share of 2.6 percent). Its 1996 sales were 14.5 percent lower than in 1995. According to Fortune magazine, Oldsmobile’s loyal customers were aging and had either ‘‘died or defected to Buick.’’
The division took stock of its situation in the mid-1990s and committed itself to revamping its entire product line. In 1994 Oldsmobile debuted the Aurora, which served as ‘‘the centerpiece of [the company’s] strategy to boost sagging sales by attracting buyers younger than its traditional sixty-something crowd,’’ noted USA Today. The redesigned Bravada sport-utility vehicle (model year 1996), the Silhouette and Cutlass (1997), and the Intrigue (1997) followed. So adamant was Oldsmobile to reach younger drivers that in 1997 it teamed up with The X-Files, a show that had a cultlike following among Generation Xers, for a major promotion. Nevertheless, Oldsmobile had no entry-level car that could draw consumers into the Oldsmobile line, so as the entire Oldsmobile line struggled to shed its geriatric image, Alero was pegged as the division’s entry-level vehicle.

TARGET MARKET
Priced between $17,500 and $22,000, the Alero was designated as the entry-level vehicle of the Oldsmobile line. The division intended it to be a high-volume car and set a prelaunch goal for Alero of eventually accounting for 40 percent of Oldsmobile’s sales. ‘‘Start Something’’ was grounded in the premise that the bulk of the consumers who would ultimately drive these sales would be those between the ages of 30 and 50. Within this broad demographic group, Oldsmobile focused on ‘‘well-educated singles or young families with children,’’ according to the San Diego Union-Tribune. The division’s lingering reputation for ‘‘fogey-mobiles’’ made this a challenging audience to win over. Nevertheless, it was an important segment for Oldsmobile to capture. The grail for all car companies was to have consumers ‘‘grow’’ within a line of cars—to start with low-end vehicles and progress to ever-more expensive cars as they became older and wealthier. Market research had shown that brand allegiances were often formed early and tended to be long lasting. If Oldsmobile were to survive, it had to introduce consumers to its line.
To indicate that the Alero represented a new direction for Oldsmobile, Leo Burnett crafted a campaign that was meant to stand out from the array of other car commercials and seize viewers’ attention for itself. ‘‘At first glance, it doesn’t look like car advertising—it’s not supposed to,’’ the division explained in an August 26, 1998, press release. To add to the aura of uniqueness, Oldsmobile opted not to use actors in the commercials. ‘‘These are real people with real lives and passions. They closely reflect the attitude and character of the Alero,’’ said Mike Sands, Oldsmobile’s director of advertising. Moreover, the commercials had a high-energy, youthful feeling. Images of children, teens at a concert, a martial artist, and a man jumping off a mountain into the snow were the core of the spots. The sound track was modern and pulsing, and the quick-cutting cinematography resembled a music video more than a standard car commercial. ‘‘We want people who are willing to try something new,’’ Sands told Automotive News. But Oldsmobile was careful not to position itself too far outside the mainstream. The company wanted women to account for 50 percent of its sales, and conventional wisdom held that this demographic responded well to family-oriented messages. As a result, the division included upbeat domestic scenes in many of its ads. ‘‘The spots are trying to communicate a certain way of thinking and living,’’ a Leo Burnett spokesperson told Adweek. ‘‘[The campaign] speaks to a consumer set that is very new to Oldsmobile.’’
Oldsmobile pitched the Alero not only to younger drivers but also to minority groups, most notably Hispanics and African-Americans. The U.S. Census predicted that Hispanics would account for 42 percent of America’s population growth between 1998 and 2008, while only 2.3 percent of Oldsmobile’s 1997 sales had come from Hispanics. African-Americans were also underrepresented among Oldsmobile consumers. ‘‘There is a huge potential for the Alero to gain Hispanic and African-American customers who had never before considered buying an Oldsmobile,’’ Oldsmobile’s brand manager Bob Clark explained to Automotive News in September 1998. In its bid to pitch Alero to Hispanic and African-American consumers, Oldsmobile created separate ads that targeted these distinct communities. For instance, Alero’s Hispanic-oriented advertising used the tagline ‘‘Vivelo,’’ which meant ‘‘To Live,’’ because ‘‘Start Something’’ translated poorly.

COMPETITION
As GM’s ‘‘import-fighting’’ line, Oldsmobile wanted the Alero to compete against comparable compact sedans by the established import players—the Honda Accord, the Toyota Camry, the Nissan Altima, and the Mazda 626. Alero’s task was a difficult one because it involved ‘‘mak[ing] conquest sales in a shrinking market segment,’’ according to Automotive News. Sales in the lower midrange segment that Alero sought to enter had seen shrinking sales, as increasing numbers of consumers bought sport-utility vehicles and other light trucks instead of cars. It was a highly competitive market, and Alero’s rivals conducted savvy campaigns designed to keep their share of the market. Claiming converts would be a challenge. Foremost among the Alero’s rivals was the Toyota Camry, which was the best-selling car in the United States in both 1997 and 1998. Since fall 1997 Toyota’s ad agency, Saatchi & Saatchi, had advertised the Camry as part of the company’s overall branding campaign: ‘‘Everyday People.’’ The Camry figured prominently in these print and television spots that showed the versatility and practicality of Toyota. Toyota’s overall share of the U.S. market grew from 8.1 percent in 1997 to 8.7 percent in 1998. The Honda Accord was the second-best-selling car in the United States in 1997 and 1998. For model year 1998 Honda had launched a completely redesigned Accord. Spots by Rubin Postaer & Associates used the tagline ‘‘An Accord Like No Other’’ to tout the Accord’s roomier interior, performance, and quiet engine. This $100 million campaign ‘‘was almost paying homage to the Accord over the past 22 years,’’ a Honda spokesperson told Advertising Age. In October 1998 Honda switched strategies with two new national Accord commercials (also by Rubin Postaer) that did not use ‘‘An Accord Like No Other.’’ Instead the spots presented the Accord not just ‘‘as a car you need,’’ but more as ‘‘a car you want,’’ a Honda representative explained in the October 5, 1998, issue of Advertising Age. In one a frazzled woman left an airport, and, by using her remote-control key, was able to freeze all action around her until she reached her Accord. The tagline proclaimed, ‘‘It’s not just a car. It’s a state of mind.’’ Honda’s overall share of the U.S. car market rose from 6.2 percent in 1997 to 6.5 percent in 1998.
Oldsmobile also viewed the Mazda 626 and the Nissan Altima as direct competitors of the Alero. Since spring 1998 Mazda, which controlled a 1.5 percent share of the U.S. car market, had used the slogan ‘‘Get In. Be Moved.’’ in advertising for all its offerings. As part of this campaign, Mazda’s ad agency, W.B. Doner & Co., created a commercial for the 626 that sought to build a more energetic and sophisticated image for the car. Set to David Bowie’s song ‘‘Rebel Rebel,’’ the commercial portrayed an attractive woman driving across town in her 626. She stopped at a sign announcing a PTA meeting and walked inside carrying a cake. ‘‘Do not go gentle into that good PTA meeting,’’ the voice-over intoned, in a spoof on Dylan Thomas’s famous poem, ‘‘Do Not Go Gentle into That Good Night.’’ Mazda ran a similar commercial for the 626 in May 1999. Nissan, whose share of the U.S. car market was an impressive 4.0 percent, pulled the plug on its ‘‘Enjoy the Ride’’ branding campaign in 1998 and initiated more product-specific spots that failed to have their desired effect. The company consequently inaugurated a new branding campaign in 1999 with the tagline ‘‘Driven.’’

MARKETING STRATEGY
‘‘Start Something’’ was designed to generate excitement for the launch of the Oldsmobile Alero. Just as the component advertisements strove to convey the car’s fun-to-drive and distinct image, Oldsmobile’s marketing efforts attempted to make the Alero’s introduction highly visible to the car’s target audience. ‘‘We really need to establish this vehicle with a big splash,’’ Oldsmobile’s Sand was quoted in the August 17, 1998, Adweek. The teaser commercials were an essential component of this plan. Even before the Alero had arrived at dealers, these 15-second spots ‘‘offer[ed] more of a sneak preview than a full disclosure of what l[ay] ahead,’’ Oldsmobile explained in a press release. By the time the full 30-second spots aired on September 1, Oldsmobile had piqued viewers’ curiosity. Print ads ran in major monthly magazines and newsweeklies after September 1. Oldsmobile employed atypical media strategies to ensure that the Alero received a considerable amount of attention. The Internet figured prominently in the ‘‘Start Something’’ campaign. According to Brandweek, the Internet was the ‘‘centerpiece of its media blitz.’’ In addition to scores of banner ads displayed on popular websites, Oldsmobile even offered test drives at home for consumers who signed up online. Incorporating the Internet into its marketing venues was a logical choice for Oldsmobile. ‘‘We think the Internet is used by very youthful, very technologically savvy consumers who are similar to the consumer profile that we want to attract with the Alero,’’ Sands told Automotive News. To raise the Alero’s profile further, Oldsmobile announced its ‘‘Start Something Tuesdays on ABC Sweepstakes’’ in August 1998. This promotional tie-in with ABC’s Tuesday evening prime-time lineup encouraged viewers to enter a sweepstakes in which 200 Aleros would be awarded.
Because Oldsmobile included Hispanic and African-American consumers in its target audience, the division used slightly different methods to reach these groups. For instance, Alero advertisements bearing the ‘‘Vivelo’’ tagline appeared in national Hispanic magazines and on Spanish-speaking networks. Oldsmobile concentrated its Hispanic-oriented efforts on large cities such as Los Angeles and Miami, as well as in regions with substantial Hispanic populations, such as Texas and the Southwest. GM declared October 13, 1998, to be ‘‘GM Hispanic Awareness Day.’’ At the company’s Miami symposium that day, a GM executive said, ‘‘I think the Alero speaks volumes about our commitment to, and expansion into, the Hispanic community.’’
In 1999 GM expanded the ‘‘Start Something’’ campaign to encompass all of its Oldsmobile vehicles in what company executives described in Advertising Age as a ‘‘divisional branding campaign,’’ or ‘‘divisional effort.’’ Karen Francis, Oldsmobile’s general marketing manager, told Advertising Age that in 1999 Alero’s marketing tagline, ‘‘Start Something,’’ was being moved to all Oldsmobile vehicle models and that the expanded campaign would kick off with television spots during the 1999 Super Bowl. A new campaign to support the introduction of the Oldsmobile Aurora sedan began in April 2000; it featured the ‘‘Start Something’’ theme, but with a subtle twist. Francis explained to Advertising Age that each vehicle in the Oldsmobile line would have a different word after ‘‘Start.’’ For the Aurora the tagline was ‘‘Start Obsessing,’’ and the Alero’s modified tagline was ‘‘Start Connecting.’’ The strategy took a different spin in late 2000 when GM announced that the redesigned Bravada sport-utility vehicle would be the last vehicle released under the Oldsmobile brand. Leo Burnett created just one 30-second TV spot supporting Bravada’s launch; it was scheduled to appear on syndicated cable for three weeks followed by a run during the ‘‘March Madness’’ basketball coverage. The spot featured a Bravada racing down a road with a herd of wild horses running alongside it. A voice-over stated, ‘‘A new beast on the road.’’

OUTCOME
Both GM officials and industry analysts heralded the Alero’s launch as a success. Although GM’s overall 1998 performance was sluggish, the Wall Street Journal called the Oldsmobile division GM’s ‘‘one bright spot’’ and stressed the importance of the Alero to Oldsmobile’s positive results. Sands informed the January 11, 1999, Adweek that the Alero campaign was the first Oldsmobile effort that had ‘‘truly resonated’’ with this younger target audience. ‘‘It was like a light bulb went off in [consumer’s heads] that Oldsmobile had changed,’’ he exclaimed. An Oldsmobile dealer further emphasized the division’s turnaround to Automotive News on February 15, 1999:
‘‘We’re attracting non-Oldsmobile owners into the showrooms to buy Oldsmobiles.’’ The company predicted 1999 sales of the Alero to exceed 100,000. The Alero’s debut was made all the more impressive by the challenges it overcame. In June 1998 a labor dispute led to strikes at major GM production facilities, which delayed the Alero’s initial release. Some dealers and analysts therefore predicted a tepid reception for the car. ‘‘We’ve got a lot of advertising support and market interest generated and now people come in the door and there’s nothing to show them,’’ one dealer complained to the Capital Times. But these fears proved to be overblown.
Following a brief rise on the crest of the ‘‘Start Something’’ campaign, in December 2000 Oldsmobile sales took a disappointing nosedive. GM executives soon announced that the entire Oldsmobile line would be phased out. The launch of the redesigned Bravada sport-utility vehicle in 2001 would be the brand’s swan song. According to an Advertising Age report, Oldsmobile’s plans for a 2001 first-quarter divisional branding campaign were canceled. ‘‘Obviously, we’re not into brand building, we’re into brand selling,’’ a GM spokesman said. Further, amidst complaints from Oldsmobile dealers that the advertising failed to clarify fully the brand’s new positioning, the unit’s general manager Karen Francis and advertising director Mike Sands both resigned, and Oldsmobile conducted an agency review. Included in the review were incumbent Leo Burnett; McCann-Erickson Worldwide, which was the agency for the Buick line; and E. Morris Communications, the agency handling Oldsmobile’s African-American advertising. Following the review Leo Burnett retained the account and created the final advertising for Oldsmobile. In 2004 the last new Oldsmobile rolled off the assembly line.

LOOKING FOR MR. GOODWRENCH CAMPAIGN

2009-07-27T22:04:00.000-07:00

OVERVIEW
In the early 2000s General Motors Corporation (GM) found itself the victim of its own success. Improved quality in its vehicles had resulted in less warranty work for the service centers of GM dealerships, which very much depended on the revenues. All of GM’s 7,400 dealers were brought under the Goodwrench program (a national chain of GM dealer repair shops), and the ad agency chemistri (later called Leo Burnett Detroit) was given the task of building up the brand to attract more nonwarranty work to the service centers. The marketers decided to revive the Mr. Goodwrench character, not seen in GM ads for almost a generation but still alive as a cultural icon. The result was the ‘‘Looking for Mr. Goodwrench’’ campaign.
Rather than portray Mr. Goodwrench as an actual person, as was done from 1975 to 1985, chemistri revisited the concept by creating an oblivious reporter character, played by comedian Stephen Colbert, known for a similar role on Comedy Central’s program The Daily Show. He set off on a never-ending quest to find the one and only Mr. Goodwrench, never quite able to comprehend that every one of GM’s 80,000 technicians was, in essence, Mr. Goodwrench. In addition to 30-second TV spots, the campaign consisted of radio spots and print ads, supplemented by an updated website.
In the first year GM spent $50 million on the ‘‘Looking for Mr. Goodwrench’’ campaign, which began in March 2003 and succeeded in elevating the Goodwrench brand in the minds of consumers. Colbert’s rising stardom also helped the campaign, and he was retained for a second set of TV spots, launched in October 2004, and for a third in 2005.

HISTORICAL CONTEXT
To promote its network of dealership service centers, in 1975 GM’s Service and Parts Operations (SPO) introduced Mr. Goodwrench, the everyman of General Motors technicians, along with the slogan ‘‘Keep that great GM feeling with genuine GM parts.’’ The character remained the focal point of GM SPO ads for a decade. In the ensuing years, however, GM SPO received fewer advertising dollars and produced no memorable campaigns. In the meantime the quality of General Motors cars improved, resulting in a significant erosion in income for the shops, which concentrated on performing warranty work. In 2002, for example, GM cars had 130 problems per 100 vehicles, an 11 percent improvement over the prior year, placing the company third in quality behind Toyota and Honda. Because their cars had fewer problems, GM consumers also became lax about taking them in for scheduled maintenance and repairs, adding further to the loss of business at GM repair shops. It was estimated that dealers performed 15 to 20 percent less warranty work in 2002 than in 2001. GM dealers became concerned that the loss of warranty work would reduce the amount of money they could invest in mechanics’ training and service facilities and that this would produce a downward spiral of diminished service quality, poor reputation, and further erosion of sales. The obvious way to offset the loss of warranty repairs was to boost nonwarranty business. To do this GM decided to beef up its Goodwrench program, in which only about half of the GM dealerships were participating. Starting in January 2003 all of the dealers were required to participate in the program. As a result Goodwrench became the largest automotive service network in the United States and had more financial resources at its disposal. For advertising GM turned to chemistri, an agency based in Troy, Michigan. Chemistri was heir to D’Arcy Masius Benton & Bowles, whose connection to GM dated to 1915, when the agency fashioned ads for Cadillac. In 2002 D’Arcy’s parent company, Bcom3, was acquired by Publicis Groupe SA and disbanded. D’Arcy’s Detroit operation was kept and renamed chemistri, its purpose to focus exclusively on GM clients.

TARGET MARKET
The target market for the ‘‘Looking for Mr. Goodwrench’’ campaign consisted of both male and female owners of GM vehicles whose ages ranged from 24 to 54. A GM spokesperson quoted by Alice Z. Cuneo in Advertising Age described the coveted demographic as ‘‘Starbucks suburbanites.’’ It was with this type of person in mind that the marketers made their decision about who would represent the brand in the new campaign.

COMPETITION
As Goodwrench service centers attempted to expand beyond warranty work, they began competing against a multitude of local mom-and-pop shops. On the national scene Goodwrench had to contend with Ford’s Quality Care service centers, which were in much the same plight, looking to drum up repair work to make up for the loss of business that had resulted from improved vehicle quality. Quality Care was spending about $40 million a year on advertising, as was another national player, Midas Muffler Company, which had been hurt by the introduction of longer-lasting mufflers in the 1990s. Midas was attempting to reposition itself as a general car maintenance center instead of just a muffler shop, and it had the benefit of a well-recognized brand to aid in the effort.
Goodwrench also faced regional competition from smaller muffler shops, such as Meineke Discount Mufflers, which had changed the name of its 900 shops in Canada and the United States to Meineke Car Care Center. Although it lacked the budgets of other companies, Meineke had the advantage of a celebrity pitchman, boxer George Foreman. Another muffler chain stepping into the fray was the 600-unit Monro Muffler and Brake. Moreover, the repair field was crowded with competitors of a different type: auto parts retailers—such as Pep Boys and the northeastern chain Strauss Discount Auto—who were opening supercenters to install the parts they sold.
Given the crowded auto repair field and the difficulty of standing out, GM was committed to spending at least as much as Ford and Midas on advertising. ‘‘We want to get this program launched at industry-leading levels,’’ Jon Brancheau, director of brand marketing for GM SPO, told Automotive News’s Dave Guilford.

MARKETING STRATEGY
As the new Goodwrench campaign was being developed, GM requested that chemistri expand its marketing approach beyond creating TV spots. The agency was asked to think in terms of wider marketing plans and to bring in partner agencies with expertise in direct mail, interactive advertising, diversity affairs, and other areas. In crafting the ‘‘Looking for Mr. Goodwrench’’ campaign, chemistri received significant input from GM’s Dealer Fixed Operations Advisory Board. The agency also got marketing advice from the Optimization Group, a Detroit consulting firm, and hired Six Degrees, based in Scottsdale, Arizona, to provide research assistance. In an interview with Guilford for Automotive News Brancheau said that the decision to bring back the Mr. Goodwrench character, even though he would be nothing more than a phantom, was a ‘‘no-brainer.’’ Research showed that, despite an 18-year absence, Mr. Goodwrench remained firmly entrenched in the mind of consumers. The marketers elected to use humor, but because it was important to portray the technicians as skilled professionals, they had to walk a fine line. The challenge, therefore, was to find a way to relay serious information—such as the fact that dealer technicians used the latest in diagnostic tools and had received more then one million hours of combined training in the previous year—and still be funny. Humor also helped to address another potential pitfall: focusing too much on the need for service, which might carry the implication that GM products were not trustworthy. Moreover, humor helped spice up what was a less-than-exciting subject for consumers. Marketing director Beth Grotz told Theresa Howard of USA Today, ‘‘Your typical automotive service ad is a technician or service manager pleading with you to come in. We thought we’d take a little different approach to see if we could get more interest in the category.’’ To serve as the focal point of the new Goodwrench campaign, GM elected to hire a comedian and settled on Stephen Colbert, a reporter on Comedy Central’s The Daily Show, a satire of an evening news program. Colbert’s deadpan delivery and well-honed dimwit persona made him an ideal choice to play the role of a reporter searching to find the one and only Mr. Goodwrench. While many people may not have recognized Colbert at the time, he was well known by the target market.
The ‘‘Looking for Mr. Goodwrench’’ campaign was multifaceted. In addition to TV spots, it included radio, print, and Internet elements. Print ads appeared in such magazines as People, Newsweek, Time, Sports Illustrated, Better Homes and Gardens, and Ebony. All ads mentioned theGoodwrench website,where consumers could find additional information and locate their nearest service center. The focus of the campaign was four 30-second television spots, which aired during both network and cable programs. In addition, chemistri created five spots that dealers could air on their own, and GM established 30 local marketing groups to fund local advertising. The national ads first appeared in March 2003, in time to be shown during telecasts of the NCAA Men’s Basketball Championship. They were also shown during other sporting events, including NASCAR races, a major venue for promoting anything automotive. Moreover, GM Goodwrench sponsored a race car, which would be featured in one of the TV spots.
All four of the first wave of ads in the ‘‘Looking for Mr. Goodwrench’’ campaign featured Colbert’s clueless reporter attempting to uncover the identity of the man called Goodwrench. The spot called ‘‘Service Bay’’ showed Colbert in a safari vest that would become the character’s trademark. He interviewed three GM service technicians, asking, ‘‘Mr. Goodwrench—who is this one and only GM expert?’’ They all claimed to be Mr. Goodwrench, confusing Colbert, who resorted to a bullhorn to ask the real Mr. Goodwrench to please step forward. The spot closed with the line ‘‘Find Mr. Goodwrench at over 7,000 GM dealerships nationwide.’’ A second spot, ‘‘Mitre Saw,’’ was broken into two parts. First, when told that Mr. Goodwrench had more than one million hours of training, the disbelieving reporter quipped, ‘‘Doesn’t leave much time for Mrs. Goodwrench now, does it?’’ Colbert then asked a technician what kind of tool Mr. Goodwrench would be if he were a tool. When the bemused technician answered, ‘‘Wrench,’’ Colbert was quick to reply, ‘‘No, the correct answer is mitre saw.’’
The final two spots in the initial ‘‘Looking for Mr. Goodwrench’’ campaign took Colbert out of the service center. In ‘‘NASCAR Garage’’ he visited with the driver of the GM Goodwrench-sponsored race car, Kevin Harvick. Colbert was again skeptical when Harvick confirmed that Mr. Goodwrench knew GM cars better than he did and could be found both at the track and at GM dealerships. The spot closed with Harvick expelling Colbert from his race car, where Colbert was pretending to be a driver. In the last spot, ‘‘On the Street,’’ Colbert approached people to question them about Mr. Goodwrench, capping off the interviews by outlandishly asking whether he did root canals as well as service work on GM vehicles.
There was no doubt that Colbert’s work on the TV and radio spots was the cornerstone of the success of the ‘‘Looking for Mr. Goodwrench’’ campaign. When the ratings of The Daily Show improved dramatically during the U.S. presidential campaign of 2004, Colbert’s visibility grew. The show’s ‘‘Indecision 2004’’ coverage was especially popular with a younger demographic, part of which admitted to getting most, if not all, of their real news from the fake news show. GM’s Goodwrench service centers enjoyed Colbert’s reflected popularity. GM even became a sponsor of The Daily Show’s website. Market research indicated that, after the launch of the campaign, GM experienced significant gains in unaided brand awareness, ad awareness, and brand consideration. In October 2004, in an attempt to build on the momentum created over the previous year, GM began airing two new spots in the ‘‘Looking for Mr. Goodwrench’’ campaign. Colbert was again featured, this time joined by a sidekick, comedian Brian Posehn. Together they traveled in a tiny three-wheeled truck with ‘‘Looking for Mr. Goodwrench’’ emblazoned on the side. In the spot titled ‘‘Stakeout’’ they tried using high-tech equipment in a dealership parking lot to find Mr. Goodwrench. In the second spot, ‘‘APB,’’ Colbert asked a mounted police officer to put out an all points bulletin (APB) for Mr. Goodwrench, noting that Mr. Goodwrench claimed to spend more than a million hours a year training. ‘‘Do you know what that means?’’ he asked. ‘‘Expertise?’’ suggested the officer. ‘‘Two words,’’ replied Colbert, then offered three: ‘‘Labor law infraction.’’
Three new ‘‘Looking for Mr. Goodwrench’’ ads appeared in the summer of 2005. While the little truck made an appearance when Colbert challenged Harvick to a race, Posehn did not. Instead, Colbert was solo once again, questioning technicians and customers alike in his ongoing search for Mr. Goodwrench, a concept that continued to provide the copywriters with enough humorous situations to exploit Colbert’s talent and promote the Goodwrench brand.

OUTCOME
GM was extremely pleased with the ‘‘Looking for Mr. Goodwrench’’ ads. As Grotz told the online resource the Auto Channel, ‘‘GM has broken away from the pack . . . Most vehicle service ads feature a technician holding a part in his or her hand, but we moved away from the typical spot and connected with consumers through unique settings in addition to the dealership environment, and through humor.’’ The campaign was recognized by the advertising industry, winning a Bronze EFFIE Award (Automotive Aftermarket Products and Services category) in 2005. Meanwhile, Colbert’s high profile, both in films and on Comedy Central, added luster to the ongoing campaign.

HUMMER CAMPAIGN

2009-07-27T20:12:00.001-07:00

OVERVIEW
When General Motors Corporation (GM) acquired the commercial marketing rights to the Hummer truck, the civilian version of the U.S. Army’s Humvee, it faced the challenge of promoting a vehicle that was never intended to be sold in high numbers. Part of the solution was to design smaller, less-expensive versions, the H2 and H3, but much of the success would have to depend on the marketing. Rather than turning to a roster of ad agencies it usually worked with, GM hired a young Boston creative boutique, Modernista!, in 2000. The initial goal of the $35 million campaign, begun in August 2001, was to establish Hummer as a luxury brand. Thus, images ofmud-splatteredHummers that played up the vehicle’s off-road capabilities were scrapped in favor of shots that made it seem jewel-like. Once the brand was repositioned, the marketers’ goal was to pitch the lower-priced H2 and H3 to a wider market, hopefully to more women. Factors such as rising gas prices and the perception that the Hummer was oversized for most consumers proved to be major hurdles for the marketers. However, by the end of 2003 the campaign had succeeded in redefining the Hummer brand, and with the introduction of the H3 in 2005, the marketers took on a new challenge: selling the Hummer to a mass market.

HISTORICAL CONTEXT
The Humvee was designed for the U.S. Army in 1979 by AM General Corp., based in South Bend, Indiana. The 3.5-ton vehicle became a star of the 1991 Persian Gulf War, spurring consumer demand for a civilian version, which was introduced in 1992 as the Hummer. It catered to an exclusive market, as demonstrated by the fact that Arnold Schwarzenegger was one of the first buyers. The vehicle never received much advertising support; AM General spent less than $1 million on marketing the Hummer in 1999, when it sold about 700 of the trucks. Nevertheless, AM General did enough business to attract the attention of General Motors, and in the end bought the Hummer brand in late 1999.
GM signed a seven-year contract with AM General to produce the next generation, GM-designed version, the Hummer H2 sport-utility vehicle (SUV). The agency Modernista! was hired to promote the brand. Prior marketing efforts had played up the military connection and the Hummer’s off-road capabilities, billing the vehicle as ‘‘the world’s most serious 4x4.’’ Modernista! won the account because it was the only agency that attempted to fashion a wider appeal by going beyond the tough-guy, army-truck image.
The principals involved in the campaign did not lack experience in selling cars. Modernista!’s cofounder, Lance Jensen, had worked with Hummer’s advertising director, Liz Vanzura, when she was at Volkswagen of America and he was with the Boston-based ad agency Arnold Communications. Both played key roles in developing Volkswagen’s award-winning ‘‘Drivers Wanted’’ campaign. Vanzura commented that, while the Volkswagen ads were aimed at ‘‘cool, young people,’’ her new mission was to sell Hummers to ‘‘cool, rich people.’’

TARGET MARKET
Even before hiring Modernista!, GM had done a great deal of market research. According to Ted Evanoff, writing for the Indianapolis Star, ‘‘In 1999 researchers stumbled across the notion that an unlikely cross-section of America—surgeons, dot-com millionaires, rock stars, high school students, corporate execs—prized their individuality. And they regarded the rugged Hummer as a symbol of individuality, especially compared with the typical sport-utility common in suburbia.’’ Modernista! was given 2,200 pages of market data to distill into an advertising message. The agency was also handed a brand that skewed very much toward males, averaging 50 years in age and with an annual household income of more than $200,000. The target buyer for the less-expensive H2, while still male, was 42 years old on average and had a household income above $125,000. Vanzura told Chris Reidy of the Boston Globe that the coveted audience included ‘‘rugged individualists, adventurous entrepreneurs, and adrenaline junkies.’’ In other interviews she described the target market as ‘‘successful achievers’’ and ‘‘style leaders.’’ She also told Evanoff that Hummer had to vie with other purchases the well-to-do might consider, such as yachts or vacation houses, stating, ‘‘We’re really not competing in an automotive category.’’

COMPETITION
The yacht, vacation house, and other status symbols notwithstanding, Hummer competed in the luxury-SUV category against other SUVs, including the Lincoln Navigator, Land Rover’s Range Rover, and the Lexus LX 470. But Hummer’s chief opponent was DaimlerChrysler’s Jeep Wrangler. Boasting similar military roots but extending back to World War II, Jeep had defined the SUV category and at its height in 1993 controlled nearly 30 percent of the traditional SUV market. Over the following several years, however, the brand failed had to introduce new models, and its lessexpensive ones faced increasingly stiff competition, resulting in a severe erosion of sales. As long as Hummer was not a direct competitor, DaimlerChrysler took little notice of it, but as soon as GM acquired the right to mass-market the Hummer, DaimlerChrysler recognized the threat at the high end of the SUV category and became determined to hold on to Jeep’s reputation as the premier heavy-duty, off-road brand. The two vehicles had slightly different target markets, however. Jeep appealed to consumers who loved the outdoors and might attend one of the dozens of Jeep Jamboree off-road events held throughout the year. Typical Hummer customers, on the other hand, wanted the off-road capabilities the vehicle had to offer but were more interested in the image it created. They were as likely to drive their Hummers to an upscale mall as up a mountain.

MARKETING STRATEGY
In preparation for marketing the lower-priced H2, Modernista! instituted a bridge campaign, paid for by AM General, to sell the H1 while repositioning the brand. As Will Uronis, an associate creative director at Modernista!, explained to the Boston Herald ’s Greg Gatlin, ‘‘Hollywood had defined what Hummers stood for—war, explosions and arrogance . . .We just took a look at another facet of the truck.’’ Jensen added, ‘‘We went out and talked to guys that drove them . . . they don’t all hunt and kill things.’’ Nevertheless, Hollywood movies had done a good job of making consumers aware of the Hummer. Market research conducted in 1999 indicated that as many as one in five buyers of full-size SUVs considered purchasing the Hummer. The bridge campaign was intended to play to the ‘‘rugged individualists’’ who, research revealed, were attracted to the Hummer and to set the stage for the launch of theH2 by creating an emotional attachment to the brand that transcended the hard-edged image fostered by Hollywood. According to Evanoff, writing in the Indianapolis Star, the promotion of the H1 was intended to create a ‘‘halo’’ over the brand, providing ‘‘the foundation for a brand image that will carry the smaller H2.’’ The first national ads for the GM-owned Hummer began appearing on August 13, 2001. It was an all-print campaign that featured photographs of the vehicle in lush locales in Chile. Not only did the pictures suggest where the H1, with its off-road prowess, could take the viewer, but they also made the big truck look small. It was the first time Hummer was not portrayed covered in mud or linked to the military. Reinforcing the visual message of the ad was the text, which included the headline ‘‘How did my soul get way out here?’’ and the concluding text ‘‘Sometimes you find yourself in the middle of nowhere. And sometimes in the middle of nowhere you find yourself. The legendary H1.’’ Hummer’s longtime tagline, ‘‘World’s most serious 4x4,’’ was replaced by ‘‘Like nothing else.’’ The four ads ran through the rest of 2001, appearing in such publications as the Wall Street Journal, Barron’s, Esquire, Spin, Wired, and Red Herring. Hummer’s 50 dealers were also encouraged to use the ads created by Modernista! to bring continuity to the brand’s makeover, with some of their media costs being reimbursed by a cooperative advertising program. The H2, based on GM’s Chevrolet Tahoe full-size SUV, was introduced in July 2002. A second model featuring a small pickup bed and a cargo door was supposed to be offered at the same time, but the launch was pushed back, partly because the vehicle needed more work but also as a way to extend the marketing buzz the brand was creating. The new H2, with a base price of $48,000, was about half the price of the H1 and, despite being called the ‘‘baby Hummer,’’ essentially the same size. But it featured a smaller, less noisy gas engine rather than a cumbersome diesel one, and it had comforts and customizable options the H1 lacked but that were expected in a luxury SUV.
The introduction of the H2 was supported by another print campaign developed by Modernista! While the ‘‘Like nothing else’’ tagline of the previous ads was retained, the look of the new ads was markedly different, relying on dramatic close-ups set against bold, sky-blue backgrounds.
Like the first ads, the new ones ran in a wide range of magazines, with the text tailored to the publication. For example, in the Robb Report, which covered all things luxurious, the text read, ‘‘Excessive. In a Rome at the height of its power sort of way.’’ The Vanity Fair text read, ‘‘Threaten the men in your office in a whole new way,’’ part of an effort to increase the number of women buying the vehicles. Another ad proclaimed, ‘‘Perfect for rugby moms.’’ About 10 percent of H1 owners were women, and one goal of the H2 campaign was to increase that number to 25 percent. Outdoor ads were also produced, running in 14 major markets, including New York, Los Angeles, Chicago, and Detroit. Print and outdoor ads were made available for the use of dealers. The first Hummer television ads aired in mid-August 2002. The initial three 30-second spots, intended to romanticize the truck, were shot in Iceland and in Vancouver, British Columbia, and featured both natural and urban locations. They showed friends in a Hummer speeding over the tundra of Iceland or a professional woman weaving through traffic in a city. Set to rock music, the only words in the spots were text statements such as ‘‘Maybe if you can, you will.’’ A second phase of the television campaign played on people’s perception of the Hummer as a gas-guzzling road hog. In one spot a young boy constructed a small wooden version of the Hummer to enter in a soapbox derby, while The Who’s ‘‘Happy Jack’’ played in the background and the little girl next door looked on. At the start of the big race the other boys scoffed at little Jack and his less-than-streamlined racer, but he prevailed by abandoning the asphalt course, breaking the rules to go cross-country and win the race and the girl. Through the humor of the spot Jack was iconoclast, offering subliminal reassurance to potential Hummer customers who might feel guilty about buying a vehicle that got about 13 miles to a gallon of gas on the highway. A second Hummer spot, also displaying a tough side, hearkened back to the Asteroids video game of the 1980s, with a spaceship blasting boulders only to confront an indestructible Hummer, which chased the ship off the screen.

OUTCOME
GM and Modernista! succeeded in introducing Hummer to a wider market, but after a strong showing in 2003, sales began to tail off, partly because of high gas prices. To regain lost ground, in 2004 GM introduced the H2 SUT (sport-utility truck). This was followed by the unveiling in 2005 of the H3, a midsize Hummer priced from $29,500 to $32,000. Almost 17 inches shorter, 1,700 pounds lighter, and more fuel-efficient at 20 miles per gallon, it was a vehicle GM hoped women and younger drivers would find more appealing. In pitching the vehicle to a mass market, Hummer and Modernista! faced a new task. Putting a positive spin on the challenge, Jensen told Jeremy W. Peters of the New York Times, ‘‘The brand has a lot of different personality levels . . . You can do the serious capability stuff, the real rough-and-tumble rock climbing stuff, the peaceful back-to-nature stuff.’’ Industry analyst Mary Ann Keller disagreed, telling the New York Times that it was impossible to sell Hummer to the masses:
‘‘How in the world can you possibly fathom that something that looks like a military vehicle is practical for the average driver?’’

EV1 INTRODUCTION CAMPAIGN

2009-06-21T17:35:00.000-07:00

OVERVIEW
In December 1996 General Motors Corporation (GM) became the first major automaker in almost 80 years to market an electric car, dubbed the EV1. The car’s debut came just months after the California Air Resources Board had reluctantly decided to postpone a mandate requiring that 2 percent of cars sold in the state by 1998 be powered by electricity. Regulators agreed to change the mandate to 10 percent by 2003, but only if automakers began voluntarily introducing electric cars. With the EV1, GM effectively shifted the discussion about electric cars from the fringe to the mainstream. By most accounts, the car was a technological marvel. Its sporty aerodynamic design, which included an allaluminum frame, magnesium seats, and low-resistance tires, earned GM engineers 23 patents. But while the introduction of the EV1 was undeniably a watershed event, there were obstacles to the car’s success. It could travel just 80 to 90 miles before needing to be recharged, which took about three hours. The price was high, with lease payments coming to about $480 a month after various federal, state, and local tax incentives. And since there were only a handful of public charging sites, drivers would need to lease a charging unit for their garages or workplaces for another $50 a month.
Thanks to a steady stream of media coverage, there was pent-up curiosity about the EV1 when it became available on December 5, 1996. The $10 million advertising campaign developed by Hal Riney & Partners of San Francisco added to the mystique of the EV1. The campaign did not delve into the intricacies of the car’s technology but instead was aimed at building awareness and excitement about the fact that an electric car was available and that GM was behind it. While the target market for the EV1 was expected to be affluent people with an interest in technology and the environment, the early stage of the campaign was aimed at reaching a broader, more general audience. Teaser billboards and newspaper ads inaugurated the campaign, which was kicked off in full force on December 5, 1996, with the broadcast of a $1.5 million television commercial that featured an endearingly lifelike brigade of home appliances.

HISTORICAL CONTEXT
During the 1990s California earned the dubious distinction of having the dirtiest air in the nation. Car and truck exhaust could be blamed for at least half of the state’s air pollution, which spurred regulators to create a mandate for electric-powered vehicles. Similar clean-air mandates were in the works in other states, such as New York and Massachusetts that were also alarmed by worsening air quality. The laws that were passed varied, but in general they required automakers to begin offering vehicles that met the ultra-low-emissions-vehicle (ULEV) standard or the zero-emissions-vehicle (ZEV) standard. The mandates were controversial. The principal question was whether states should mandate production of the cars and hope that consumers and ample public charging stations followed or if consumer demand should determine how many electric cars automakers built. GM’s research suggested that consumers were receptive to electric cars, even if it meant sacrificing some of the conveniences they enjoyed with gas-powered automobiles. The lack of a public infrastructure was worrisome but not insurmountable to GM. In southern California, for example, utility companies had already begun installing charging sites in locations such as shopping centers, restaurants, hospitals, theaters, and public parking structures. By being the first to bring a car to market, GM would be able to stake a claim to technological leadership going into the next century.
Many in the industry believed that the EV1 and other electric cars could legitimize a new approach to transportation that would dramatically lessen air pollution. John Dunlap III, the chairman of the California Air Resources Board, was enthusiastic about the EV1: ‘‘This has the potential of being a revolutionary step.’’ Others, however, worried that if the EV1 failed it could set back development of alternative-fuel vehicles for years to come.

TARGET MARKET
Not surprisingly, GM selected California as a launch state for the EV1. Arizona, the other launch state, also made sense, for its warm climate allowed for optimal performance of the car’s battery. A key marketing decision was made that, while the car would carry the GM badge, it would be leased through the Saturn Corporation subsidiary. The two-seater EV1 seemed to be a good fit with Saturn’s young, environmentally conscious buyers. Moreover, by offering the EV1 at Saturn dealerships, where 73 percent of sales were to people whose second choice was not a GM vehicle, GM saw an opportunity to reach import-loyal customers. Oddly enough, marketing the EV1 was as much about determining who should not drive it as who should. GM was quick to point out that the EV1 was not right for everyone. Joseph Kennedy, the Saturn vice president for marketing, told Popular Science, ‘‘Because the EV1 is a two-seat vehicle and does not have the longdistance range [of] 200 miles or 300 miles, it will play a role in the owner’s portfolio of vehicles.’’ He explained that the EV1 was not a primary household vehicle that could fulfill all driving needs but one appropriate for ‘‘shorter, quicker uses around town.’’
The groundwork for introducing the EV1 was laid in 1994, when GM’s PrEview Drive Program gave people in 12 cities the chance to drive a prototype model for two weeks. ‘‘We saw that it wasn’t going to be an ordinary buyer,’’ Necole Merritt, manager of corporate communications for Saturn, observed. ‘‘It was someone attuned to innovation, the kind of person who bought the first cell phone or first computer.’’ The PrEview Drive Program and other research suggested that potential drivers would be affluent college graduates, usually white, middle-aged men who were leaders in their fields. They were expected to be 35 to 54 years old, with an annual family income of more than $125,000 and a high interest in technology and the environment. Frank Pereira, GM’s EV1 brand manager, noted that the car ‘‘really speaks to those who have a desire to be in the forefront of directing the evolution of technology.’’ Once the vehicle was in the Saturn retail facilities, sales consultants narrowed the target market even further. Each facility had a consultant trained in EV1 technology who screened customers to be sure that an electric vehicle was appropriate for their needs. Next, would-be customers made an appointment with an electric vehicle marketing specialist who spent up to 12 hours making certain that their driving habits and expectations were a good fit with the EV1. ‘‘It’s important they convey to customers what this car can and cannot do,’’ explained Donald Young, Saturn’s representative for the EV1 program. ‘‘We don’t want to sell it to someone who drives 60 miles to work each way.’’ The specialists also coordinated a home and garage inspection to determine how to install the EV1’s charging unit.

COMPETITION
In 1996 a reporter for the Los Angeles Times wrote that, ‘‘while other major auto makers have held their electric vehicle cards close to the vest, GM has been center stage.’’ Every major automaker, however, was under the same clean-air mandate, and they all kept watchful eyes on the public’s reaction to the EV1. What they observed was a market, albeit a small one, emerging. Other automakers followed on GM’s heels. Toyota produced an electric version of its RAV4sport utility vehicle, but for government or company fleet leasing only. In 1997 Ford produced an electric vehicle for fleet use. Ford, however, seemed to be taking a different approach from GM, with its efforts directed at creating alternative-fuel vehicles that would meet ULEV standards. Consumers’ Research Magazine reported that Ford offered the best range of ‘‘street-worthy’’ alternative-fuel vehicles, including the electric Ranger pickup truck, a Taurus sedan that ran on methanol and ethanol, and several other sedans that ran on compressed natural gas. In May 1997 Honda presented the most formidable challenge to GM’s electric car yet when it introduced its EV Plus, which boasted a longer-life nickel-metal hybrid battery and a greater driving range. Advertising for the EV1, however, did not address any of the emerging competitors. For the time being there was plenty of room for all electric carmakers on the playing field.

MARKETING STRATEGY
To build public awareness of the EV1’s introduction, GM hired Hal Riney & Partners, the same marketing and communications partner that had created Saturn’s award-winning advertising. Teaser billboards in Los Angeles and San Diego were the first element of the campaign to be unveiled. The billboards displayed a lightning bolt and the words ‘‘You can’t hear it coming, but it is.’’ The day the cars went on sale, new billboard ads went up with a photograph of the EV1 and the words ‘‘The electric car is here.’’
The campaign’s centerpiece was a 90-second television commercial that showed animated household appliances greeting the battery-powered EV1. Its eyecatching special effects were created by Industrial Light and Magic, a studio started by Star Wars creator George Lucas. The commercial began with a thunderstorm that knocked the electricity out in a home. When the power came back on, the appliances sprang to life. They unplugged themselves and waddled out the door to watch as the EV1 approached on the street. ‘‘It’s intended as a celebration of the arrival of the electric vehicle,’’ explained Saturn’s Kennedy. Both 30- and 60-second versions of the commercial also aired for 12 weeks in late 1996 and early 1997.
Newspaper ads during the introductory campaign tried to show consumers what a dramatic departure the EV1 was from gasoline-powered cars. For instance, a two-page ad in the Los Angeles Times depicted reeds blowing in the wind as the car drove by. It read, ‘‘There is no noise. No pistons. No valves or exhaust. Just the whir of an AC motor. And the wind. And your thoughts, of course. As you drive the electric car.’’ Because the automobile was available only in limited markets, the heaviest concentration of newspaper advertising was regional. Newspapers ads appeared in the California edition of the Wall Street Journal and in the Los Angeles Times, Arizona Republic, and Phoenix Gazette. Magazine advertising during the introductory period was placed to reach leaders in technology and innovation. The media plan included such periodicals as Business Week, Inc., Scientific American, Wired, and American Benefactor. Magazine ads had the same thoughtful, laid-back approach as the newspaper ads. One ad, for instance, showed the blur of the car on a stretch of highway and read, ‘‘You will never again use the words ‘fill’er up.’ Or ‘check the oil.’ Never utter the need for a tune-up. Or a smog check. Nope. You will simply say, ‘Unplug the car and let’s go.’ When you drive the electric car.’’ Following the 12-week introductory campaign, the marketing efforts for the EV1 shifted into a lower gear. The remainder of the advertising budget went primarily into direct-mail pieces and a handful of ads in magazines favored by technology buffs.
Time magazine’s Margot Hornblower criticized the marketing approach used for the EV1. Describing a billboard that showed a single headlight in the darkness and the words ‘‘Electrohydraulic power steering, digital clock, EV1,’’ Hornblower wrote, ‘‘The low-key print campaign has been so esoteric as to be nearly incomprehensible.’’ This subtle approach also was frustrating to members of the EV1 Owners Club, who felt that the car’s features should be spelled out more clearly in order to lure potential drivers. In fact, Marvin Rush, cofounder of the club, purchased airtime on KFI in Los Angeles with his own money and ran unauthorized spots for four weeks in early 1998. Rush told the Los Angeles Times that EV1 owners ‘‘consider ourselves evangelists. We’re trying to get GM to change its advertising.’’ In the end GM’s lawyers reviewed the radio ads for misstatements, found none, and opted to let the renegade campaign run its course. ‘‘They’re actually pretty good,’’ EV1 brand manager Frank Periera confessed to the Los Angeles Times.

OUTCOME
The EV1 advertising campaign received critical kudos. Bob Garfield, a reviewer for Advertising Age, wrote that the television commercial used ‘‘eye-popping digital effects to communicate the revolutionary significance, the drama and the exciting implications of this introduction.’’ He added, ‘‘The march of the electronivores! It’s a wonderful concept, wonderfully realized. Even the unplugged among us will not be able not to stare at the futuristic vehicle Californians and Arizonans can buy right now.’’ A print ad for the EV1 took home the prized $100,000 cash Kelly Award for best magazine advertising as well as nonmonetary Kelly Awards for meeting the campaign’s objective and for design and graphics.
While the EV1 got rave reviews for its advertising, the car itself had no shortage of critics. Automotive analyst Christopher Cedergen told CBS News, ‘‘Overall, the electric car concept is premature. The technology really isn’t there yet.’’ Richard de Neufville, professor of transportation at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, was quoted in Time magazine as saying, ‘‘They gave a party, and nobody came.’’ GM declined to make sales projections when the EV1 rolled out, but industry sources speculated that fewer than 2,000 would be leased in the first year. That figure proved to be optimistic, for only 300 EV1s were actually leased. Some speculated that the advertising had missed the mark by failing to link the EV1 with Saturn dealerships. Joe Ricciardi, who led GM’s EV1 effort in Arizona, acknowledged in the Arizona Republic that ‘‘there are a lot of people who don’t know it [the electric car] is out there and don’t know where to find it.’’ To some the EV1 was most remarkable in its role as a stepping-stone to other clean-air transportation solutions.
Phil Hodgetts, president of the Electric Vehicles
Association of Southern California, said in the Los Angeles Times, ‘‘The biggest advantage of the EV1 has been to excite public interest in cars that will be nonpolluting, in pure electric vehicles running on batteries. I think it’s the start of something big.’’ GM executives contended all along that the goal of the EV1 was to build a market for alternative-fuel vehicles and that sales volume was less important than giving early drivers a good experience. Despite tepid leasing numbers in 1997, GM’s commitment to the EV1 remained firm going into 1998. The car was introduced in the metropolitan areas of San Francisco and Sacramento, the advertising budget was increased from $10 million to $15 million, and GM stepped up efforts to create an infrastructure by committing $750,000 for the development of public charging sites in the car’s markets.
While the basic approach remained the same, advertising leading into 1998 introduced a welcome touch of humor to the sometimes awestruck tone of the 1997 campaign. A few print ads even cleverly capitalized on the public’s dubiousness. An ad that ran in newspapers in northern California, for example, showed an overhead view of the EV1 and stated, ‘‘All the skepticism in the world can’t stop it. The electric car is here.’’

THE CADDY THAT ZIGS CAMPAIGN

2009-06-21T17:32:00.000-07:00

OVERVIEW
Although ownership of a Cadillac was for decades widely considered a part of the ‘‘American Dream,’’ Cadillac Motor, a division of General Motors, saw its share of the luxury-car market begin to decline in the 1990s. The company also saw the rise of a new subcategory in the luxury-car field, the entry-level luxury car (or ‘‘entry-lux’’), exemplified by new models such as the Lexus and new, lower-priced Mercedes models. Cadillac responded to these trends by taking a risk in 1997 with a new entry-lux model, the Catera. The sporty, comparatively affordable Catera was unlike anything Cadillac had ever sold before. It was also the first Cadillac made entirely overseas (in Germany). To launch this groundbreaking new model, Cadillac implemented a marketing campaign unlike any it had done before, calling the Catera ‘‘The Caddy that Zigs.’’ The campaign—which included a variety of television and print advertisements—used humor and clever copy to communicate to car buyers that the Catera was a whole new kind of Cadillac. The campaign even used a quirky red cartoon duck as a prominent symbol, another move that broke with the more staid marketing usually associated with Cadillac.
The campaign received harsh criticism from media and auto-industry critics. Surveys also showed the public had a mixed reaction to the campaign (especially the duck). But Cadillac executives were pleased with the sales figures for Catera’s first year, and they reported that the campaign overall had made a positive impression on the public’s traditional perceptions of the car maker.

HISTORICAL CONTEXT
Since its early days Cadillac was a company that specialized in luxury cars. Eventually car buyers identified the Cadillac name as synonymous with American luxury cars (‘‘Cadillac’’ even appears in some dictionaries with the definition ‘‘luxurious’’). Marketing campaigns emphasized the car maker’s tradition and quality and were aimed at an older, wealthy, male demographic. But the emergence of luxury cars from foreign manufacturers made a dent in Cadillac’s market share. Competitors like Mercedes-Benz, BMW, and Lexus gradually eroded Cadillac’s long-time dominance of the luxury field: from 1990 to 1996 Cadillac’s share of the luxury-car market plunged dramatically from 22.2 percent to 14.8 percent.
One of the reasons for the drop was that other car makers were building the popular entry-lux vehicles. Traditional luxury vehicles controlled 52 percent of the overall luxury market in 1991 but only 34 percent four years later. During the same time period, the market for entry-lux cars grew from 25 to 39 percent.

TARGET MARKET
The typical buyer of a Cadillac automobile was male, in his late 50s or 60s, affluent, and usually but not always college-educated. David Nottoli, Cadillac’s Catera brand manager for 1997, said the Catera campaign sought a different market. ‘‘We were looking at the 45–50 age bracket,’’ he said. In addition to this narrow market, Cadillac wanted to expand on its traditional customer base by pursuing more female customers. The car maker was hoping 50 percent of Catera customers would be women. In addition, Cadillac hoped to draw an audience that was almost 100 percent college-educated. Nottoli added that non-General Motors customers were also targeted by the Catera campaign.
According to the Catera Brand Book for Cadillac dealers, ‘‘The target buyer for this car is young enough to be the son (or, just as likely, daughter) of people currently driving DeVilles [a larger, older Cadillac model]. Their definition of luxury bears no resemblance to their parents’ generation. For them . . . BMWs, Volvos, and Infinitis say more than Cadillacs and Lincolns. When it comes to luxury, Cadillac is status quo. And these buyers don’t want status quo.’’

COMPETITION
By 1997 Cadillac was increasingly concerned about its decreasing market share as well as the growing popularity of entry-lux autos. The buyers in this new market tended to be younger, more performance-conscious, and more open to automobiles built overseas such as Mercedes-Benz and Lexus. Cadillac executives’ attention was especially drawn to the cases of two competitors’ vehicles launched in the 1990s: The Lexus ES 300, which sold 39,367 units in its first year (1992); and the Mercedes-Benz C class, which sold 23,793 units in its launch year (1994). Cadillac’s Nottoli noted that these cars were introduced with essentially the same marketing strategies traditionally used for upscale automobiles. Television and print ads were geared for an affluent audience, with dignified shots of cars rolling along country roads or displayed in luxurious settings. Cadillac knew it had to pursue a different style of marketing campaign for its Catera, as it wanted to make a major impact in the competitive entry-lux market.

MARKETING STRATEGY
To launch its ambitious Catera campaign Cadillac worked closely with its national advertising agency, the Bloomfield, Michigan, office of the international firm D’Arcy Masius Benton & Bowles (DMB&B). The car maker spent an estimated $40 million on the campaign. According to Nottoli, Cadillac knew most car buyers saw the company as the manufacturer of serious, luxury automobiles. To challenge this perception, Cadillac wanted to emphasize a lighter side in the Catera campaign. ‘‘We tried to focus on fun,’’ he said.
They started with the campaign’s slogan, ‘‘The Caddy that Zigs.’’ Although auto enthusiasts and Cadillac owners had long called the cars by the ‘‘Caddy’’ abbreviation, the company had never used the shortened term in any advertisement before the Catera. This simple break with tradition was an important one for Cadillac, as the company wanted to emphasize that the Catera was different from any car the maker had produced before. When Cadillac and DMB&B faced the issue of which symbol or spokesperson to use for the campaign, they turned to the family crest of the founder of Cadillac (the crest is on each automobile made by the company). That crest featured six ducks—actually mythical birds called merlettes that are similar to ducks. In the crest all six ducks face left. Cadillac officials decided to play off the crest—a symbol rooted in years of family and company tradition—for its Catera ‘‘spokesperson.’’ Cadillac and DMB&B creative teams decided to turn one of the ducks in the crest to the right. The idea was that the duck ‘‘zigged’’ away from Cadillac tradition, just like the Catera. Thus the slogan ‘‘The Caddy that Zigs’’ was born. The use of a cartoon duck—red, no less—was meant to emphasize fun and irreverence, Nottoli said. Cadillac knew the use of a cartoon animal to promote a luxury car was not without its risks, but the company also knew it had to take chances to reach its younger target market. ‘‘The goal of the duck was to show how luxury and fun could come together,’’ Nottoli said. ‘‘It was representative of a whole attitude.’’
The 1997 Catera campaign got off the ground in January with a spot in a prime advertising location: the Super Bowl. The Catera spot, featuring the red duck and model Cindy Crawford, generated quite a bit of attention—not all positive—for the car maker. Several more television spots followed, all emphasizing the duck and a younger, irreverent attitude. One full-page magazine advertisement played on this attitude with a paean to ‘‘duck logic’’: ‘‘Ducks think differently than you and me. They would never forget a birthday. They have never sponsored a negative political ad. They avoid talk shows like the plague. They dance in the rain and take great pains not to walk around the puddles.’’ Ads later in the year noted the performance features of the car. One 30-second television spot was set on a curving, mountain road. The Catera drove along with two competing entrylux cars following. The voiceover announced, ‘‘You follow the leader. You follow the pack. Then you get a Catera. Suddenly, you don’t follow anything.’’ The background music was upbeat techno-pop, and the spot closed with the ‘‘Caddy that Zigs’’ slogan and the duck. In a unique promotional move, Cadillac displayed Cateras at an Atlanta mall for five weeks in January and February 1997. Cadillac-trained specialists were on hand to answer questions about the cars, and special kiosks were set up for curious shoppers. The idea was to expose the Catera to the public in an environment not traditionally associated with automobiles, with the goal of interesting consumers who might not normally consider buying a Cadillac in test driving a Catera. Figures showed about 70,000 people visited the mall display. Other innovative direct marketing techniques were employed. One Cadillac dealer took Cateras to golf and tennis tournaments, events populated by affluent, younger car buyers. The same dealer also used Cateras to taxi people to and from National Symphony Orchestra performances. In another unique move, a six-page foldout ad, which ran in fashion magazines, tied the Catera’s styling to the work of trendy fashion designers.

OUTCOME
There were strong, divergent views on how successful the 1997 Catera campaign was. For Nottoli, the campaign was a winner for bottom-line reasons: the Catera sold well in its launch year. ‘‘In the end you judge the outcome based on results,’’ Nottoli said. Those results included the sale of 25,411 Cateras in the vehicle’s first year, surpassing Cadillac’s sales goal of 25,000. But Nottoli remarked that sales figures were not the only measure of success for the Catera campaign. He noted that the age of the typical Catera buyer—a factor that had been a crucial part of the marketing strategy—was lower than that of other Cadillac buyers. While Cadillac and industry experts differed on what the median Caterabuyer age was (while Cadillac claimed the median age was 52 years old, 13 years younger than the median age for traditional Cadillac buyers, auto industry observers claimed the age was closer to 58), Nottoli said the undeniable fact was that the car was bought by younger consumers.
The gender makeup of Catera buyers was also promising, Nottoli said. About 51 percent of Catera buyers were male, which was right on target for Cadillac’s goal of having an equal number of female and male buyers. This gender equity was much different from the typical Cadillac customer base, and Nottoli said the Catera marketing campaign played a big part in drawing female customers.
In addition, Nottoli said the Catera was successful as a ‘‘conquest vehicle,’’ an auto industry term for a car that brings in buyers who had previously not purchased a vehicle from that brand. In the case of the Catera, the campaign helped draw non-General Motors buyers into the Cadillac showrooms, another of the campaign’s key goals.
While Nottoli considered the 1997 Catera campaign a success, he acknowledged problems, most notably the red duck. While Cadillac originally adopted the duck as a spokes-symbol to emphasize fun and irreverence, the cartoon character soon began receiving too much attention. ‘‘We couldn’t get people off the duck,’’ Nottoli said. ‘‘People took it too far. They had a love-hate relationship with the duck.’’
Criticism of the Catera campaign was consistent and strong. From the beginning of the campaign, viewers were critical of the use of the duck. They also questioned whether the target market would accept a Cadillac. USA Today’s fourth annual survey of advertising agency creative directors reported it as one of the worst campaigns of 1997, writing, ‘‘More than a third of the panelists name Catera as their first choice for 1997’s worst ad. Cadillac wants to attract younger viewers to its $30,000 car, but ad executives say it was a mistake to link a luxury brand in a commercial with a wise-cracking cartoon duck.’’ In addition, USA Today’s Ad Track survey reported that only 9 percent of consumers surveyed liked the Catera duck (below the 22 percent average) and only 11 percent found the ad campaign very effective (compared to a 25 percent average).
Cadillac dealers were also critical of the campaign, complaining that the Catera campaign focused too much on fun and not enough on the car’s features. ‘‘We don’t need a quack as our spokesman,’’ Jacques J. Moore, president of a Cadillac dealership, told the Washington Post. ‘‘The Catera is a heck of a good car, an excellent car. We need an advertising campaign that sticks to the merits of the car, that emphasizes the quality of the Cadillac name.’’
Nottoli responded by saying that Cadillac was aware of the campaign’s weaknesses. He added that his one regret was the campaign was a little too ‘‘silly’’ and not sophisticated enough. But, he added, ‘‘We took a risk. I’m glad we did.’’
Nottoli said focus groups conducted by Cadillac showed solid awareness of the Catera, but that awareness did not necessarily bring buyers to the point where they bought the car. He added that many focus group participants did not consider the Catera a Cadillac; they considered it to be a different car altogether. Cadillac owners also did not consider the Catera a ‘‘real’’ Cadillac, but rather a ‘‘little Cadillac,’’ he said.
Nottoli said this was part of the ‘‘Cadillac baggage’’ the Catera marketing campaign fought to overcome. Cadillac’s traditional image as a maker of big luxury cars for older people played a big part in the acceptance of the ‘‘Caddy that Zigs’’ message. ‘‘We didn’t start with a clean slate,’’ Nottoli said. ‘‘The Cadillac baggage hurt us.’’ In 1998 Catera advertising downplayed the duck and emphasized the car’s performance features. The duck only appeared at the end of ads as an icon. Catera sales for 1998 were up considerably over sales in 1997, and the age of Catera buyers continued to decrease, Nottoli said, demonstrating the effectiveness of the ‘‘Caddy that Zigs’’ campaign.

BREAK THROUGH CAMPAIGN

2009-06-21T02:29:00.000-07:00

OVERVIEW
Cadillac, a division of Detroit-based auto giant General Motors Corporation (GM), had long been GM’s luxury division, offering higher-priced, roomier vehicles. The brand had been in trouble for several years, however, and saw sales tumble almost 10 percent between 2000 and 2001. One of the primary culprits was Cadillac’s aging customer base. By the early 2000s the average age of Cadillac buyers was 65 years old. Younger drivers tended to prefer European and Japanese luxury automobiles such as BMW, Mercedes, and Lexus. To help reach younger consumers, Cadillac developed the CTS, a sedan that was priced as an ‘‘entry’’ luxury car, along the lines of the BMW 3 Series.
Cadillac earmarked nearly a quarter of a billion dollars for a new campaign, which was implemented by advertising agency D’Arcy Masius Benton & Bowles. Titled ‘‘Break Through,’’ the campaign revolved around a television spot that premiered at the 2002 Super Bowl. The commercial first invoked the brand’s post–World War II heyday by showing a young professional driving a 1959 Cadillac. The commercial really kicked into gear with the arrival of the new CTS, which passed the 1959 vehicle on the open road while Led Zeppelin’s ‘‘Rock n’ Roll’’ played in the background. Led Zeppelin was one of the most successful rock bands of the 1960s and 1970s, and Cadillac believed that the band’s iconic status and hard-rock sound offered the right combination of nostalgia and edge.
Representing a major achievement for the campaign, the average CTS buyer was 55 years old. Cadillac expanded the ‘‘Break Through’’ campaign for several years, making it a division-wide affair. It became a key component in the company’s efforts to revitalize itself.

HISTORICAL CONTEXT
Cadillac rose from the remains of the Henry Ford Company. After Ford left the company, his former partners decided to continue in the automobile business. In 1902 they formed the Cadillac Automobile Company. The organization took its name from Antoine de la Mothe Cadillac, the founder of the company’s home city of Detroit. In 1909 Cadillac was purchased by General Motors. As the twentieth century progressed, GM grew to become the largest automaker in the world. Cadillac developed into GM’s luxury brand. The vehicle never sold well outside the United States, but within the country Cadillac became synonymous with quality and luxury. By the early 2000s, however, the brand was under pressure from European and Japanese luxury brands such as Lexus and BMW. Between 2000 and 2001 the company’s sales dropped about 9 percent, bringing to 40 percent the sales slide that had been going on since the mid-1980s.
As Cadillac’s customer base aged, the brand began to get a reputation as an ‘‘older’’ company aligned with establishmentarian attitudes. In fact, by 2001 the average Cadillac buyer was 65 years old. This presented a problem for GM because the division’s future depended on attracting baby boomers—people who were in their 40s and 50s in 2001. The company also had trouble getting women to purchase its vehicles. In an effort to reach out to younger drivers, for model year 2003 Cadillac replaced its sagging Catera model with the CTS, which was designed to be sleeker and flashier than the Catera. The CTS operated on a 5-speed transmission, reminiscent of that used in BMWs, and it used a 220-horsepower V-6 engine, which provided a smooth ride. It also offered OnStar, a computerized guidance system.

TARGET MARKET
The new CTS was positioned as an entry-level luxury car for drivers who tended to be well established in their careers. It was intended for professionals and other consumers who were interested in a roomier, more luxurious ride but who were put off by the price of such Cadillac mainstays as the Seville, a midsize luxury vehicle that would soon be phased out in favor of the STS. Cadillac hoped to attract a younger audience for the CTS: baby boomers (those born from World War II to the early 1960s) and members of Generation X (those born in the late 1960s and 1970s).
The company was concerned that Cadillac was being seen by consumers as an older, un-hip brand. Imageconscious boomers tended to shy away from Cadillac in favor of flashy foreign luxury brands such as BMW and Lexus. The company also felt that it needed to appeal to more women drivers. Cadillac wanted to reach those consumers with the CTS, with the anticipation of luring them to buy higher-priced Cadillac models, like the Seville/STS, in the future. While the company enjoyed its reputation as a classic luxury car, it wanted to freshen up that image to help meet the challenges of the early 2000s.

COMPETITION
As an affordable, entry-level luxury car, the CTS competed with similarly priced vehicles from other luxury automobile brands. Chief among these was the Lexus ES 300, manufactured by the Toyota Motor Corporation’s Lexus division. The ES 300 was the latest in the popular ES sedan line, first introduced in 1989. Lexus introduced the ES 300 in model year 2003, at the same time that Cadillac brought out its new CTS. Because the ES 300 launch was a major priority for Lexus, the CTS faced intense competition from the beginning. Acura would also be launching a new design of its luxury vehicle the TL, though with less fanfare than Lexus. Other imports that competed directly with the CTS included the Mercedes-Benz C-Class, the Audi A4, the BMW 3 Series, and the Infiniti G35, made by a subsidiary of Nissan. The Ford Motor Company’s Lincoln luxury division was long considered a chief competitor for GM’s Cadillac division. Lincoln, however, did not have a strong entry-level vehicle available at the time. Its flagship model, the Town Car, did draw from some of the CTS’s market share, but it was more expensive and competed more directly with the Cadillac Seville.

MARKETING STRATEGY
Cadillac wanted its new campaign to accomplish many different things. Most importantly, it needed to introduce the CTS successfully. Its other goals were to reverse the previous year’s substantial decline in sales and to burnish the company’s image in relation to import luxury brands. Cadillac enlisted ad agency D’Arcy Masius Benton & Bowles, based in Troy, Michigan, to run its new campaign, which would cost more than $240 million. The agency had worked with Cadillac before and understood the company’s concerns.
To drum up advance publicity, Cadillac offered the CTS for use in The Matrix Reloaded, the 2003 sequel to the popular science fiction movie The Matrix. At the core of the campaign was a series of several television spots, all of which featured the Led Zeppelin song ‘‘Rock n’ Roll.’’ Led Zeppelin, who recorded nine studio albums between 1968 and 1980, was one of the first hard-rock bands and also one of the most enduringly popular. While the band still appealed to younger fans, its original loyal fan base was now comfortably middle-aged.
It was believed that Led Zeppelin’s music possessed a combination of nostalgia and edge that would appeal to baby boomers. The band’s untitled fourth record, featuring the classic-rock staple ‘‘Stairway to Heaven’’ as well as the hard-charging ‘‘Rock n’ Roll,’’ was one of the best-selling records of the 1970s and was seen by some baby boomers as a touchtone of their youth. Because Led Zeppelin had an outlaw reputation in its heyday, attracting various stories and urban myths about its members’ over-the-top parties and decadent lifestyle, the band never acquired a stuffy reputation, even with the passage of time. Also, the band’s classic status—it was in the Rock n’ Roll Hall of Fame and was generally regarded as the exemplar of the hard-rock genre—helped to underscore Cadillac’s reputation as the classic luxury car. The campaign kicked off during the 2002 Super Bowl on Fox television, at a cost of more than $10 million. The event, which served as the championship game for the National Football League, was typically the most watched television event of the year, and the advertisements that ran during it garnered not only a large audience but also a significant amount of media attention. The Cadillac spot began by showing a young professional driving a vintage 1959 Cadillac. He was stuck in a traffic jam but then managed to turn off down a side street, which led to an open highway. At this point the Led Zeppelin music began, and a CTS appeared in the rearview mirror. A unseen announcer then declared: ‘‘A legend—reborn.’’ Soon the CTS passed the older car and rocketed down the open road, as the music played louder and louder. The spot closed with the tagline ‘‘Break Through.’’
Other brands, including Coors Light beer and
Sheraton Hotels, also used popular 1960s and 1970s songs in their advertisements during this time. As baby boomers aged, they continued to buy products that celebrated 1960s and 1970s recording artists, such as the Beatles Anthology CDs. Led Zeppelin itself had released several popular box sets in the 1990s, and in 2003 it put out a successful collection of live performances recorded in 1972. On January 27, 2004, Cadillac paid to become the official vehicle of Super Bowl XXXVIII, which was broadcast on CBS. Cadillac featured a new 60-second spot called ‘‘Turbulence’’ that expanded upon the ‘‘Break Through’’ campaign. It featured a voice-over by the actor Gary Sinise, who had played a major role in the Oscarwinning 1994 film Forrest Gump. The commercial retained ‘‘Rock n’ Roll’’ on the soundtrack and highlighted four key Cadillac models: the Escalade and SRX sports utility vehicles (SUVs), the XLR, and the CTS. The spot showed the four cars driving in the desert. The CTS, Escalade, and SRX all met at an intersection, creating a swirl of ‘‘turbulence’’ that eventually subsided to reveal an XLR with its top down, driven by a young woman. Cadillac ran three other spots during the broadcast, featuring the Escalade, SRX, and XLR individually. All three ended with the ‘‘Break Through’’ tagline. The musical focus of the spot dovetailed with Cadillac’s decision to offer XM radio in its DeVille, Seville, CTS, and Escalade models. XM was a popular satellite-radio service that provided a diverse array of music, sports, and entertainment channels. The subscription service required a special radio, which Cadillac began to offer for the CTS and other lines.

OUTCOME
The CTS did not fare well competing head-on with BMW or Mercedes, but its competitive pricing—it came in at under $35,000—meant that Cadillac could reorient its campaign to take on the Honda Accord and Toyota Camry. Otherwise, the campaign met with success. Automobile journalists awarded the CTS the North American Car of the Year at the Detroit-based North American International Auto Show in 2002.
Cadillac was pleased with the ‘‘Break Through’’ campaign results. Eventually the company’s website even carried the ‘‘Break Through’’ tagline. As late as 2005, 85 percent of respondents to an internal survey still saw the campaign as fresh and different. Most importantly, within nine months of the ‘‘Break Through’’ campaign’s inception, the average age of CTS buyers was down to 55, a marked improvement over the Cadillac division’s average of 65. Nearly 40 percent of those consumers were women. Internal data showed that approximately half of CTS buyers would not have previously considered purchasing a Cadillac

REVOLUTION CAMPAIGN

2009-05-26T08:57:00.000-07:00

OVERVIEW
In 1997, when it was acquired by CKE Restaurants, Hardee’s Food Systems was a struggling chain in the Midwest and Southeast with a growing reputation for poor service and substandard food. By 2002 the chain had launched 10 different marketing campaigns in nine years, each designed to turn the chain’s business around. The campaigns met with little success. To try and carve out a niche somewhere between inexpensive fast-food chains and pricier ‘‘quick-casual’’ restaurants, as well as to win back customers, Hardee’s executives initiated the Hardee’s ‘‘Revolution’’ in select test markets. The rebranding effort included a scaled-down menu featuring the chain’s new premium Thickburgers, renovated restaurants, and a new emphasis on customer service.
In 2003 the ‘‘Revolution’’ program was expanded to the rest of the chain with a supporting marketing campaign created by Mendelsohn/Zein Advertising, an agency based in Los Angeles. Andrew Puzder, president and chief executive officer of Hardee’s, told Nation’s Restaurant News that the chain planned to devote all of its marketing energy in 2003 to the ‘‘Thickburger Revolution.’’ According to Nation’s Restaurant News the campaign had an estimated budget of $50 to $60 million. The commercials, which ran on television and radio, were honest and apologetic about the company’s slip into substandard food and service. Puzder was featured in some spots, where he admitted that the food the chain used to serve was bad. In other spots former customers stated why they no longer ate at Hardee’s. Although it seemed that Hardee’s was taking a risk by introducing higher-priced premium burgers at a time when competitors were slashing prices, the strategy paid off. In 2004, following the launch of ‘‘Revolution,’’ the chain’s fourth-quarter same-store sales increased 9.2 percent over 2003. In addition the ‘‘Revolution’’ campaign was awarded an EFFIE in 2005.

HISTORICAL CONTEXT
Hardee’s started out in 1960 in Greenville, North Carolina, as a simple walk-up counter business owned by Wilbur Hardee. It eventually grew into a small-town hero to hungry diners throughout the South and Midwest. The chain built a reputation for good quality, nontraditional fast-food fare such as roast beef sandwiches and ‘‘made from scratch’’ biscuits. For a brief time, before Hardee’s became known as the place to avoid if you were hungry for hamburgers, the chain bumped Wendy’s International from its number three spot. But by 1990 its downward spiral had begun. The chain’s food quality was unpredictable, and menu changes left customers confused, while poor service sent them running for the door. In 1997 CKE Restaurants, which already owned the burger chain Carl’s Jr., acquired Hardee’s with a plan to transition the entire chain to Carl’s Jr. restaurants. Hardee’s franchisees and executives bitterly rejected the plan. Hardee’s and Carl’s Jr. maintained their separate identities, but the former became known as Star Hardee’s and sported the Carl’s Jr. happy-star logo on its signs. The menu at Hardee’s also underwent changes to more closely match the offerings served by its sister chain, and stores were haphazardly remodeled to make their decor resemble that of Carl’s Jr. The changes did little to boost business for Hardee’s, and the brand slipped to number six among fast-food burger restaurants. In 2003 Puzder, who had become president of Hardee’s in 2000, determined it was time to reestablish the brand’s identity and to rebuild the neglected chain’s business and reputation. The Hardee’s ‘‘Revolution’’ was launched.

TARGET MARKET
Sister chain Carl’s Jr. had focused its energies on being the place for young men to go for big, juicy burgers, but the goal for Hardee’s was to appeal to adults by offering a broader range of menu items that included fast, tasty breakfasts and restaurant-style burgers for lunch or dinner. ‘‘The Hardee’s brand is broader—it has more breakfast business, it’s more adult,’’ Brad Haley, the company’s executive vice president for marketing, told Restaurants & Institutions.
The two brands not only appealed to different consumer groups but also were distinguished from each other by regional differences, which made it difficult to create a single marketing theme for both brands. Hardee’s was centered in the Midwest and Southeast, whereas Carl’s Jr. served the West. Haley said, ‘‘In the Southeast, Hardee’s is a very strong breakfast brand. In other regions it’s more a lunch/dinner [concept]. So when you’re looking at the brand, it’s not one-size-fits-all.’’

COMPETITION
While Hardee’s was taking a risk by offering customers the kind of thick burgers served at casual-dining restaurants and selling them at a higher price (about $4 for a burger), the chain’s key competitors, McDonald’s (the number one burger chain) and Burger King (the number two chain), were promoting discount prices to attract customers. The tactic was dubbed the ‘‘99-cent menu war’’ by Jim Kirk of the Chicago Tribune. He wrote, ‘‘With No. 2 burger chain Burger King preparing a major national marketing assault around 99-cent menu items, executives at McDonald’s are making their own value strategy a priority with franchisees.’’ McDonald’s launched a national marketing campaign focused on its ‘‘Dollar Value Menu’’ in October 2002. Burger King launched its campaign just a month ahead of that of McDonald’s. The Atlanta Journal-Constitution reported that, faced with complaints that fast-food restaurants were causing American obesity, the two chains had earlier ‘‘tinkered with their menus to add healthier choices and more sophisticated flavors. Now they’re turning to price to win back customers.’’ Individual items on the 99-cent value menu at McDonald’s included two sandwiches, fries, salad, and beverages; Burger King’s 99-cent offerings included hamburgers, tacos, and chili. For both chains the strategy behind the 99-cent value menu was to attract price-conscious consumers who were limiting their visits to restaurants because of the weak economy. Harry Balzer, vice president of the market research firm NPD Group, told the Atlanta Journal-Constitution, ‘‘The average cost of preparing a meal at home is $1.96, making it tempting to turn the cooking over to someone else for just a few pennies more.’’ The 99-cent value menu strategy produced mixed results and weakened profits for the dueling chains. As Burger King’s global marketing officer Chris Clouser noted during an interview with Time magazine, the problem with promotions offering deep discounts was that ‘‘you train customers to come only when there’s a blue-light special.’’

MARKETING STRATEGY
‘‘Revolution’’ was created to set the Hardee’s chain apart from other fast-food restaurants and to establish it as a premier-burger specialist, according to Jack Hayes, writing for Nation’s Restaurant News. The company was also trying to lure customers by carving out a niche somewhere between typical fast-food chains and higher-priced quick-casual dining establishments. To accomplish that, Hardee’s introduced a selection of Angus-beef burgers and eliminated about 40 percent of its lunch and dinner items. The breakfast menu, popular with customers, was left intact. In addition to a menu overhaul, the campaign included a series of television commercials that boldly tackled the chain’s reputation for bad food and poor customer service. One spot, which opened with a scene shot in black-and-white, featured a young man stating that, while Hardee’s ‘‘used to be cool,’’ he no longer went there because when he wanted a burger, he wanted a big, juicy one. The spot then switched to a color shot of a Thickburger and the tagline ‘‘It’s how the last place you’d go for a burger will become the first place.’’ Other commercials featured company president Puzder humbly agreeing with customer complaints that the food quality at Hardee’s had deteriorated and that service was substandard. The spots had been developed based on consumer research that included reviewing comment forms customers had filled out and left in suggestion boxes at Hardee’s restaurants.
The ‘‘Revolution’’ campaign also signified the chain’s shift away from the low-cost—and often low-quality—approach to fast-food menu items that had dominated the quick-service food arena almost since its beginnings. Puzder said that the chain’s new campaign was intended to set Hardee’s apart from the competition and to build its brand identity as the premium-burger specialist among fast-food restaurants. In an interview with QSR Magazine, he explained, ‘‘We not only made the burgers bigger and began using higher quality Angus beef, we also improved the quality of virtually every ingredient on the burgers . . . At a time when most of our competitors have turned to discounting tactics, Hardee’s is banking on America’s ongoing love affair with truly great burgers.’’

OUTCOME
After declining steadily for more than 10 years, Hardee’s experienced a swing in the other direction following the January launch of ‘‘Revolution.’’ The chain reported a 9.2 percent increase in same-store sales in the fourth quarter of 2003 compared to the same period the previous year. Sales growth continued, and Hardee’s reported same-store sales increases for eight consecutive months through March 2004 at stores open for one year or more. Haley told QSR Magazine, ‘‘This was a pure quality strategy and it’s very reassuring to see that fast food consumers appreciate what we have done.’’ The success of the campaign was enhanced when CKE, reversing its original strategy, applied the Hardee’s approach to sister chain Carl’s Jr. and introduced to the latter’s menu not only Thickburgers but also some of the Hardee’s breakfast items. Further recognition of the campaign’s success came in 2005, when it was awarded an EFFIE for meeting its goals of increasing sales, regaining consumer confidence in the brand, winning back the company’s core customers (men aged 16 to 34), and earning credibility as the best place to go for a great burger.

SNEAK A PEEK CAMPAIGN

2009-05-26T08:36:00.000-07:00

OVERVIEW
With its ‘‘Sneak a Peek’’ advertising campaign, Hallmark Cards, Inc., hoped to convince consumers to insist on buying only Hallmark greeting cards and to check the brand insignia on the backs of cards they received. ‘‘This campaign hinges on the concept that there is only one thing consumers need to know: it’s Hallmark, cards that say what they think and feel, the brand they trust,’’ said Brad Van Auken, the company’s director of brand management and marketing. The television spots for the campaign featured a young married couple either exchanging greeting cards between them or picking out cards to give to others. The woman attempts to teach her husband the best techniques to discreetly check whether or not the cards he receives are from Hallmark. The campaign played on the company’s long-running slogan, ‘‘When you care enough to send the very best.’’ Hallmark, the dominant greeting card company in the United States, had a wholesome image and was known for its emphasis on excellence. The company had a long history of successful marketing endeavors, including the award-winning ‘‘Hallmark Hall of Fame’’ series of television programs. Hallmark and its two major competitors, Gibson Greetings, Inc. and American Greetings Corporation, branched out in 1997 by marketing their merchandise via the Internet and offering related products, such as cards that consumers could print at home on their computers. The ‘‘Sneak a Peek’’ commercials won an Effie Award and were popular among consumers, especially with women, who were the primary target market. The campaign was launched in 1996 and ran through 1997. As in previous years, Hallmark’s sales accounted for nearly half of the $7 billion in revenues generated by the greeting card industry in 1997.

HISTORICAL CONTEXT
The Hallmark company was established in 1910, when a penniless teenager named Joyce C. Hall arrived in Kansas City, Missouri, and began marketing his two shoeboxes full of picture postcards through a mail-order business. The business grew rapidly and was soon producing greeting cards, ornamental gift wrap, party decorations, and jigsaw puzzles. In 1984 the company acquired Binney & Smith, which manufactured Crayola products, Magic Markers, and Liquitex art supplies. By 1997 Hallmark Cards was a global firm employing more than 20,000 people, including hundreds of artists, designers, writers, editors, and photographers. In addition to the Hallmark brand, the company made Ambassador Cards, Shoebox Greetings, and several other lines. Hallmark products were sold at a chain of stores owned by the company but also at drug stores and other retail outlets. Since consumers wanted the convenience of finding Hallmark products wherever they shopped, the company launched a new line of cards, Expressions from Hallmark, in 1996. Unlike some other Hallmark brands, the Expressions line was available in supermarkets and other mass-merchandise stores. By encouraging consumers to check the insignia on the back of cards, the ‘‘Sneak a Peek’’ campaign helped call attention to the fact that Expressions was a Hallmark line.
Some of the company’s advertisements were tailored to promote specific products, such as Ambassador Cards. Others, like the ‘‘Sneak a Peek’’ campaign, were intended to generate awareness of Hallmark products in general. In 1951 the company had begun a long-term sponsorship of the popular and critically acclaimed ‘‘Hallmark Hall of Fame,’’ a series of television programs for family viewing. In 1997 alone Hallmark sponsored 87 films and miniseries for television, including Gulliver’s Travels and Larry McMurtry’s Streets of Laredo. In 1996 the company spent $23 million to publicize the Hallmark Hall of Fame and $102 million on advertising designed to draw consumers into Hallmark Gold Crown stores, which carried greeting cards and specialty items. The print and broadcast ads promised, ‘‘You’ll Feel Better Inside.’’ A Hallmark survey in the spring of 1997 showed a 93 percent approval rating for the programs and an 86 percent approval rating for the company’s advertising.
The ‘‘Hallmark Hall of Fame’’ broadcasts won numerous
Emmy Awards, and the Hallmark commercials that
accompanied the programs were recognized for their
tastefulness and creativity. Joyce Hall’s motto, ‘‘Good
taste is good business,’’ had helped the company establish
a wholesome image. The company’s slogan since 1944,
‘‘When You Care Enough to Send the Very Best,’’ was a
reference to Hall’s memoirs When You Care Enough. For
many years the slogan was incorporated into the company’s advertising. Consumers age 50 and over tended to be particularly fond of Hallmark’s sentimental, familyoriented advertising. In 1997 the company’s Internet site included a Nice-O-Meter, an interactive survey that allowed visitors to measure how nice they were.
TARGET MARKET
In 1997 the market for greeting cards, stationery, and other correspondence products was increasing steadily. Hallmark’s research showed that 29 percent of consumers were writing more than they had previously, 46 percent of grandmothers said they received correspondence from their grandchildren, and 58 percent of mothers said their children wrote them thank you notes. A poll in Adweek said nearly a third of the people in the United States planned to correspond more frequently than they had in the past. Consumers liked to give cards that expressed the feelings that they did not have the courage to say aloud. ‘‘If the message in a card rings true, people identify with it and see themselves in it,’’ said Ellen McKeever, manager of the Shoebox Greetings division of Hallmark. ‘‘If a character on a card reminds people of someone the know, or if they just like the character or find it funny, they will choose that card.’’ The perception was that the exchange of cards made people feel good and enhanced their relationships. The ‘‘Sneak a Peek’’ campaign played up these feelings by emphasizing that sending a Hallmark greeting was the ultimate demonstration of caring. The company had conducted extensive research to determine what its customers, who were 90 percent women, wanted in greeting cards. ‘‘From all the information we’ve collected directly from greeting card purchasers, three things are abundantly clear,’’ said Mark J. Schwab, the company’s vice president of strategy and marketing. ‘‘First, consumers want to find great products that are a good value . . . Second, the time-pressed consumer longs for a convenience-based greeting card offering from Hallmark, a company she knows and trusts . . . . Third, we have to make it crystal clear to the consumer that the card shop is simply the best place to shop for our category of products, an exciting, vibrant site from which to reinforce Hallmark brand equity.’’ The ‘‘Sneak a Peek’’ campaign encouraged consumers to have such faith in the Hallmark brand that they would not bother looking at anything else.

COMPETITION
Hallmark was the dominant greeting card company in the United States, with a market share that averaged about 42 percent, according to USA Today ’s Ad Track. American Greetings Corporation came in second with 35 percent, and Gibson Greetings, Inc., was third. In 1996 American Greetings had entered a small but expanding market—interactive entertainment for girls—by developing books and video games that featured several of the company’s popular characters, including Strawberry Shortcake, the Holly Hobbie Blue Girl, and the Popples. In 1997 the company worked with Avery Dennison Corp. to produce a line of greeting cards for inkjet printers. Television commercials and ads in women’s magazines were planned to target women 25 to 54 years old who had children less than 18 years old. American Greetings was involved in various other marketing endeavors during 1997, including advertising on the Internet site of Hearst HomeArts, which featured several magazines published by the Hearst Corporation. The World Wide Web offered vast opportunities for selling greeting cards, candy, and related merchandise, a market estimated to be more than $219 million in 1998. In December 1997 American Greetings tapped into the world of electronic commerce by promoting its cards, flowers, chocolates, and gifts via America Online at a site that had previously been known as AOL’s Card-o-Matic store. American Greetings invested $3 million initially, committed to the arrangement for three years, and agreed to pay millions more in the future. The venture, which had been announced in October, was launched at about the same time that Hallmark began an on-line marketing partnership with the company operating Yahoo!, an Internet search engine. Although some of Hallmark’s on-line cards were free, American Greetings charged for all its cards.
American Greetings was also one of 65 businesses that began marketing merchandise through Compu-Serve’s Electronic Mall on the World Wide Web in March. In addition, the company collaborated with SmarTalk TeleServices in an on-line promotion before Mother’s Day, from April 22 through May 11. Customers who purchased American Greetings merchandise were awarded free telephone time, and customers could follow a link to SmarTalk’s site on the Internet. American Greetings products were also featured at the redesigned Internet site of a third company that offered telephone services, MCI Communications Corp. Meanwhile, Gibson Greetings invested $6 million for an equity in Greet Street, an Internet site where the company could market its cards. Gibson also made an agreement with Firefly, a software company, to market cards through Firefly products. By the end of the year Gibson was preparing to launch its first television advertising campaign to promote its popular bean bag toys. The company had lost $28.6 million in 1994 but had made a profit of $900,000 in the first half of 1995. In that year Gibson wanted to sell either its greeting card business or its Cleo, Inc., gift wrap division. Although American Greetings expressed interest in merging with the greeting card division, Gibson would not agree to the arrangement because of possible antitrust complications.

MARKETING STRATEGY
One of Hallmark’s strongest selling points was the popularity and widespread recognition of the brand. In a 1995 survey by UPS Equitrend, consumers preferred the Hallmark brand more than 18 times as often as its closest competitor. When asked to name a brand of greeting cards, 91 percent of consumers mentioned Hallmark, and 84 percent mentioned Hallmark first. The company had built its brand equity by insisting on excellence, continually pushing its creative staff to be innovative, developing new ways to help Hallmark outlets and other retailers market the company’s merchandise, and conducting research to determine consumer response to the company and its products. ‘‘The marketplace is changing, and consumers’ needs are always evolving, but excellence remains at the top of our priority list,’’ said Hallmark’s Van Auken. ‘‘Through our products, our advertising, our retail environments, and even our World Wide Web site, Hallmark creates experiences to strengthen the tremendous equity of the Hallmark brand. So the real good news is, we’re on the right track, and consumers see it.’’
In 1996 Hallmark had begun to employ a new, multifaceted marketing strategy that included launching the ‘‘Sneak a Peek’’ advertising campaign to promote general awareness of the brand. Of the $175 million Hallmark spent each year for marketing, it budgeted $50 million for the ‘‘Sneak a Peek’’ campaign in 1996 and $44 million in 1997. The campaign, developed by the Leo Burnett USA advertising agency in Chicago, was intended to motivate consumers to act on their preference for the Hallmark brand when they purchased greeting cards and other personal expression products. The campaign centered on a consumer’s impulse to look at the back of a greeting card to see whether it was a Hallmark. ‘‘Sneaking a peek’’ was portrayed as a commonplace indulgence that required enviable adroitness. The broadcast commercials featured a young couple who verified that they ‘‘cared enough to send the very best’’ by glancing furtively at the backs of cards they received from each other. Celebrities appeared in some of the television commercials during 1997; one spot showed three women checking for the Hallmark insignia on the backs of Valentine’s Day cards they had received from singer Ray Charles. Another spot showed a baby in a bassinet looking at the ‘‘Hallmark’’ on a card. The commercials aired during popular prime-time television programs such as Friends, Frasier, Mad about You, and Home Improvement. The campaign also included advertisements in print media. These ads, which made the back covers of magazines such as Good Housekeeping and National Geographic look like the backs of Hallmark cards, ran in 115 publications in 1996 and 125 publications in 1997. Most of them featured a single line of text that was tailored for each magazine. Other ads on the backs of more than 100 magazines consisted of the Hallmark name only.

OUTCOME
The ‘‘Sneak a Peek’’ campaign received an Effie Award in 1996 for effectiveness and creativity in advertising. Hallmark’s research from the spring of 1997 indicated that 86 percent of consumers felt positive about the company’s advertising. In October 1997 Hallmark’s brand equity was ranked fourth among 282 national brands in a study by Total Research Corporation. The study analyzed how well consumers recognized each brand and their perception of the quality associated with it. In another survey USA Today’s Ad Track reported that 31 percent of respondents liked the ‘‘Sneak a Peek’’ campaign, compared with a survey average of 22 percent. The campaign was particularly popular with its primary target market; 36 percent of women liked the ads. In contrast, 21 percent of men liked them. Only 4 percent of the respondents said they disliked the ads, compared with a survey average of 12 percent. Consumers age 65 or older liked the campaign best; 37 percent gave it the highest scores for popularity. The Hallmark ads were among only a few in the survey to receive high marks for both popularity and effectiveness.
The company maintained its dominance in the $7 billion greeting card industry with sales of $3.4 billion in 1997, $3.6 billion in 1996, and $3.4 billion in 1995. The market remained strong and was expected to expand because the average age of the population was increasing, and older people tended to send more greeting cards. Additional sales were expected as card companies customized more of their products for target markets.

WORRIED ABOUT BILL CAMPAIGN

2009-05-26T08:19:00.000-07:00

OVERVIEW
In 2000 the largest tax-preparation company in the Unites States, H&R Block, Inc., was venturing beyond the niche industry in which it had excelled for 45 years. After a series of acquisitions and changes in upper management, the firm known for preparing tax returns began touting its new mortgage and brokerage services, financial-planning services, and line of personal-finance software. The company’s executives also wanted to brand H&R Block as a financial service available to all Americans, not just high-profile businesses. Assimilating all of the company’s changes into one advertising message, H&R Block released its ‘‘Worried about Bill’’ campaign. Created by the advertising agency Young & Rubicam, ‘‘Worried about Bill’’ broke nationally on January 12, 2000. H&R tripled its advertising budget to finance the $100 million campaign, which employed television, radio, print, and outdoor advertisements. Most of the campaign’s 21 television spots featured the fictional character Bill, who, as the April 15 tax deadline approached, grew increasingly anxious while preparing his taxes. The commercials depicted the frazzled Bill becoming so obsessed with the task that he ignored his wife’s attempts at seduction, allowed his daughter to stay out all night, and eventually looked to his daughter’s boyfriend for financial advice. The campaign’s storyline culminated with Bill, delirious from reading his 1099 tax form, incinerating his financial records in the backyard barbecue.
The campaign collected the Best of Show and two Gold awards for the broadcast category at the 32nd annual American Advertising (ADDY) Awards. It also garnered two Gold awards in the television competition at the One Show’s 2001 ceremony. Besides its ad-industry success, the campaign helped H&R Block boost its 2000 sales 38 percent over the previous year’s sales. David Byers, the company’s chief marketing officer, explained to USA Today, ‘‘We’re very happy with the creativity. The feedback we’ve gotten from consumers has been that it’s been enormously successful for us.’’ Much to Young & Rubicam’s astonishment, H&R Block opened its advertising account up for review only a few months after ‘‘Worried About Bill’’ began.

HISTORICAL CONTEXT
Henry and Richard Bloch, brothers from Kansas City, Missouri, first offered their tax-preparation services in 1946 under the name United Business Company. The business quickly grew after the Bloch brothers franchised it. Wanting to change the name United Business Company but afraid that consumers would pronounce their last name as ‘‘blotch,’’ Henry and Richard renamed the business H&R Block in 1955. Later in the 1970s Henry appeared in television spots for the company and assured his audience that their taxes were safe with H&R Block.
In 1996 Young & Rubicam won the firm’s advertising account. Some of the agency’s early work for H&R Block included a 20-second radio spot titled ‘‘Proctor,’’ which stressed the importance of privacy by humorously featuring a street-corner proctology exam. The magazine Advertising Age deemed ‘‘Proctor’’ the best radio commercial of 1998. That year H&R Block spent an estimated $30 million on advertising. In 1999 the firm spent $28 million on advertising during the first nine months. Believing that his company could offer more services to its preexisting customers, newly elected H&R Block president Mark Ernst wanted to brand the business as more than just a tax preparer. In 1993 the company had purchased the personal-finance-software company MECA Software; to expand its mortgaging services H&R Block purchased Fleet Financial Group’s Option One Mortgage; and in 1999 the company expanded its brokerage services by acquiring discount brokers Olde Financial Discount. By late 1999 the firm wanted Young & Rubicam to unify its services under the H&R Block brand. The Delaney Report quoted H&R Block chief marketing officer David Byers as saying in 1999, ‘‘We’re going through a major transformation—moving from being a one product company to a financial services powerhouse. H&R Block is a brand that is ubiquitous. We want to capitalize on that as well as on the high degree of trust the consumer has in the brand.’’

TARGET MARKET
‘‘Worried about Bill’’ targeted its preexisting small and medium-sized business customers that trusted H&R Block for their tax preparation but that still relied on brokerages such as the Charles Schwab Corp., Morgan Stanley, and Merrill Lynch & Company for financial planning, mortgaging, and investing. In addition to businesses, the campaign also targeted individuals with similar financial needs. Differing from H&R Block’s advertising during the late 1990s, which suggested that H&R Block was the best firm for preparing taxes, ‘‘Worried about Bill’’ communicated to audiences that the firm offered a wider range of financial services. According to Greg Farrell of USA Today, the campaign attempted the transform ‘‘H&R Block from tax preparer to full financial services company for Middle America.’’ By early 2000 the surge of young entrepreneurs within the burgeoning technology sector had expanded America’s newly wealthy crowd. According to market researcher Spectrem Group, the number of U.S. households with more than $1 million in assets had doubled from 3.45 million in 1994 to 7.1 million in 2000. Spectrem Group also reported that 44 percent of this population felt overwhelmed by the amount of time needed to manage their assets. Sixty percent of the same population believed that there was too much information regarding financial planning. ‘‘Worried about Bill’’ suggested that using H&R Block’s services would make organizing their finances easier.

COMPETITION
The ad agency Emmerling Post released a series of print ads for the asset-management branch of financial holding company the Phoenix Companies in 2000. One print ad featured the text ‘‘Money. It’s not what it used to be,’’ above a picture of a queen dressed in ostentatious clothing beside another woman wearing black leather and a tiara. Other print ads stated, ‘‘Some people still inherit wealth, the rest of us have no choice but to earn it.’’ Specifically targeting an audience composed of the newly wealthy, a third print ad featured a casually dressed young man standing beside a dapper-looking gentleman with the copy, ‘‘New money is different than old money. For one thing, it’s younger.’’ Instead of repeating the trends of other asset-management firms that placed print ads in financial magazines, Phoenix Companies placed Henry appeared in television spots for the company and assured his audience that their taxes were safe with H&R Block.
In 1996 Young & Rubicam won the firm’s advertising account. Some of the agency’s early work for H&R Block included a 20-second radio spot titled ‘‘Proctor,’’ which stressed the importance of privacy by humorously featuring a street-corner proctology exam. The magazine Advertising Age deemed ‘‘Proctor’’ the best radio commercial of 1998. That year H&R Block spent an estimated $30 million on advertising. In 1999 the firm spent $28 million on advertising during the first nine months. Believing that his company could offer more services to its preexisting customers, newly elected H&R Block president Mark Ernst wanted to brand the business as more than just a tax preparer. In 1993 the company had purchased the personal-finance-software company MECA Software; to expand its mortgaging services H&R Block purchased Fleet Financial Group’s Option One Mortgage; and in 1999 the company expanded its brokerage services by acquiring discount brokers Olde Financial Discount. By late 1999 the firm wanted Young & Rubicam to unify its services under the H&R Block brand. The Delaney Report quoted H&R Block chief marketing officer David Byers as saying in 1999, ‘‘We’re going through a major transformation—moving from being a one product company to a financial services powerhouse. H&R Block is a brand that is ubiquitous. We want to capitalize on that as well as on the high degree of trust the consumer has in the brand.’’

TARGET MARKET
‘‘Worried about Bill’’ targeted its preexisting small and medium-sized business customers that trusted H&R Block for their tax preparation but that still relied on brokerages such as the Charles Schwab Corp., Morgan Stanley, and Merrill Lynch & Company for financial planning, mortgaging, and investing. In addition to businesses, the campaign also targeted individuals with similar financial needs. Differing from H&R Block’s advertising during the late 1990s, which suggested that H&R Block was the best firm for preparing taxes, ‘‘Worried about Bill’’ communicated to audiences that the firm offered a wider range of financial services. According to Greg Farrell of USA Today, the campaign attempted the transform ‘‘H&R Block from tax preparer to full financial services company for Middle America.’’ By early 2000 the surge of young entrepreneurs within the burgeoning technology sector had expanded America’s newly wealthy crowd. According to market researcher Spectrem Group, the number of U.S. households with more than $1 million in assets had doubled from 3.45 million in 1994 to 7.1 million in 2000. Spectrem Group also reported that 44 percent of this population felt overwhelmed by the amount of time needed to manage their assets. Sixty percent of the same population believed that there was too much information regarding financial planning. ‘‘Worried about Bill’’ suggested that using H&R Block’s services would make organizing their finances easier.

COMPETITION
The ad agency Emmerling Post released a series of print ads for the asset-management branch of financial holding company the Phoenix Companies in 2000. One print ad featured the text ‘‘Money. It’s not what it used to be,’’ above a picture of a queen dressed in ostentatious clothing beside another woman wearing black leather and a tiara. Other print ads stated, ‘‘Some people still inherit wealth, the rest of us have no choice but to earn it.’’ Specifically targeting an audience composed of the newly wealthy, a third print ad featured a casually dressed young man standing beside a dapper-looking gentleman with the copy, ‘‘New money is different than old money.
For one thing, it’s younger.’’ Instead of repeating the
trends of other asset-management firms that placed print
ads in financial magazines, Phoenix Companies placed

SINGLE MALT CAMPAIGN

2009-04-25T04:35:00.000-07:00

OVERVIEW
Having established what constituted a high advertising budget for its Glenfiddich brand of scotch, nearly $1.7 million, William Grant & Sons Ltd. at the end of 1998 moved its account from New York-based McCann-Erickson Worldwide to a much smaller firm, Gyro Worldwide in Philadelphia. The change marked the end of McCann’s three-year ‘‘The Friday Scotch’’ campaign. Scotch whisky was not usually a product whose advertising attracted enormous attention in the United States, simply because it was not marketed on television or radio. Nor had Glenfiddich or its family-owned Scottish distillery attained enormous exposure in the American market—despite the fact that it was the world’s leading brand of single-malt scotch. For that matter Glenfiddich’s 1998 advertising itself did not make headlines:
the real story was the gathering resurgence of scotch in general and of single-malt scotch in particular—a trend on which Glenfiddich and its competitors sought to capitalize. ‘‘About five years ago,’’ wrote Jerry Shriver in USA Today in 1998, ‘‘a wave of well-heeled consumers began rebelling against the prevailing low-fat/abstemious lifestyle.’’ Shriver went on to note, ‘‘distinctive and pricey single-malt scotches began elbowing aside generic blend whiskies. Then, cigar smokers helped revive cognac, port, and bourbon sales.’’
Despite the renewed interest in scotch among the youthful set, single-malt scotch whisky still suffered from an association with old age, according to Lisa Buckingham in the Guardian: ‘‘Think of whisky and the picture which most readily springs to mind is that of a greying cardigan wearer, nestled contentedly in a high-backed armchair. It is an impression most distillers would give their right arm to eradicate.’’ Age and the changing of the guard between generations were themes that had animated the advertising of Glenfiddich for many years.

HISTORICAL CONTEXT
Scotch whisky received its name for a simple reason: it came only from Scotland, which in the 1990s had some 100 distilleries. Most of these were of long standing, though few had remained in the hands of their founders’ descendants from the beginning. Thus William Grant & Sons, established in the 1850s and led some 140 years later by the great-great-grandchildren of the founders, was an exception.
The term ‘‘single-malt scotch’’ had little meaning until the latter part of the nineteenth century. Up until that time all scotch was made from malted barley and was distilled unblended; then a distiller by the name of Usher began blending high-grade scotch with less expensive varieties of whisky, using water to further extend the mixture. The resulting whisky was not only cheaper than single-malt but also weaker, which actually proved to be an advantage since it made it more appealing to a wider range of drinkers.
Another benefit to the distiller was the fact that blends were easier to control. Each batch of single malt tended to have its own level of quality, which was consistent throughout the whole batch but did not extend to future batches. The many variables in a blend actually made it more predictable, since a distiller could use varying mixtures to correct for anomalies such as bitterness.
Thanks to these factors, single-malt had all but disappeared by the end of World War II. Scotch itself continued to be popular, but by the late 1960s liquor consumption began to decline and was increasingly confined to older and older drinkers. The young, who became ever more health-conscious in the 1980s, saw liquor as something their parents drank. Yet in the early to mid-1990s there came a popular backlash against those values of the 1980s. This was accompanied by the stigmatization of ‘‘political correctness’’ and an embracing of fashions from the 1950s and early ‘60s, albeit reinterpreted for the ‘90s. The change in the zeitgeist extended to diet: thus red meat, vilified for many years, was in again. So were martinis, cigars instead of cigarettes, and single-malt scotch.

TARGET MARKET
Driving the new trends toward single-malt scotch and other fashions was the same youthful market that made crooner Tony Bennett one of the most popular performers on MTV. In 1998 James B. Arndorfer of Advertising Age speculated that William Grant would introduce ‘‘shooter-type drinks aimed at young adults,’’ and though a William Grant executive declined to comment on this supposition, vice chairman Grant Gordon—great-grandson of one of the company’s founders—told a reporter for the Indian edition of Business Line that ‘‘Our targetgroup all over the world is the 25-30 age.’’ Gordon went on to add something that seemed to contradict his first statement: ‘‘Whisky is for mature drinkers.’’ What he meant, of course, was that it was not for people who had merely reached legal drinking age, a clientele more inclined toward beer. The youngest drinkers, after all, would not typically be able to afford the prices associated with higher grades of scotch. According to Peter Simoncelli, food and beverage director at the Four Seasons hotel in Chicago, ‘‘the trend is to order the 18-or 25-year-old selections at prices up to $23 a pour.’’ Such prices fit with the upscale ‘‘menus’’ of cigar bars. ‘‘Cigar rooms in restaurants provide a clublike setting,’’ said Curt Burns of Chicago’s Hudson Club, quoted in the Orlando Sentinel, ‘‘and since it takes time to smoke a great cigar, it’s tempting to sip a special spirit too. The need to spend $10 to $18 for a snifter hasn’t scared anyone off.’’ Burns was referring to brandy or cognac, but similar rules applied to single-malt scotches. Yet price, combined with the long-standing image associated with scotch, meant that brands such as Glenfiddich had to overcome resistance among the young. According to Mike Dennis in SuperMarketing, a British survey in 1997 revealed that 62 percent of regular whisky drinkers were 50 years old or older.

COMPETITION
The British study also showed that 61 percent of vodka drinkers, by contrast, were in the 18-to-34 age group. Vodka, the star component in the martini, thus represented one of Glenfiddich’s primary competitors. Then there were the 100-plus makers of scotch whisky. Dominating the scotch industry, in terms of quality appraisal if not sales, were six distilleries that earned a five-star rating from British connoisseur Michael Jackson, arguably the world’s leading authority on scotch. These six distilleries were the Macallan, Auchentoshan, the Glenlivet, Highland Park, Lagavulin, and Springbank. As for the top scotch in terms of U.S. sales, that position was held by Dewar’s; but Glenfiddich still held the lead in Great Britain, with a 22 percent market share, and in the world, where it enjoyed a 27 percent share. According to an October 1998 report in the Herald, three brands had managed to overcome vicissitudes in the market, such as a decline in overall growth of whisky sales in Europe and North America. These three brands were Glenfiddich, Laphroaig, and Glenmorangie, each of which had reached a ‘‘respectable’’ 13 percent increase in sales during the year. Of Glenfiddich, a commentator in Off Licence News (‘‘off licence’’ is the British term for a liquor store) wrote, ‘‘It is sold in 190 nations. Considering [that] the United Nations has just 185 members, that’s pretty impressive brand penetration.’’ Hence William Grant marketing manager Patrick Tully spoke proudly of Glenfiddich as the ‘‘category captain.’’ Certainly maintenance of a distinct identity proved crucial in a heavily segmented industry. William Rice in the Orlando Sentinel quoted Ronny Millar of United Distillers as saying, ‘‘One thing is clear: if you try to duplicate a whisky at another distillery, it won’t work.’’ But in the sudden rush to single-malt brands that characterized the market during the late 1990s, numerous scotch makers either attempted to get on the bandwagon or to shore up existing offerings. Dewar’s announced plans in 1998 to introduce a ‘‘high malt content’’ 12-year-old scotch, and Bowmo represented a ‘‘cask strength’’ malt. The latter had a higher alcohol content than most single malts, up to 120 proof; Glenfiddich also marketed its own cask strength variety.

MARKETING STRATEGY
In 1996 Glenfiddich and McCann-Erickson ran 90-second spots on British television in a campaign that cost 1.5 million pounds, or about $2.5 million. The spots focused on a father and son, whose dialogue emphasized the concept of scotch as a tradition passed down through generations. At the end of the commercial, the two shook hands, and the father handed his son a small bottle of Glenfiddich.
This advertising represented a shift from past Glenfiddich marketing, which was built around images of Scottish heritage and time-honored techniques of distilling.
In the United States at about the same time,
McCann-Erickson launched ‘‘The Friday Scotch,’’ a series of print ads centering around the idea of scotch as an element of good times and celebration. During this period William Grant dramatically increased its advertising, establishing an annual budget as high as $10 million for all its brands. In 1997 it devoted $3 million to Glenfiddich and Frangelico alone, and by 1998 it was spending 1 million pounds, or about $1.68 million, on Glenfiddich.
‘‘We have outstanding brands,’’ Mark Teasdale, senior vice president for marketing, told Advertising Age in April 1998, ‘‘and we’re going to aggressively get back to building their upscale status.’’ At the same time William Grant moved away from its exclusive relationship with McCann, first by signing Grace & Rothschild of New York to handle all brands except for Glenfiddich. Teasdale suggested that the company would be reviewing its ‘‘Friday Scotch’’ campaign but declined to discuss future plans; meanwhile, as Arndorfer reported in Advertising Age, Glenfiddich sales in the stateside market had leveled off at 95,000 cases in 1996, the last year for which sales information was available.
By December 1998 Glenfiddich was running a new campaign in Britain. Posters displayed at bus stops and shopping centers asked ‘‘How much do you love your next-door neighbour?’’ and ‘‘How much do you love your father-in-law?’’ According to a report in Off Licence News, First Drinks Brands, distributor of Glenfiddich in Great Britain, had conducted research which showed that ‘‘consumers hold their beloved bottle of single malt in such high esteem that they are likely to hide it away when expecting a high influx of visitors, and offer their guest less prized drams instead.’’

OUTCOME
William Grant spent one million pounds on the British poster campaign and by the end of 1998 was prepared for a new assault on the U.S. market—with a new advertising agency. Thus on one of the last business days of the year, December 22, the New York Times reported that the company was prepared to drop its ‘‘Friday Scotch’’ campaign. According to Teasdale, the latter had run ‘‘for about three years and delivered some solid numbers,’’ but apparently it was time for a change. That change came with the December selection of Gyro Worldwide as the U.S. agency for Glenfiddich. McCann would still handle other advertising throughout the world, but the choice of Gyro represented a clear desire to appeal to a more youthful, MTV-influenced market. The Philadelphia agency, as the New York Times reported, was ‘‘known for provocative campaigns aimed at consumers in the 20’s and 30’s for such products as clothing, alcoholic beverages, and cigarettes.’’ Gyro’s techniques had not always won praise from critics of advertising: its print ads for clothing retailer Zipper Head, for instance, showed convicted mass murderer Charles Manson along with the headline, ‘‘Everyone has the occasional urge to go wild and do something completely outrageous.’’
In 1999 a new William Grant marketing director, Heather Graham, signaled the company’s interest in a new agency to handle its British advertising, primarily on television. During the spring of that year, it launched an agency review with the help of pitch consultant Agency Assessments, and by July BMP DDB had won the British account for William Grant. Universal McCann would continue to oversee media buying in the British market. If anything was clear about William Grant in general, or its Glenfiddich single-malt advertising in particular, it was the fact that changes were afoot. As Off Licence News reported in November 1998, ‘‘there are clearly busy times ahead for Glenfiddich and William Grant. Whether the brand succeeds in maintaining the momentum in the malt market or not over the next few years, no one will be able to turn around and accuse it of not trying.’’

ON THE WINGS OF GOODYEAR CAMPAIGN

2009-04-25T04:32:00.000-07:00

OVERVIEW
Upon regaining its title as the world’s largest tire manufacturer in 1999, the Goodyear Tire & Rubber Company broke sales records and was busy collecting the tattered market shares of its competitors. Its competitor Bridgestone/Firestone Retail & Commercial Operations suffered notably in 2000, when tires made by the company malfunctioned, causing some 200 deaths. In an attempt to gain even more ground over the competition and create a campaign outside of its traditional format, Goodyear decided to embark upon a new campaign. Goodyear awarded its $60 million advertising contract to San Francisco–based Goodby, Silverstein & Partners. The resulting television and print campaign, called ‘‘On the Wings of Goodyear,’’ began over Labor Day weekend in 2001. The agency tailored ‘‘On the Wings of Goodyear’’ for viewers who were previously unresponsive to product-centered tire commercials. ‘‘It really wasn’t about the tires. It was more about the role that tires, and specifically Goodyear tires, play in people’s lives,’’ Cathryn Fischer, Goodyear’s vice president and chief global marketing officer, told the PR Newswire. Three different 30-second spots, all centering on the experience of travel, aired across network and cable programming. The commercials continued into 2003 and focused on universal travel themes; for instance, one spot depicted families from different cultures on road trips, all with children asking, ‘‘Are we there yet?’’ from the backseat. Aiming at a wider target than past campaigns, six print variations of ‘‘On the Wings of Goodyear’’ appeared in consumer magazines.
By 2003 Michelin North America and Bridgestone had rallied back, knocking Goodyear to the number three position. Analysts attributed Goodyear’s market slip to its restructuring attempts, which involved consolidating factories and performing cost-cutting measures. Even though ‘‘On the Wings of Goodyear’’ did not draw many accolades from the ad industry, it forced all tire makers to rethink using a technical pitch to sell their products to Americans. In 2004 Goodyear ended its relationship with Goodby, Silverstein & Partners and reassigned responsibilities to Arnold Worldwide, but the company continued to use the tagline ‘‘On the Wings of Goodyear.’’

HISTORICAL CONTEXT
Goodyear was founded in 1898 and led the world’s tire market by 1916. Throughout the twentieth century it oscillated in and out of the number one spot in the tire industry. By 1990, however, Goodyear had been suffering so drastically that it lost money for the first time since the Great Depression. With the help of CEO Stanley Gault, Goodyear by 1999 had rallied back and regained its position as market leader. Gault moved the company’s tire sales outside Goodyear’s retail stores by forging partnerships with Wal-Mart, Kmart, and Sears. Goodyear also benefited from the misfortune of its competitor Firestone when Firestone Wilderness AT tires malfunctioned on Ford Explorers. Ford replaced them with Goodyear-made tires.
In 2001 Goodyear ended its 15-year relationship with ad agency J. Walter Thompson, which had orchestrated Goodyear’s straight-shooting ‘‘Serious Freedom’’ campaign. The campaign included spots that explained to consumers the inner workings of tires. Advertising commentators criticized ‘‘Serious Freedom,’’ along with campaigns launched by Michelin and Bridgestone, for not differentiating the brands from one another. Except for a handful of tire enthusiasts, most consumers described tire commercials ‘‘simply as a lot of tires,’’ Fischer told the PR Newswire. In an attempt to reach a wider audience, Goodyear hired Goodby, Silverstein & Partners to craft its advertising. Saul Ludwig, an industry analyst, said to the Cleveland Plain Dealer, ‘‘Goodyear is getting in with their new ad program, while Firestone is on the sidelines, and Michelin is in the process of changing their advertising. Goodyear hasn’t had a brand problem. Goodyear is acting out of strength, not out of weakness.’’

TARGET MARKET
Goodyear’s new campaign targeted a much broader market than its previous ‘‘Serious Freedom’’ campaign, which had appealed to male, sports-orientated tire consumers. In contrast ‘‘On the Wings of Goodyear’’ focused on safety-minded consumers with an affinity for travel. Awareness about tire-safety issues, however, did not automatically translate into brand awareness. ‘‘Surprisingly, even with all the Firestone stuff, it’s not on people’s minds,’’ Harold Sogard, general manager of Goodby, explained in an interview with the Plain Dealer. ‘‘If you go ask your neighbors what kind they are driving on, they don’t have a clue.’’ Research conducted before the campaign showed that most consumers never purchased tires with a brand in mind. The company concluded that explaining tire safety with a heartfelt narrative would make a more vivid impression.
To make sure the ads connected with consumers, Goodyear first screened the campaign for 20,000 of its employees. A.J. Faught, vice president of Goodyear affiliate Northwest Tire & Service in Flint, Michigan, told Tire Business, ‘‘So many tire ads look so technical, which doesn’t appeal to anyone other than the enthusiast. This campaign goes straight to the point about safety. Safety is a big issue right now with consumers, who don’t want to have to worry about their tires.’’ Goodyear employees felt that the new campaign was more ‘‘touchy-feely’’ and that it would indeed strike a chord with a larger demographic.

COMPETITION
Bridgestone/Firestone had worked its way up to be the world’s largest tire manufacturer by 2003. This was despite the fact that Firestone tires had notoriously shredded on Ford Explorers in 2000, leading to the deaths of more than 200 people. Further investigation into the tragedy’s causes shifted blame onto Ford. One source quoted a Ford Motors spokesperson as admitting, ‘‘Something about the car caused it to roll over and crash, no matter what tires it was riding on.’’ In 2000 Bridgestone/Firestone reported a $2.8 billon loss over the previous year. By 2002 Bridgestone had rebounded with a sales growth of 16.5 percent, reaching almost $19 billion and surpassing Goodyear’s $13.8 billion. Until 2001 Bridgestone had primarily advertised with sponsorships at motor-sports events. After 2000 the company began moving advertising into wider markets, shifted efforts from Firestone to Bridgestone, and premiered two TV spots at the start of the 2002 Olympic Games. For the first six months of 2001 Bridgestone spent $12 million on advertising, a significant increase from the $400,000 the same period the year before. Despite the accidents Bridgestone continued marketing Firestone tires. Grey Worldwide, the advertising firm handling the Bridgestone account, told Advertising Age in 2002, ‘‘We are not going to abandon a more than 100-year-old brand. Firestone has a rich heritage and it’s the tire you can rely on.’’
While Goodyear’s ‘‘On the Wings of Goodyear’’ campaign ran, its competitor Michelin drifted between being the second- and third-largest tire manufacturer in the world. Focusing most of its efforts in North America, the South Carolina corporation had $7 billion in sales during 2002 and grew 14 percent. In 2002 Michelin launched a television, print, and outdoor campaign that featured Michelin’s longtime mascot, Bibendum, the plump character made of white tires. The campaign’s first TV spot, ‘‘Guardian Angels,’’ was created by Palmer Jarvis DDB and capitalized on the consumer’s need for safety. The 30-second commercial featured Bibendum making snow angels, followed by the tagline ‘‘Your guardian angel this winter.’’ Another Michelin spot, ‘‘Shuttle,’’ featured Bibendum entering a NASA space shuttle, which also used Michelin tires, just before its launch. The campaign focused primarily on consumer satisfaction and safety issues, as opposed to tire performance.

MARKETING STRATEGY
Before releasing the ‘‘On the Wings of Goodyear’’ campaign, Goodyear had 20,000 of its employees preview the first television spots in August of 2001. Each 30-second commercial centered on a specific theme: carpooling, family vacations, and the morning commute. All three aired for the public during Labor Day weekend, and six print ads began appearing in consumer magazines such as Time, People, and Newsweek. Goodby, Silverstein & Partners wanted to venture outside Goodyear’s previous target market, sports-centric males. The television spots ran during a wide range of prime-time television programs, including 60 Minutes, The Drew Carey Show, Everybody Loves Raymond, and 48 Hours. Firestone’s disaster had made the public acutely sensitive to tire safety, a concept Goodby drove home with ‘‘On the Wings of Goodyear.’’ The campaign attempted to imply that Goodyear’s tires would keep drivers and passengers safer, which in turn would increase consumer desire for Goodyear tires. One 30-second spot, ‘‘Carpooling,’’ which dwelled exclusively on the theme of safety, featured a young girl being carpooled. The spot’s voice-over warned, ‘‘She’s not your daughter, but if you give her a ride home, she might as well be.’’ Another spot, ‘‘Morning Commute,’’ carried a lighter tone and featured a car full of office workers. The driver was constantly swerving to avoid random furniture and housewares left in the road.
One of the campaign’s most memorable spots, first airing on September 1, 2001, featured four families from different ethnic backgrounds on road trips. The spot, directed by Bryan Buckley of the production company Hungry Man, played on the universality of bored children enduring family road trips. The commercial began with an American family traveling in a midsize sedan. A little girl in the back seat asked, ‘‘Are we there yet?’’ to which the father grunted, ‘‘No.’’ The next shot featured a second family road-tripping through snow-capped mountains, and a similar ‘‘Are we there yet?’’ exchange took place, but in subtitled Russian. A third road trip, in the middle of a rainstorm, unfolded, but this time the family spoke Chinese. The last shot featured an African family all speaking a tribal click dialect and speeding across the desert in a Land Rover. Two young boys in back asked if they had arrived at their destination yet. The mother finally snapped, ‘‘If you ask me that again, I have to stop this car!’’
Later television spots, gravitating around similar themes of safety and introducing Goodyear’s Run-Flat technology, broke in 2003. One television spot, ‘‘Screw,’’ showed a screw tumbling from a skyscraper and onto the street. After a car ran over it, a voice-over explained, ‘‘Sharp steel is no match for smart rubber. Tires with Run-Flat technology.’’ Print ads ran during 2003 as well. Harry Cocciolo, creative director for Goodby, Silverstein & Partners during 2003, told Adweek, ‘‘We tried to find ways to remind people that tires can really make a difference. The Run-Flat technology is being used by Humvees in the military. These are really great proof points that haven’t been taken advantage of.’’ Adweek selected the Goodyear commercial ‘‘Bouncing Balls’’ as one of the best spots of April 2003. The surreal spot featured a driver heading down a street that suddenly filled with bouncing balls. Seconds later children began chasing the balls. The driver slammed on his brakes, and a voice-over remarked, ‘‘The unexpected can be planned for. Tires with proven stopping power.’’

OUTCOME
By 2003 Goodyear had again slipped to number three among tire makers. But despite the fact that ‘‘On the Wings of Goodyear’’ coincided with a decline in Goodyear’s sales (from $14.1 billion to $13.8 billion in one year), the campaign was important for reshaping the advertising paradigm that tire makers had used for years. As John Polhemus, president of Goodyear’s North American operations, told Tire Business, ‘‘It’s a dramatic departure from the type of product-and-technologyfocused advertising that Goodyear has used in the past, and quite frankly, a departure for the tire industry itself.’’ In 2002 Michelin and Bridgestone began tailoring advertising efforts around safety and brand awareness instead of product design.
The majority of industry analysts blamed Goodyear’s 2002 backslide on the company’s restructuring efforts rather than on Goodby’s campaign work. The closing of factories and laying off of thousands of workers resulted in an $85 million decrease in annual operating costs. In 2003 Goodyear also sold most of its stock in Sumitomo Rubber Industries, which had sustained the company for decades. To exacerbate Goodyear’s problems even further, it became entangled in an agediscrimination lawsuit.
‘‘On the Wings of Goodyear’’ did score minor adindustry points when Adweek chose the ‘‘Bouncing Balls’’ commercial as one of the best spots of April 2003. By 2004 Goodyear had signed its creative efforts over to Arnold Worldwide, but it continued using the tagline ‘‘On the Wings of Goodyear.’’

GODADDY.COM SUPER BOWL COMMERCIAL CAMPAIGN

2009-04-25T04:30:00.000-07:00

OVERVIEW
By 2004 Go Daddy Software had become a leader in the Internet domain-name registration industry, buying available domain names and then selling themto individuals and businesses for a yearly fee. In 2004 the company embarked on its first national marketing effort, contracting New York agency the Ad Store to help make Go Daddy and the GoDaddy.com website known to mainstream America via a TV spot for Super Bowl XXXIX. That Super Bowl, played on February 6, 2005, was the first since the infamous ‘‘wardrobe malfunction’’ that had resulted in pop singer Janet Jackson’s breast being exposed on the air during the previous year’s halftime show. Among the results of the public outcry following the incidentwas increased pressure on Super Bowl advertisers to avoid risque´ images and themes. Go Daddy chose to fly in the face of this pressure by running a sexually suggestive commercial that lampooned the prevailing climate of censorship.
With a 30-second Super Bowl spot costing $2.4 million, Go Daddy’s decision to advertise twice during the game represented a considerable risk for such an unknown company. Additional production expenses approached $1 million. The spot featured a buxom woman undergoing Congressional questioning in order to gain approval to appear in a commercial for GoDaddy.com. As the woman pointed to the GoDaddy.com logo on the front of her tight tank top, one of the shirt’s straps broke, a wardrobe malfunction that was met with camera flashes and shocked exclamations as the woman continued to explain what GoDaddy.com was. The commercial aired as planned during the first quarter of the Super Bowl, but then, apparently because of the protests of a National Football League executive, Fox neglected to run the spot during the second on-air slot that Go Daddy had purchased. The spot was rated one of the Super Bowl’s most memorable, but it was the controversy surrounding the network’s refusal to air it a second time that proved to be Go Daddy’s true marketing coup. The numerous media stories about Fox’s censorship of a commercial about censorship gave Go Daddy nearly $12 million in free publicity. The company continued to run TV spots featuring the tank-top-clad woman, including a spot during Super Bowl XL that made reference to the previous year’s commercial.

HISTORICAL CONTEXT
Bob Parsons sold his first successful company, Parsons Technology, in 1994, and in 1997 he used the proceeds to start a new company, Jomax Technologies. Unsatisfied with the Jomax name, Parsons and his staff came up with the more arresting moniker Go Daddy. As Parsons told Wall Street Transcripts, the name worked ‘‘because the domain name GoDaddy.com was available, but we also noticed that when people hear that name, two things happen. First, they smile. Second, they remember it.’’ After an unsuccessful attempt to establish the company as a source for website-building software, Parsons reinvented Go Daddy as a registrar of Internet domain names, buying unused website names and then reselling them to individuals and businesses in need of an online presence. Go Daddy also offered auxiliary services and products enabling customers to launch their sites after the domain-name purchase, including (as in the company’s early days) software for building sites. Domain-name registration, however, was a burgeoning industry as America became increasingly wired and more and more businesses found it essential to establish a Web presence. By 2004 Go Daddy had sold nearly seven million domain names and was the world’s leading registrar of domain names. Up to that point the company had done little marketing, relying primarily on word-of-mouth buzz and low prices; Go Daddy offered domain names for $8.95, compared with fees of $35 at the industry’s high end.
In late 2004 Go Daddy enlisted New York agency the Ad Store for its first sustained offline advertising campaign. The company announced that the campaign would make its TV debut during the 2005 Super Bowl, a move that drew widespread criticism, partly because of the recent history of Super Bowl advertising undertaken by dot-com companies. Dot-com advertising on the Super Bowl had been prevalent in the late 1990s and in the first few years of the new century but had been nearly absent from the game since the bursting of the Internet bubble, leading many industry observers to connect such Super Bowl airtime purchases with the fiscal irresponsibility characteristic of failed dot-coms. Parsons argued that his company was different. As he told Brandweek, ‘‘Back in ‘99 . . . dot-coms raised money on ideas that weren’t viable. But we are the leader in our industry and actually do make money.’’
The 2005 Super Bowl presented a uniquely restrictive environment for advertisers. During the previous year’s Super Bowl halftime show a much-publicized ‘‘wardrobe malfunction’’ had occurred that resulted in the on-air exposure of pop singer Janet Jackson’s breast. The uproar surrounding this incident led some critics to address what they saw as the related indecency of much of that year’s Super Bowl advertising. 2004 Super Bowl commercials singled out for censure had included a Budweiser spot featuring flatulent Clydesdale horses and numerous commercials promoting erectiledysfunction drugs. Both the National Football League and the Federal Communications Commission were exerting pressure on Fox, the broadcaster carrying the 2005 game, to ensure that newly rigorous standards of decency were upheld during Super Bowl XXXIX.

TARGET MARKET
Parsons told Brandweek that Go Daddy targeted ‘‘everyone who wants a [W]eb presence.’’ Go Daddy’s domainname prices were among the industry’s least expensive, and it offered a range of website-management services that comparably priced competitors did not; therefore, Parsons and his colleagues believed that the company would continue to grow rapidly as long as it could make a wider public aware of its brand. The Super Bowl, of course, offered one of the last giant television audiences in an age of fragmenting viewership, and it was annually the most watched television program in America by a wide margin. Super Bowl XXXIX was expected to reach 130 million U.S. viewers, though the actual number of viewers watching the game at any given time was estimated at closer to 90 million.
If Go Daddy could make a splash with an audience of this size, it could count on a much greater degree of brand awareness among the American population at large. Though that year’s restrictions on the content of Super Bowl commercials limited the degree to which advertisers could use provocative imagery and messages, Go Daddy and the Ad Store nevertheless charted an intentionally controversial course as a means of standing out from the field of high-profile advertisers. The Go Daddy commercial thus featured an attractive female model in sexually suggestive attire and in a context that directly parodied the political hysteria surrounding the previous year’s halftime incident.

COMPETITION
Among Go Daddy’s top competitors was Network Solutions, which was introduced as a technologyconsulting company in 1979, making it a veritable ancient in the online world. Network Solutions was awarded a grant from the National Science Foundation in 1993 to create a single domain-name registration service for the Internet, which effectively gave the company a monopoly in the industry of domain-name registration until 1999, when the field was opened to competition. The Internet-security and telecommunications company VeriSign acquired Network Solutions at the height of the dot-com bubble in 2000, for $15 billion (the largest Internet merger in history at that point). The company’s 2003 sale to Pivotal Equity was a measure of the changes in the dot-com world in the interim: the purchase price this time was $100 million.
Register.com was another of Go Daddy’s rival domain-name registrars. The company was founded as a domain-name registrar in 1994, and it was one of the five original companies selected for entry into the newly opened market in 1999. Like Network Solutions, Register.com had Internet-bubble baggage. The company made its initial public offering on March 3, 2000, a week before the Nasdaq peaked, at a price of $24 per share; by the end of that first trading day, Register.com was priced at $57.25 per share. Register.com shares climbed to $116 before the dot-com bubble definitively burst. By 2005 the company’s shares were hovering between $5 and $6 and were considered by many analysts to be a good value for the money.

MARKETING STRATEGY
The official price for 30 seconds of Super Bowl XXXIX airtime was $2.4 million, and Go Daddy bought two such blocks of time, intending to run the same commercial twice, once in the first quarter of the game and once just before the two-minute warning at the game’s end. (Media-industry insiders contended, however, that publicized Super Bowl advertising rates were akin to sticker prices on automobiles and that advertisers ultimately did not pay the full amount.) Go Daddy’s expenses were not limited to the media-buying cost; the company invested close to $1 million in production of its Super Bowl commercial, an amount of money equivalent to the yearly marketing budget of comparably sized companies. Part of this expense was a result of unforeseen problems with Fox in the weeks leading up to the game. As Tim Arnold, managing partner at the Ad Store, recounted after the fact in Adweek, Fox approved storyboards of the Go Daddy commercial on December 3, 2004 (just over two months prior to the Super Bowl, which was played on February 6, 2005), only to withdraw that approval on December 22, after the commercial was already in preproduction. After Fox placed new restrictions on the commercial—including a demand that the words ‘‘wardrobe malfunction’’ be removed from the script—the Ad Store shot ‘‘16 and a half’’ versions of the spot to account for all possible objections the network might yet make. The network continued to reject proposed versions of the commercial until the week before the game, at which point Go Daddy finally received grudging permission to use the airtime for which it had already paid in excess of $4 million.
The commercial reproduced the look of the C-SPAN network (known for its live coverage of Congressional matters), with a banner at the bottom of the screen informing viewers that they were witnessing ‘‘Broadcast Censorship Hearings’’ in Salem, Massachusetts. A woman named Nikki Cappelli (played by Candice Michelle), wearing a tight-fitting tank top and jeans in an otherwise formally dressed crowd, explained to the Congressional committee that she wanted to be in a commercial. When asked what she was advertising, she stood and pointed to the chest of her tank top, on which the GoDaddy.com name was printed, and as she began to inform the panelists about the company’s identity, a strap on her top snapped, threatening to reveal her breasts and triggering a flurry of camera flashes and gasps from onlookers. Asked what she would do in the commercial, Cappelli stood and performed a dance with her arms in the air, again triggering shocked gasps and camera flashes. A Congressional panelist then said, ‘‘Surely by now you must realize that you’re upsetting the committee.’’ Cappelli earnestly replied, ‘‘I’m sorry, I didn’t mean to upset the committee,’’ as an elderly committee member was shown putting an oxygen mask to his face. A black screen featuring the message ‘‘See more coverage at GoDaddy.com’’ then appeared—a reference to an uncensored and more sexually suggestive version of the ‘‘hearings’’ that was available for viewing on the website—and the commercial closed with the voice of a female committee member saying, ‘‘May I suggest a turtleneck?’’ The commercial never made its second appearance on the Super Bowl. After airing it in its assigned firstquarter spot, Fox decided not to run it in the fourth quarter, reportedly because of complaints made by a high-level National Football League executive.

OUTCOME
During the Super Bowl traffic to GoDaddy.com spiked by 378 percent, and a survey conducted one and then two days after the Super Bowl found that the Go Daddy commercial was the most memorable of all spots that ran during the game. It was the story of Fox’s decision not to air the commercial a second time, however, that proved most useful to the company. The censorship of a commercial that itself poked fun at overzealous censorship proved irresistible to the media, especially in the context of the ongoing commentary about standards of broadcast decency. As word of this incident spread, Go Daddy became by far the most talked-about Super Bowl advertiser. The buzz surrounding the brand in the game’s aftermath—measured as ‘‘share of voice,’’ the percentage of times that Go Daddy was mentioned in stories about the Super Bowl that ran on national, cable, and the top 50 local TV networks—was calculated at 51.4 percent between February 7 and 11, 2005. Go Daddy received nearly $12 million in free publicity, and many of the TV stories about the incident replayed portions of the commercial. Bob Parsons said in a press release, ‘‘Go Daddy accomplished exactly what it set out to achieve with its first-ever Super Bowl ad—increased brand awareness. Today, millions of people now know about GoDaddy.com, which in turn has generated significant new business.’’ The magazine Business 2.0 declared the Go Daddy Super Bowl effort the ‘‘Smartest Ad Campaign’’ of 2005.
Though Go Daddy allowed its contract with the Ad Store to expire soon after the 2005 Super Bowl, moving its creative duties in-house, the company’s subsequent advertising conformed closely to the model established by the Super Bowl commercial. The actress who played Nikki Cappelli, Candice Michelle, continued to appear in Go Daddy spots that drew overt attention to her sexual appeal, and she became known as the ‘‘Go Daddy Girl.’’ In 2006 she appeared in a Go Daddy spot that ran during the NFL Playoffs, and Go Daddy again struggled to get a spot approved for the Super Bowl. The Super Bowl XL commercial, which rehashed material from the previous year’s spot, again ran in an extended form on the company website, as did alternate versions of other Go Daddy commercials. Website visitors could read a detailed history of Go Daddy’s attempt to gain approval for its 2006 Super Bowl entry and could also view numerous spots that had been denied, suggesting that the company’s battles against censorship had become increasingly self-conscious and premeditated. Go Daddy continued to grow rapidly.

ANYTHING ELSE WOULD BE UNCIVILIZED CAMPAIGN

2009-03-28T04:58:00.000-07:00

OVERVIEW
The Gillette Company enjoyed a position of dominance in men’s toiletries, a broad category that included not only deodorants and antiperspirants but also such items as pre- and aftershave products. Deodorants and antiperspirants, however, remained the largest product categories in toiletries, with Gillette’s Right Guard brand among the leaders. Gillette had attained its leadership in the market through a combination of new product development, technological innovation, and an expanding global presence.
By the mid-1990s marketers of deodorants and antiperspirants were no longer emphasizing protection against odor but rather various aesthetic factors. New developments included products that were clear and that left no residue on clothing as well as protectants that were formulated to glide on easily. This new approach in product development and marketing came at a time when sales of antiperspirants and deodorants had begun to stagnate, a sign that the market was saturated. With the advent of clear gels and sticks, however, the market began growing again. Not unexpectedly, industry leader Gillette was in the forefront of the growth. Seeking continuity in its marketing, it rolled out its clear stick and clear gel products under the banner of its long-running ‘‘Anything Else Would Be Uncivilized’’ campaign, using famous athletes in unlikely situations to promote the new items. Although response to the campaign was mixed, Gillette was able to maintain and even improve upon its market share.

HISTORICAL CONTEXT
For almost a century Gillette had been the worldwide leader in products for male grooming, a category originally comprising blades, razors, and other shaving accoutrements. But toiletries for men came to form only a portion of the company’s vast global sales. Gillette also achieved a dominant market position in writing implements, correction products, and toothbrushes and oral care appliances. Relying on its traditional strengths of research and development, advertising, and geographic expansion, the company managed to continue to sustain its growth. Founded in Boston in 1901 by King C. Gillette, the company introduced the world’s first safety razor two years later. A patent for the device followed in 1904. In 1905 Gillette expanded outside the United States, establishing a sales office in London and a manufacturing operation in Paris. The famous Gillette Blue Blade was introduced in 1932 and an innovative dispenser that eliminated the need to unwrap razor blades after World War II. Gillette diversified its operations after the war. In 1955 it acquired the Paper Mate Pen Company, an expansion into the area of stationery that it has maintained since. Hoping to secure its grip on the toiletries market, Gillette introduced Right Guard aerosol deodorant in 1960. Brisk sales of the deodorant, along with innovations in shaving products, pushed annual Gillette sales past the $1 billion mark for the first time in 1973. In the 1980s Gillette continued to expand by acquiring Liquid Paper Corp., a maker of correction products, and Oral-B Laboratories, a toothbrush manufacturer. But the company had to fend off numerous hostile takeover bids, and it embarked on a dramatic restructuring program in order to increase profitability. In 1990 the company introduced the Sensor shaving system in 16 countries. Since that time Gillette has continued to seek competitive advantage in its three businesses: personal grooming products, stationery products, and small electrical appliances. By 1997 sales exceeded $10 billion. With a workforce of 44,000 in 63 facilities worldwide, the company distributed its products in more than 200 countries and territories around the globe.
By sharing resources among its units to optimize performance, Gillette hoped to nurture sustained sales and profit growth. Its plan was to maintain its market dominance by shrewdly investing in the technologies that were vital to success in each of its core businesses. This strategy informed the 1993 launch of Gillette Series Clear Gel antiperspirant. This product was followed in 1996 by the introduction of clear stick products under the Gillette and Right Guard brand names. The company’s stated mission, however, remained unchanged—
‘‘to offer consumers products of the highest level of performance for value.’’

TARGET MARKET
‘‘Anything Else Would Be Uncivilized’’ was first introduced as the tag line in Right Guard ads in 1986. The New York advertising agency NW Ayer & Partners had created the commercials to appeal to sports-loving male consumers. Early spots featured such sports celebrities as the basketball player Charles Barkley, football’s Brian Bosworth, baseball player Kirk Gibson, boxer Marvin Hagler, and wrestler Terry ‘‘Hulk’’ Hogan, along with action film star Chuck Norris. The common trait of these celebrity spokesmen was an aggressive nature and tough-guy demeanor.
With the launch of Right Guard Clear Stick Antiperspirant and Deodorant in 1996, Gillette again turned to NW Ayer to create an appeal to the active male. The agency developed a new print and television ad campaign featuring Scottie Pippen of the National Basketball Association (NBA) champion Chicago Bulls. By placing a highly recognizable sports star in an unfamiliar visual context—in this case on a croquet lawn—the ad team hoped to provide a juxtaposition that would grab the attention of the male sports fans who bought Right Guard.

COMPETITION
By the mid-1990s Gillette had reasons to be concerned about its toiletries business. According to data from Information Resources, sales of deodorants and antiperspirants in food, drug, and mass-merchandising stores fell 1.1 percent in 1996 to $1.4 billion. Among the top five leading brands, only Procter & Gamble’s Secret and Colgate-Palmolive’s Mennen registered sales gains. The dollar sales of Secret rose 3 percent, while Mennen’s sales increased 13.1 percent. According to Mennen’s own figures, its Speed Stick grew two to three times faster than its other brands.
The tremendous rise in Speed Stick sales could be explained by three key factors: the introduction of Speed Stick gel in March 1996, improvements to the traditional stick formula that kept cannibalization of existing products to a minimum, and an aggressive marketing program that motivated consumers. Because of the success of Speed Stick, Gillette moved quickly to replicate the formula.

MARKETING STRATEGY
In the category of clear antiperspirants, Gillette chose to focus its efforts on promoting its existing line instead of launching a new one. Accordingly, in 1996, when Peter Clay was named vice president for business management of Gillette toiletries, he was given a simple mission—to take the technology already in use on Gillette Series Clear Gel and put it into an antiperspirant stick form. Gillette poured $30 million into research and development on the clear stick.
The first fruit of Clay’s mandate was Gillette Series Clear Stick, introduced in the summer of 1996. This was followed later in the year by Right Guard Clear Stick. Together the two products were the first truly clear antiperspirant sticks on the market that did not leave white residue on the body or clothes. ‘‘It’s an antiperspirant formula that’s a challenge because it’s hard to get the efficaciousness of a stick without white residue,’’ Clay explained to Advertising Age. To emphasize the difference, Clay decided to make the packaging clear, and, to drive home the distinction even further, he had stickers bearing the legend ‘‘No White Residue’’ placed on every package. Under the aegis of Clay and his staff, NW Ayer created the product’s $25 million ad campaign. For its national ad campaign Gillette commissioned the agency to create a series of television commercials using the slogan ‘‘Anything Else Would Be Uncivilized.’’ The tag line had been a staple of Right Guard spots since 1986. Industry veteran Stan Schofield was selected to direct the ads, and Scottie Pippen of the NBA champion Chicago Bulls was chosen to appear in the spots as celebrity spokesman. The sports connection was obvious, since many previous Right Guard spots had used superstar athletes. But Gillette had other reasons for choosing Pippen. ‘‘We decided to utilize Scottie because he is a driving force on the most powerful team in the NBA and truly embodies the spirit of Right Guard,’’ Carole Johnson, Gillette’s vice president for personal care products, told PR Newswire.
To provide humor that would help make the ad memorable, NW Ayer’s creative team attired Pippen demurely in an Edwardian cable knit sweater vest and placed him on a croquet lawn. His mouthing of the campaign’s tag line thus became the blithe comment of a sophisticate who has finally found a deodorant that will not jeopardize the aesthetics of his leisure ensemble. For Gillette’s Johnson, the use of a basketball player was winningly apropos. ‘‘On the court, he’s a tough competitor and a highly respected player,’’ she told PR Newswire. ‘‘Portraying him in an unexpectedly gentle and reserved manner provides a contrast that is both attention-getting and humorous.’’ The first ads of the new campaign began airing in January 1997. The commercials appeared in prime time on broadcast networks and cable television outlets in 15- and 30-second versions. The accompanying print campaign ran in sports and general-interest publications.
In January 1997 the 10-year relationship between Right Guard and NW Ayer & Partners came to an end. Gillette shifted its account, whose value was estimated at $10 million, to New York-based Saatchi & Saatchi Advertising. The new agency now faced the challenge of putting a fresh twist on the ‘‘Anything Else Would Be Uncivilized’’ campaign. In January 1998, Saatchi & Saatchi debuted its first television commercials. The 15-and 30-second spots were shown during NBC’s national telecast of the FedEx Orange Bowl college football game. Retaining the ‘‘Anything Else Would Be Uncivilized’’ tag line, the new spots again placed a prominent athlete in an unlikely situation, this time Dallas Cowboys running back Emmitt Smith as the master of a team of show dogs. ‘‘When one is competing for the eye of the judges,’’ Smith remarked in the 30-second spot, as he held a pack of bulldogs at bay, ‘‘one must keep a firm leash on odor and perspiration.’’ The dogs then performed tricks at Smith’s command. The spot ended with Smith accepting a trophy for best of show as he uttered the tag line. The commercials were followed by print ads in sports and general-interest periodicals. Some critics questioned the choice of Smith, a veteran on the downside of his career, as the new spokesman. But Gillette was quick to offer a defense of its new standard bearer. ‘‘Emmitt’s championship attitude and tenacious style of play mirror the Right Guard image and make him a great candidate for the campaign,’’ said Clay. ‘‘He is a driving force on the field and a highly respected player by both teammates and fans; depicting him as reserved and genteel is a contradiction that is entertaining and humorous.’’

OUTCOME
Despite favorable reaction in the media, the Right Guard ‘‘Anything Else Would Be Uncivilized’’ ads failed to impress consumers. USA Today’s Ad Track measured the popularity and effectiveness of the Pippen commercials in the spring of 1997. A scant 11 percent of respondents who had seen the spots at least three times reported that they liked them a great deal. The Right Guard commercials thus ranked among the least popular campaigns measured by Ad Track in its first two years of polling.
There also were mixed results among demographic groups. Older consumers tended to like the ads, with 19 percent responding very favorably. The spots were clearly targeted at the young, however. But only 14 percent of those polled between the ages of 18 and 24 gave high popularity marks to the ads. Even more vexing for Right Guard’s marketers was the lukewarm response of male consumers, the campaign’s core market. Only 9 percent of men liked the ads a lot, compared with 14 percent of women.
When Ad Track sought to measure consumer recall, the Right Guard ads elicited more positive responses. More than 60 percent of those surveyed reported that they had seen an ‘‘Anything Else Would Be Uncivilized’’ ad on more than one occasion. Industry observers credited the campaign’s high recall numbers to its effective use of humor.
It remained to be seen whether the Saatchi & Saatchi ads featuring Smith would do anything to improve the poll numbers. The initial critical response to the ads was less than encouraging. At best, Gillette was faulted for bad timing in choosing Smith to do the ads. For the first time in seven seasons the Dallas Cowboys had failed to make the National Football League play-offs, and Smith himself was widely seen as being headed for retirement. ‘‘Smith is a likable athlete,’’ said Denise Gellene in the Los Angeles Times, ‘‘but for now, at least, he isn’t a winner.’’
Although the deodorant category as a whole was flat in 1997, Gillette, along with other top brands, posted sizable gains. According to Information Resources, sales of Gillette’s Right Guard grew 4.9 percent during the year.

SOCIAL ANXIETY DISORDER CAMPAIGN

2009-03-28T04:53:00.000-07:00

OVERVIEW
In 1999 Paxil, manufactured by SmithKline Beecham (now GlaxoSmithKline plc), was third among the pharmaceutical industry’s best-selling SSRIs, a class of drugs then used primarily to treat depression and anxietyrelated maladies. The drugmaker’s strategy for gaining ground on rivals Prozac and Zoloft included extending Paxil’s market by winning approval by the U.S. Food and Drug Administration (FDA) to treat other forms of mental illness. When, in May of that year, the FDA made Paxil its only approved treatment for social anxiety disorder, the drug finally found itself in a position, after seven years on the market, to outsell its rivals. Social anxiety disorder was a little-known condition at the time, but estimates by SmithKline Beecham put the number of potential Paxil customers in the United States at close to 10 million. Enlisting the public relations firm Cohn & Wolfe as well as Paxil’s advertising agency of record, McCann Erickson Consumer Health, SmithKline Beecham mounted a combined physician, PR, and directto-consumer branded campaign that was meant to inform Americans about social anxiety disorder and to let them know that Paxil alone had been approved to treat it.
Immediately after learning of the FDA ruling,
SmithKline Beecham increased its spending on physician-targeted ads to get the word out about the new Paxil designation. Meanwhile, the drugmaker funded a public-service campaign meant to spread awareness of social anxiety disorder. Then, in September 1999, a $30 million push of the Paxil brand began its run on television and in magazines with national circulations. SmithKline Beecham focused its message about social anxiety disorder on professionals between the ages of 18 and 34, with an emphasis on men, who were believed more likely to seek help for the condition because of career concerns.
The PR campaign resulted in more than a billion media references to social anxiety disorder, up from roughly 50 in previous years, almost all of which mentioned that Paxil was the only approved treatment for the condition. Seven months after its launch, the campaign had made the Paxil brand name one of the most recognized prescription drugs in the United States, and the drug was responsible for a sizeable increase in the anxiety medication category. Paxil gained on its SSRI rivals and experienced sustained sales growth, a trend that continued as the drug won further treatment designations, and the company adapted its marketing accordingly in the following years.

HISTORICAL CONTEXT
In 1987 Eli Lilly and Company won U.S. approval to sell Prozac, the first among a class of drugs called selective serotonin reuptake inhibitors (SSRIs) that treated clinical depression by elevating levels of serotonin—a chemical believed crucial to regulating mood—in the brain. Prozac’s effectiveness and lack of side effects compared to existing medications for depression revolutionized not only the way mental illness was treated by psychiatrists but also the way it was perceived by the public. By 1992, when Pfizer and SmithKline Beecham introduced their own SSRIs, Zoloft and Paxil, respectively, depression had lost much of its stigma in the United States. In the following years SSRIs became one of the best-selling prescription drug categories.
For its first several years on the market, Paxil remained in third place among SSRIs, and SmithKline Beecham set its sights on new markets for the drug. In the mid-1990s Paxil won FDA approval for the treatment of anxiety-related conditions like panic disorder and obsessive-compulsive disorder. Though these markets led to substantial growth for the brand, it was the FDA’s approval of Paxil in 1999 as a treatment for a little-known condition called social anxiety disorder that gave the drug its first significant advantage over competitors. Social anxiety disorder, or debilitating shyness, was a condition that, according to SmithKline Beecham, affected as many as 10 million Americans, and Paxil was the only FDA-approved treatment. SmithKline Beecham was aided in its attempt to reach this untapped market by an easing of FDA regulations in 1997 that governed the advertising of prescription drugs. The policy shift almost immediately changed the nature of the advertising of prescription drugs, as pharmaceutical companies, which traditionally had focused on physicians and other medical professionals in their marketing efforts, began to rely on advertising their products directly to consumers, much as was done with other consumer goods. Though restrictions remained regarding the disclosure of side effects and though the FDA retained a role in approving advertisements, directto-consumer pharmaceutical marketing quickly became ubiquitous in the United States, increasingly putting patients rather than their doctors in the position of deciding which drugs might best satisfy their needs.

TARGET MARKET
The social anxiety disorder campaign targeted professionals aged 18–34 who, despite appearing normal, experienced overwhelming fear in social or work-related situations. SmithKline Beecham estimated that the total number of people suffering from the condition in the United States numbered 10 million, and the company believed that only 5 percent of these people were being treated. The company thus set out to define social anxiety disorder for an enormous untapped market, to let people know that they were not alone in their suffering, and to urge people to seek out Paxil, the only available FDAapproved treatment. As the Paxil product director, Barry Brand, told Advertising Age, ‘‘Every marketer’s dream is to find an unidentified or unknown market and develop it. That’s what we were able to do with social anxiety disorder.’’
The National Institute of Mental Health, however, placed the number of sufferers from social anxiety disorder at around 5 million. This discrepancy pointed to a controversy surrounding the subjectivity of diagnosis and, by extension, SmithKline Beecham’s marketing of Paxil. While SmithKline Beecham argued that it was catering to an overwhelming need and helping relieve previously untreated suffering, critics believed that the drugmaker was artificially creating a market for Paxil by encouraging the merely shy to diagnose themselves with the more debilitating form of social phobia. It was estimated that twice as many women suffered from social anxiety disorder as men, but in a departure from conventional wisdom men appeared more likely to seek treatment for the condition. In most medical matters men were less likely to seek treatment, but as McCann Erickson’s Nan Dillon told Advertising Age, ‘‘This tends to be the exception because social anxiety disorder can actually damage a man’s career.’’

COMPETITION
When the Paxil social anxiety campaign was launched, Prozac was the SSRI market leader and Eli Lilly’s biggest earner, with annual sales approaching $3 billion. In the summer of 1999 a Prozac campaign narrowly preceded Paxil’s social anxiety disorder ads to become the first-ever TV marketing of a psychiatric drug. The centerpiece of the Prozac campaign was a 30-minute infomercial that aired on local and cable networks late at night and on weekends, when people with untreated depression were believed likely to be watching. The infomercial featured a mostly female cast of Prozac users giving testimonials, as well as imagery of presumably depressed people and informational segments with doctors talking about depression and its treatment. Mental health experts were divided on the question of whether it was appropriate to pitch Prozac under the cover of public-service programming. The company supported the infomercial with 30-second TV spots offering a toll-free number to call for more information.
Paxil’s other major competitor in the SSRI market, Pfizer’s Zoloft, whose 1999 sales were estimated at $2 billion, had not yet used direct-to-consumer advertising. In early 2000, however, Pfizer initiated an account review with the intention of moving the duties for Zoloft advertising away from health care specialists Lyons Lavey Nickel Swift to a general-market agency. Deutsch Inc. won the review and began preparing a Zoloft direct-toconsumer message. Having already won approval for treatment of post-traumatic stress disorder, Zoloft was well positioned to benefit from the dramatic increase in SSRI prescriptions following the terrorist attacks in the United States on September 11, 2001. direct-to-consumer campaign supporting BuSpar. One of only two drugs approved to treat generalized anxiety disorder at the time, BuSpar was also used to treat depression. Unlike its competitors among psychiatric drugs, BuSpar was not associated with such side effects as drowsiness and loss of libido. The BuSpar campaign targeted women via magazines like Good Housekeeping and People and, using an image of a cartoon female with symptoms of anxiety, on broadcast and cable TV.

MARKETING STRATEGY
Soon after the FDA decision in May 1999 allowing Paxil to be marketed as a treatment for social anxiety disorder, SmithKline Beecham increased its spending on physician-targeted ads by $1 million, according to Medical Marketing and Media. The company changed the copy in medical journals from ‘‘Paxil means peace . . . in depression, panic disorder, and OCD’’ to ‘‘Show them they can . . . the first and only approved treatment for social anxiety disorder.’’
Meanwhile, SmithKline Beecham funded an informational and public relations campaign to spread awareness about social anxiety disorder. Sponsored by a trio of advocacy organizations—the American Psychiatry Association, the Anxiety Disorders Association of America, and Freedom From Fear—the campaign was orchestrated by the New York PR firm Cohn & Wolfe and was designed, according to PR News, ‘‘to educate reporters, consumers, and, in some cases, physicians, in an effort to encourage diagnosis and treatment.’’ Featuring posters placed at bus stops across the country and the tagline ‘‘Imagine being allergic to people,’’ the PR campaign did not explicitly mention Paxil or SmithKline Beecham. Likewise, Cohn & Wolfe technically represented the nonprofit organizations and the doctors involved, even though SmithKline Beecham paid for the campaign. Virtually all of the sizeable media coverage Cohn & Wolfe generated mentioned not just the Paxil name but also the fact that it was the only FDAapproved treatment for the condition.
In September 1999 SmithKline Beecham launched its first Paxil direct-to-consumer ads, a TV and print campaign crafted by McCann Erickson Consumer Health and with an estimated cost of $30 million. Like the public relations efforts, the branded advertising was intended to define the condition for potential Paxil users and to give afflicted Americans comfort by sending the message that they were not alone. This portion of the campaign also sought more directly to raise awareness of the Paxil name.
In an attempt to reach its core target of 18- to 34-year-old professionals, SmithKline Beecham bought airtime on prime-time shows like Ally McBeal and ran the print ads in magazines that included Rolling Stone and Sports Illustrated. Both the television spots and the print ads used the tagline ‘‘Your life is waiting,’’ and they directed consumers to ask themselves whether they experienced anxiety that made them avoid social interaction, that resembled a panic attack, or that was detrimental to their social or professional life. The 60-second TV spot informed viewers that more than 10 million Americans suffered from social anxiety disorder and that sufferers were a mix of male and female professionals engaged in productive office and social activities. In keeping with the belief that men were more likely to seek treatment for social anxiety disorder, the print ads primarily targeted male professionals, with the primary image being a distraught man in business clothes.

OUTCOME
PR News reported that, as a result of the campaign to advertise social anxiety disorder, media references to the condition climbed to more than 1 billion articles, up from 50 in 1997 and 1998, with 96 percent conveying the information that Paxil was the only FDA-approved treatment then available. After the campaign had been running for seven months, according to Medical Marketing and Media, Paxil scored third among advertised prescription drugs in unaided recall, behind Viagra and Claritin. Paxil’s market share among anxiety drugs from December 1998 to May 1999, the months immediately preceding the campaign, was 9.3 percent of 6.7 million prescriptions. From June to October 1999, as the campaign ran, Paxil’s market share not only grew to 11.5 percent but was responsible for half of the increase in the entire market, which grew to 7.2 million prescriptions. In 2000 British rival Glaxo Wellcome merged with SmithKline Beecham. In its 2000 annual report the new entity, GlaxoSmithKline, claimed that Paxil ‘‘became number one in the U.S. selective serotonin reuptake inhibitor market for new retail prescriptions in 2000.’’ In 2001 GlaxoSmithKline won FDA approval to market Paxil for both generalized anxiety disorder and posttraumatic stress disorder. Paxil continued to outpace its rivals in sales growth. The terrorist attacks in the United States on September 11, 2001, resulted in a dramatic increase in prescriptions for all antidepressants and anxiety drugs. During this time Paxil’s advertising positioned it as an answer to the uncontrollable feelings of fear and helplessness that many people felt in the aftermath of the attacks.