SEINFELD CAMPAIGN

OVERVIEW
Although the American Express Company (AmEx) had built its brand on an idea of exclusionary ‘‘membership,’’ its elitist image proved a weak spot in the 1980s and 1990s, when competitors such as Visa and MasterCard eroded AmEx’s market share by positioning themselves as more convenient alternatives. One of the AmEx marketing moves meant to counteract the company’s outdated image was enlisting the comedian Jerry Seinfeld in 1992 as a collaborator on TV commercials that reproduced the observational comedy of his stand-up routine and of his NBC sitcom Seinfeld, which at the time had a devoted but comparatively small viewership. As Seinfeld became increasingly popular, AmEx heightened Seinfeld’s role in its marketing. Between 1995 and 2002 the comedian was a centerpiece of the credit-card giant’s American marketing efforts.
In one spot Seinfeld was shown foiling, thanks to his AmEx card, a gas-station attendant who wanted to inconvenience him by failing to stop the pump at exactly $20. This focus on humorously trivial acts was characteristic of Seinfeld’s comedy, but the tone and content of the commercials represented risky new territory for American Express. Seinfeld’s intelligent and accessible persona helped the card-issuer bridge generational divisions and position itself as suitable for use in unglamorous hubs of daily life, such as grocery stores, without undermining the upscale image it had spent so many years creating. The cost of retaining Seinfeld and of running the commercials was not disclosed, but the comedian was, at the peak of his popularity, one of the highest-paid TV stars, and his AmEx spots often debuted on Super Bowl broadcasts, the most expensive of all advertising forums. American Express annually spent about $300 million advertising its credit cards.
The commercials were well received by consumers and ad-industry critics; they were consistently named among Adweek ’s monthly Best Spots in the late 1990s, and the ‘‘Gas Station’’ spot won a Silver Lion at the Cannes International Advertising Festival in 1997. Seinfeld was a central part of AmEx’s long-term brand repositioning, a project that paid intermittent dividends during the years of the campaign’s run. Seinfeld and AmEx further collaborated on a well-received online campaign in 2004.

HISTORICAL CONTEXT
Beginning in the 1960s American Express distinguished itself for two decades with several highly acclaimed campaigns. Advertising Age included two 1970s American Express campaigns (‘‘Do You Know Me?’’ and ‘‘Don’t Leave Home without It’’ featuring Karl Malden) on its list of the ‘‘50 Best Commercials.’’ The 1988 print campaign featuring photos of famous card members by Annie Leibovitz was a finalist for the book Advertising’s Ten Best of the Decade 1980–1990.
But in 1990 AT&T Corp. disrupted the generalpurpose credit-card market by introducing its Universal Card with no annual fees. The move adversely affected American Express, which relied on annual fees for much of its revenue, for two reasons. First, American Express was not a credit card but rather a charge card that had to be paid in full monthly, and so it did not earn interest by extending credit. Second, American Express collected on average 3.22 percent of the transaction, making Visa a much more attractive card for merchants to honor, since it charged about half of this percentage. CEO James Robinson III attempted to salvage American Express by turning it into what Time magazine called ‘‘an unwieldy financial supermarket.’’ In 1993 the board of directors replaced Robinson with Harvey Golub, who streamlined the company by severing the brokerage, investment-banking, and life-insurance divisions. Golub’s tactics turned the company around in short order. Spending on American Express cards increased by 15.6 percent in 1996, outpacing the 13.4 percent rise for credit cards overall (exclusive of debit transactions and cash advances). And in the first half of 1997 American Express finally reversed its decadelong downward trend in market share, rising from 18.3 to 18.9 percent of the $469 billion credit-card market.

TARGET MARKET
The Seinfeld commercials were part of a larger AmEx effort to counteract a damaging perception that the brand was the elitist province of older, wealthy consumers. To broaden its card-holding base AmEx needed to reach younger consumers, who tended to remain loyal to their first credit-card brand, but it was also important that the company not alienate those who had been drawn to AmEx’s long-cultivated aura of prestige. Seinfeld was a key figure in this brand repositioning beginning with his initial involvement with AmEx in 1992. The comic’s ironic, urban-inflected sensibility attracted a devoted following among young consumers, but his value to the company became increasingly evident in the following years, as his eponymous sitcom achieved a level of popularity that transcended demographic divisions. Even as Seinfeld became universally known and appreciated, Jerry Seinfeld’s hold on younger, hipper consumers remained strong. His persona was that of an intelligent yet accessible and self-effacing everyman. He thus emerged as a spokesperson who fit neatly with the AmEx imperative to broaden the brand’s target market without alienating its existing cardholders.
Seinfeld’s centrality to AmEx’s advertising increased in concert with his celebrity. As of 1995 Seinfeld was well on its way to becoming perhaps the defining TV sitcom of its era, and the comic became one of the chief elements of the wider AmEx marketing effort tagged ‘‘Do More,’’ a branding campaign that was intended to extend the ongoing redefinition of the company’s image. AmEx’s other primary spokesperson during this time, the young golf phenom Tiger Woods, likewise contributed a uniquely inclusive aura to the brand. As a 21-year-old of mixed ethnicity, Woods appealed to young people across ethnic lines, but his overwhelming mastery of a Comedian Jerry Seinfeld
sport closely linked with older, moneyed consumers likewise won him respect from many established AmEx customers.

COMPETITION
While American Express’s market share was rising in the first half of 1997, to 18.9 percent, Visa’s was falling slightly, from 48.88 to 48.85 percent. Visa nevertheless dominated almost half of the market, with about 600 million cards accepted at more than 14 million locations worldwide. This made American Express pale in comparison, with 42.3 million cardholders able to charge at 5 million locations worldwide. In an attempt to make its numbers more competitive, American Express lowered the average percentage of the fee it charged merchants on each transaction from 3.22 percent in 1990 to 2.74 percent in 1998. The discount increased merchant acceptance of the card. In a 1997 survey cardholders confirmed that they could use their cards at 92 percent of the locations where they wanted to shop, up from 72 percent five years earlier. These statistics substantiated the portrayals in the commercials of Seinfeld charging gas and purchasing single stamps. But Visa still charged merchants a fee of less than 2 percent, allowing the front-runner to claim, ‘‘It’s everywhere you want it to be.’’
American Express edged out its main competition in the corporate and small-business markets, where it controlled a 65 percent share. Consistent with its image, American Express cardholders tended to be bigger spenders, charging on average $6,000 yearly in 1996, compared with Visa’s per-card average of $3,200. Consumers tended to use their American Express cards for higherpriced purchases, such as travel and entertainment. They also, however, tended to rack up a much higher volume of charges on competitors’ cards on day-to-day spending. The use of debit cards, which drew directly from checking accounts and thus worked well for this kind of spending, increased by 75 percent in 1996. University of Maryland economics professor Lawrence Ausubel predicted that consumer spending would bifurcate between the extremes of immediate payment (debit cards) and extended payment (credit cards), emptying the middle ground of charge cards with monthly payments in full that represented American Express’s traditional arrangement.
In fact, exclusive agreements with Visa and
MasterCard barred major banks from joining American Express to offer debit cards and make other arrangements, a case that was contested in federal courts. Internationally, American Express established relationships with banks that benefited both.

MARKETING STRATEGY
Ogilvy & Mather creative director David Apicella had first noticed Seinfeld as a promising stand-up comic in the 1970s. In 1992, acting on a hunch, Apicella hired Seinfeld to endorse American Express, although the Seinfeld show was still in its infancy and not yet the pop-culture juggernaut that it eventually became. ‘‘When we started, he hadn’t quite reached the spectacular levels of success,’’ Apicella recalled. ‘‘He had kind of a cult following. But I thought he was a nice combination of being Everyman—and appealing to every man—and being insightful in his observations.’’ At first Seinfeld’s role was supplemental to the company’s brand advertising, and his minimalist spots simply mimicked his standup routine, with his material focusing on touting American Express. By 1995 Seinfeld’s role at American Express had expanded to include being the spokesperson for the general brand campaign.
The Seinfeld spots that appeared in those years imitated the plots of the eponymous sitcom that had become a part of the collective American consciousness, and like the Seinfeld show, they were crafted via brainstorming sessions, according to participants in the creative process. ‘‘We do it much like a sitcom is written,’’ Apicella said. ‘‘We just sit around a room for as long as it takes to get a funny commercial . . . Having spent however many days it takes to get the thing right with Jerry in the room, we’re usually pretty together, but we’re always changing things on the set.’’ Apicella continued, ‘‘Jerry does some ad-libbing, but things are generally scripted. Jerry’s commercials are done the way Jerry’s show is, which is done the way Jerry’s act was—[they are] carefully constructed beforehand.’’ One well-known spot, ‘‘Gas Station,’’ showed Seinfeld filling his car with gas, preparing to stop the pump at exactly $20, presumably because this amount would facilitate the cash payment he wanted to make. When the pump went slightly over $20, the gas-station attendant began to delight in the irritation the error would cause, but Seinfeld responded by giving the pump handle another gratuitous squeeze and victoriously producing his AmEx green card, which made the precise total of his purchase irrelevant. The humorously trivial nature of the comedian’s triumph was in keeping with his sitcom character’s personality, a necessary element of the campaign from the point of view of the TV show’s loyal audience. Additionally, the fact that AmEx was being connected with the commonplace act of purchasing gas was noteworthy. Typically associated with upscale travel and leisure purchases, AmEx had not, prior to the Seinfeld campaign, been regularly promoted as a card to be used for such mundane, unglamorous tasks.
Another prominent spot in the campaign, which made its debut during the 1998 Super Bowl, showed an American Express card being put to a similarly commonplace use, while further deriving humor from the small scale of Seinfeld’s personal triumphs. This time, however, the spot—set in a grocery store—literally juxtaposed the comedian’s character with that of Superman, who appeared as an animated figure. When Lois Lane, having forgotten her wallet, needed help purchasing her groceries, it was Seinfeld who was able to oblige, thanks to his American Express card. Superman’s costume, alas, had no pockets, limiting his ability to save the day. Although the last episode of Seinfeld aired in May 1998, Seinfeld’s relationship with AmEx continued; indeed, in the aftermath of the show’s end the public appetite for new Seinfeld material could only be satisfied via AmEx commercials. The Seinfeld campaign was put on hold during 2000 as AmEx relied more heavily on Tiger Woods and a more aspiration-minded iteration of its ongoing ‘‘Do More’’ message. A new batch of Seinfeld spots began appearing on TV with the March 2001 broadcast of the Academy Awards, and the Seinfeld campaign remained an integral part of AmEx’s television advertising through 2002.

KNIX TIX
In an underscoring of American Express Company’s affiliation with the New York Knicks, Michael Bay of Propaganda Films directed a 30-second spot titled ‘‘Knicks Tickets,’’ in which spokesperson Jerry Seinfeld brandished his American Express card to pursue his lost Knicks tickets from his limo to horseback to inline skates to underwater diving. The final frames, shot outside Madison Square Garden (because it was too expensive to shoot inside), showed Seinfeld in full scuba gear telling his date, ‘‘I’d have gone to the moon for these.’’ The spot ended on a two-shot of Seinfeld and film director and Knicks fanatic Spike Lee, in an astronaut’s suit, affirming, ‘‘Tell me about it.’’ Seinfeld performed his own stunts for the spot—mounting a horse, diving backward off a boat, and even in line skating for just the second time in his life.

OUTCOME
Adweek editors consistently included commercials from the ‘‘Seinfeld’’ campaign on their monthly list of the ‘‘Best Spots’’ breaking on broadcast and cable television, and ‘‘Gas Station’’ garnered a Silver Lion at the Cannes Advertising Festival in June 1997. Although AmEx began to make up ground against its rivals in 1997, it was locked out of the debit-card market by an agreement between Visa, MasterCard, and the banks that issued debit cards. Therefore, AmEx lost market share in 1998 and 1999. It reversed the trend by introducing its Blue Cards, which featured a microchip meant to store the consumer’s personal information to facilitate online purchasing—a feature that was not fully functional because it required retailers to use special equipment that was not then cost-effective or readily available. The microchip nevertheless effectively positioned the card as a hip, youth-focused accessory, the only credit card of its kind. AmEx attracted millions of new cardholders in this way in 2000 and 2001. The Seinfeld commercials were not used to pitch the Blue Card, but the card’s success marked an extension of the ongoing brand repositioning of which the comedian had long been an integral part.
The concept behind the 1998 Seinfeld and Superman commercial was revived in 2004 for a much-publicized pair of ‘‘webisodes,’’ five-minute films available for viewing only online. The comedian and the superhero passed their time together in much the same way that Seinfeld and his onscreen friends Elaine, George, and Kramer typically passed their time on Seinfeld. In the first webisode, for instance, Seinfeld and Superman made small talk in a diner, returned a damaged DVD player (thanks to an AmEx policy of replacing faulty merchandise within 90 days of purchase), and attended a lackluster Broadway musical about the state of Wyoming. The second webisode touted, among other AmEx attributes, the company’s roadside-assistance service, by showing Superman and Seinfeld stranded on a road in Death Valley. This Web campaign attracted more than 2 million visitors. Although ad-industry observers questioned its practical brand-building and product-promotion benefits, ‘‘The Adventures of Seinfeld and Superman’’ was widely considered one of the most innovative online campaigns of its time. Because of the campaign Adweek named American Express its Interactive Marketer of the Year for 2004.

DO MORE CAMPAIGN

OVERVIEW
The American Express Company (AmEx) was long associated with the celebrities whose appearance in print campaigns was meant to position ‘‘membership’’ in its credit-card brand as the domain of a privileged few. But AmEx’s elitist brand image became a serious hindrance in the 1980s and 1990s. Rivals such as Visa U.S.A. and MasterCard International had been using their own marketing to exploit the fact that their card brands were accepted more universally than AmEx, and by 1996 their gains had significantly eroded AmEx’s market share. The launch of a new umbrella advertising campaign tagged ‘‘Do More’’ was not just the debut of new creative concepts; it marked a concerted attempt to reposition the AmEx brand.
Created by ad agency Ogilvy & Mather, ‘‘Do More’’ aimed to convey all the advantages AmEx could offer, ranging from its numerous charge and credit cards to travel services and financial-planning assistance. ‘‘We want consumers to see American Express as more than a charge card company,’’ John Hayes, AmEx’s head of global advertising, told USA Today. The company also used ‘‘Do More’’ to broaden its consumer base, employing celebrities, such as Tiger Woods and Jerry Seinfeld, who appealed to consumers across demographic and income boundaries. The umbrella effort had various incarnations and encompassed several individual campaigns through 2001. AmEx typically spent between $170 million and $200 million on U.S. credit-card advertising during these years.
AmEx gained market share in the first two years that ‘‘Do More’’ ran. Difficulties in later years were reversed by the introduction of a new card appealing to young adults, a product whose existence itself was a measure of the evolving nature of the AmEx brand. ‘‘Do More’’ did a great deal to bring about and to publicize this evolution, and many of the hallmarks of this repositioning campaign—including the continued participation of Tiger Woods and Jerry Seinfeld—were visible in the advertising that followed its discontinuation in 2002.

HISTORICAL CONTEXT
American Express had built its reputation as a prestigious charge card. In 1976 the company began its famed ‘‘Do You Know Me?’’ campaign in which celebrities ranging from dancer Mikhail Baryshnikov to puppeteer Jim Henson appeared in ads that pictured them and an AmEx Green Card bearing their names. In 1987 the ‘‘Portraits’’ campaign followed a similar formula. By aligning the brand with stars, AmEx cultivated the notion that carrying one of its cards was more akin to joining an elite country club than making a financial transaction. As later ads sniffed, ‘‘membership has its privileges.’’ In the 1980s, however, AmEx’s careful positioning began to backfire. According to Brandweek, while AmEx ‘‘clung to its old, elite ways,’’ the credit card industry went through monumental changes. With so many cards vying for consumers’ attention, Visa and MasterCard (specifically, the member banks that comprised the Visa and MasterCard consortia) began to cross-market with various businesses so they could offer incentives to consumers. For instance, by teaming up with airlines, Visa and MasterCard could entice consumers to charge purchases with the promise of frequent-flier miles. Moreover, companies such as AT&T and GM allied themselves with the Visa and MasterCard brands and began to peddle cards that tied in to phone service or car purchases. But while the entire industry became hyper-segmented, AmEx continued to sell itself on its reputation alone and lost market share as a result. Also damaging was Visa’s 1987 launch of an attack campaign that stressed Visa’s global acceptance by featuring countless businesses that declined to take American Express. Further limiting AmEx’s appeal was the fact that the company continued to charge its hefty $55 membership fee, while Visa and MasterCard offered fee-free cards and low interest rates. Taken together these factors weakened AmEx considerably. In fact more than 2 million AmEx cardholders canceled their memberships in the early 1990s, and the company’s share of the domestic creditcard market sank from nearly 20 percent in 1990 to 16 percent in 1995, according to Fortune.
In 1995 AmEx began to explore new ways to stanch the flood of cardholders abandoning AmEx and to persuade existing cardholders to use AmEx more often. After negotiating an agreement with Delta Airlines, AmEx was able to offer a frequent-flier program like those of its rivals. The company also debuted its Membership Rewards program, which gave consumers points for each AmEx purchase made. These points could then be redeemed for bonuses such as gift certificates, travel vouchers, or car rentals at an array of participating businesses. AmEx also introduced the Optima card, a revolving credit account similar to Visa and MasterCard in that consumers could carry a balance on it from month to month rather than having to pay it in full at the close of each billing period (as the Green Card required). Moreover, AmEx pushed more retailers to accept its cards. This effort was punctuated by the inauguration of the ‘‘Do More’’ campaign in June 1996. ‘‘This company has had a great history of reinventing itself,’’ Hayes told American Banker. ‘‘This is the next logical step.’’

TARGET MARKET
Because AmEx wanted to use ‘‘Do More’’ ads to gain new cardholders, the company crafted individual ads to appeal to distinct groups, especially those that it had not targeted in its previous advertising. One of the key approaches AmEx used to broaden its customer base was to employ spokespeople who counteracted the company’s image as ‘‘a stodgy, premium brand that caters to older customers,’’ according to the Wall Street Journal. In 1997, for instance, AmEx signed Woods, who had won the Masters Tournament that year. As a 21-year-old phenomenon of mixed race, Woods provided AmEx an opportunity to reach younger consumers as well as African-American consumers. It was essential to AmEx’s future that it garner younger consumers because they ‘‘tend to stick with the first credit card they use,’’ explained USA Today. Furthermore, Woods was able ‘‘to cross every demographic line . . . and appeal to an audience that makes $250,000 a year as well as an audience that makes $25,000,’’ an industry analyst told American Banker.
Seinfeld, who pitched the Green Card in spots that aired during such high-profile events as the Super Bowl, was another figure that transcended the traditional AmEx audience. ‘‘The Seinfeld advertising has attracted a new and younger group to the franchise and has also helped promote everyday usage, which is key,’’ Hayes told Brandweek. While AmEx was typically associated with the travel and leisure retail sector, the company wanted to increase the routine purchases consumers charged each month to their AmEx cards. Instead of presenting Seinfeld in the same sort of glamorous settings that permeated ‘‘Portraits’’ or ‘‘Do You Know Me?’’ AmEx showed Seinfeld wielding his Green Card at grocery stores and gas stations. One commercial paired Seinfeld with the animated figure of Superman and portrayed Seinfeld (rather than the caped hero) rescuing Lois Lane at a grocery store by pulling out his AmEx card. (She had forgotten her wallet; Superman’s costume had no pockets;
Seinfeld paid for the food.)
Similarly, in the 1998 series of spots for AmEx’s Small Business Services division, the company focused on African-American, Latino, and female entrepreneurs. ‘‘We have represented the three groups who represent the strongest growth in new business starts,’’ an AmEx spokesperson told Brandweek. In the 1998 ads that did present wealthy and prominent businesspeople, AmEx chose the likes of Jake Burton, a snowboarding pioneer, and Earvin ‘‘Magic’’ Johnson, a basketball hall-of-famer who had been diagnosed with HIV, both of whom Hayes classified as ‘‘people who have challenged the status quo and appreciated the service we give . . . [They are] not just those that fit the traditional view of success.’’ Despite AmEx’s desire to broaden its consumer base, it was careful not to ‘‘move downscale,’’ as Hayes described it in Brandweek. The company had considerable brand equity rooted in AmEx’s reputation for superior service, and it did not want to alienate its core group of affluent card users. ‘‘Creating the balance where the brand becomes accessible, yet . . . remains special at the same time, is a real challenge,’’ Hayes said. AmEx relied on its spokespeople’s ability to walk this tightrope. Though Woods was young, he was nevertheless a golfer, a player of a sport popular among businessmen. Moreover, Woods was not a rebellious upstart. Though barely out of his teens, he was one of the best golfers in the world. Similarly, Seinfeld’s hit sitcom was watched by a huge audience. Popular with many viewers, Seinfeld was not exclusively a Generation X hero, and the commercials featuring him also appealed to AmEx’s older cardholders as well.

COMPETITION
Industry leader Visa had persisted in its attacks on AmEx since the 1985 launch of its ‘‘It’s Everywhere You Want to Be’’ campaign. Although Visa’s share of the domestic credit-card market fell to 48.8 percent from 49.2 percent in 1996, it continued to portray businesses, restaurants, and entertainment providers that would not accept AmEx as a way to stress the universality of its own cards. Like AmEx, Visa also addressed specific new markets in its 1998 efforts. Under the umbrella of the ‘‘Everywhere’’ theme, Visa targeted Generation X consumers in ‘‘The Attic,’’ a commercial featuring a trendy used-clothing store. In ‘‘eToys,’’ a television spot for an online merchant, Visa linked itself to the growing e-commerce sector by presenting itself as the credit card of choice for Internet purchases. With a commercial highlighting Jack Nicklaus’s golf school (which only took Visa), Visa tried to reach more affluent cardholders. A cornerstone of Visa’s marketing strategy was its sponsorship of sporting events. In addition to being the official sponsor of the National Football League (NFL), horse racing’s Triple Crown races (the Kentucky Derby, the Belmont Stakes, and the Preakness), and NASCAR auto racing, Visa had been an Olympic Games sponsor since 1986. Visa used the 1998 Winter Olympic Games as a platform to reinforce its message of global acceptance. As a Visa executive explained in the January 30, 1998, edition of American Banker, ‘‘nothing was better for a brand’’ than associating itself with the Olympics. Like American Express, Visa also endeavored to expand its empire—and its name recognition—beyond credit cards. In 1998 Visa continued to promote its debit card, the Visa CheckCard, with big-budget advertisements depicting celebrities being hassled for identification when writing a check. Visa touted its small-business cards as well. According to the October 5, 1998, issue of Advertising Age, Visa’s long-term goal was to leverage ‘‘its brand equity into different kinds of payment.’’ MasterCard, too, vied to be consumers’ card of choice. Breaking free from a long period of mediocre advertising and negligible growth, in 1997 the company debuted ‘‘Priceless,’’ which ‘‘bec[ame] one of the industry’s most admired campaigns, creating an almost nonstop buzz . . . [and] raising consumer awareness and consumer usage of the card,’’ Adweek raved. Using the tagline ‘‘There Are Some Things Money Can’t Buy. For Everything Else There’s MasterCard,’’ MasterCard’s agency, McCann-Erickson, made an emotional appeal to its viewers. These print and television advertisements showed scenes of various activities, such as a father and child at a baseball game and an older couple celebrating a wedding anniversary. The voice-over announced the cost of various aspects of these endeavors, and the commercials all culminated in a ‘‘priceless’’ moment (such as ‘‘real conversation with 11-year-old son’’ at the end of the baseball spot), followed by the campaign’s tagline. Buoyed by ‘‘Priceless,’’ MasterCard’s purchase volume rose 16 percent from 1997 to 1998 and its market share remained steady, increasing slightly to 27.8 percent from 27.6 percent, according to Credit Card News.

‘‘DO MORE’’ EVERYWHERE
American Express Company’s ‘‘Do More’’ campaign truly was a global one, running in 23 different countries simultaneously. Although the same basic ads were used everywhere, the ad agency Ogilvy & Mather changed small details when appropriate. ‘‘We’ve created an overall platform for positioning,’’ John Hayes, the company’s head of global advertising, told Advertising Age. ‘‘We make modifications and customizations everywhere to make sure what we do is right.’’ Golfer Tiger Woods proved an especially valuable global representative—particularly in Japan, where golf was a passion among a large percentage of the population.

MARKETING STRATEGY
Because the primary goal of ‘‘Do More’’ was to establish the brand’s relevance to diverse consumers, AmEx used a targeted strategy to pair specific messages with specific groups. For instance, the print executions portraying small-business entrepreneurs ran almost entirely in publications such as Success, Entrepreneur, and Forbes. The initial Tiger Woods ads touting American Express Financial Advisors favored major newspapers (especially the Wall Street Journal, the New York Times, and USA Today) and newsweeklies (including Time and Newsweek) over lifestyle publications. AmEx chose to air the Seinfeld commercials on mainstream, high-profile television programming because the company hoped the comedian could connect a mass audience of credit-card users to the Green Card. ‘‘Superman’’ first appeared during NFL playoff games, which reached viewers across demographic lines.
The message of ‘‘Do More’’ was that AmEx—not Visa or MasterCard—could improve one’s ventures and that AmEx was a global solution always available to make things better (or easier). Part of the way AmEx delivered this message was by making its ads attention-getters. The spokespeople chosen to represent the various facets of the brand were not only well known but also had a certain renegade charm. Certainly Johnson was one of the greatest basketball players of all time, and his excellence was intended to mirror AmEx’s reputation for service and prestige. But Johnson had also shocked the nation when he announced he was HIV-positive. Pundits had decried him, and some fellow basketball players even shunned him. Using him in the AmEx spots was a daring choice and attracted much notice.
Similarly, the ‘‘Superman’’ spot was designed ‘‘to break through commercial clutter,’’ Hayes said. Instead of banking on Seinfeld’s celebrity, AmEx created a commercial that juxtaposed him with a comic book character and spoofed the notion of any credit card (or personality) being able to ‘‘save the day.’’ As he took his AmEx card out of his pocket, Seinfeld spun around in a blur. An onlooker asked, ‘‘What’s with the spinning?’’ ‘‘He idolizes me,’’ Superman wryly explained. ‘‘It’s embarrassing.’’ Again, the notion was to twist the genre slightly, to prompt viewers to sit up and take note that American Express was not quite what everyone assumed it to be. In 1999 AmEx extended its association with Seinfeld. One noteworthy spot showed the comedian embarking on a cross-country road trip after observing that he needed to ‘‘get some kind of real life.’’ In keeping with his persona, his adventures were simultaneously largescale and trivial: among other activities, he saw Mount Rushmore, held a cup of coffee that was too hot, had a conversation with an attractive blond woman, and visited the Saint Louis Arch.
American Express updated the ‘‘Do More’’ concept in 2000, adapting the tagline to a subcampaign dubbed ‘‘Moments of Truth,’’ the first phase of which consisted of five TV spots featuring ordinary people. Each of these commercials focused on the fact that AmEx offered ‘‘more’’ services than its competitors. For instance, American Express’s travel-assistance benefits were touted in one spot that showed a woman waiting fruitlessly at an airport baggage claim. Another spot emphasized American Express’s partnership with the bulk-sales supermarket Costco; yet another focused on the company’s online-banking offerings via the juxtaposition of a ‘‘wired’’ young woman with her ‘‘analog’’ father, who was paying bills by hand. The tagline’s flexibility was further demonstrated by that year’s highest-profile and most imaginative spot, which featured Tiger Woods playing an outsized game of golf on the streets of Manhattan. Woods was shown swatting a ball over the Empire State Building and then from Central Park all the way downtown to Wall Street, before sinking a putt in a paper cup positioned on the Brooklyn Bridge. In this case ‘‘do more’’ was intended as a suggestion that American Express could help cardholders realize their most ambitious hopes.

OUTCOME
When AmEx inaugurated ‘‘Do More’’ in 1996, critics predicted that the company would lose its ability to differentiate itself by shedding some of its snobbish image. Ogilvy and AmEx quickly seemed to prove the skeptics wrong, however: the company’s 1996 purchase volume rose 15.6 percent, and ‘‘after years of decline,’’ its 1997 share of the domestic credit-card market climbed to 17 percent from 16.4 percent, according to Advertising Age. AmEx posted global market share declines in 1998 and 1999, but this was partly a result of the Visa and MasterCard emphasis on debit cards, a product AmEx did not offer. AmEx countered with its most successful product launch in recent memory, the Blue Card, aimed at college-age consumers and other young adults. The ranks of Blue Card holders steadily increased in 2000 and 2001, and AmEx unveiled a Blue Card designed for small-business owners. Although the Blue Card’s marketing did not fall under the ‘‘Do More’’ umbrella, it did build on the strategy of democratizing the traditionally upscale AmEx brand image, an approach whose merits were no longer questioned at the beginning of the new century. This change in perception was perhaps a measure of the success of the brand repositioning accomplished through the ‘‘Do More’’ campaign.
The Seinfeld and other ‘‘Do More’’ spots aired through 2001, but AmEx, like many advertisers, struggled to find appropriate ways to promote itself in the somber months after the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001. AmEx’s post-9/11 difficulties were compounded by the fact that the company’s headquarters were located at the World Financial Center, adjacent to the Twin Towers, which had collapsed. In early 2002 the ‘‘Do More’’ tagline was dropped in favor of ‘‘Make Life Rewarding.’’ Both Seinfeld and Woods continued to be involved with the American Express brand.

COMPETITIVE CAMPAIGN

OVERVIEW
In June 1996 American Express Company launched a $200 million global marketing campaign to emphasize its strong brand presence and also to introduce new products and services. As competition in the credit card market intensified, American Express (AmEx) had suffered declining revenues in the early 1990s. At the same time AmEx lost market share as the company made a failed attempt at becoming a financial services supermarket by purchasing several brokerage firms, investment banking companies, and real estate businesses. American Express hoped that its ‘‘Do More’’ campaign, which consisted of both print and television ads, would lure consumers with the company’s historic brand image of reliability and prestige. Once interest was captured, AmEx planned to inform consumers of its wide variety of services and programs, with the belief that consumers would take advantage of the offers because they trusted and respected AmEx. John Hayes, the company’s executive vice president of global advertising, explained, ‘‘Our advertising used to be about a limited number of products and services, and was often defined by the people who used them. This campaign stresses our growing number of services and what American Express can do for you.’’
The ‘‘Do More’’ campaign continued into 1997, spreading information about the American Express collection of charge cards, credit cards, investment products, travel services, and more. In January AmEx also launched the ‘‘Competitive’’ campaign, which was part of the ‘‘Do More’’ effort yet focused exclusively on addressing the faults of its competitors’ services. The campaign primarily targeted longtime rival Visa International, which had a history of attacking American Express in its ad campaigns.

HISTORICAL CONTEXT
The competitive portion of the ‘‘Do More’’ campaign was a reaction to continual onslaughts from Visa’s marketing. Since the mid-1980s Visa had deliberately pitted itself against American Express, producing numerous television commercials that pointed out AmEx’s alleged shortcomings as a credit card provider. James Desrozier, vice president of MasterCard International’s advertising division, said in a 1992 Newsday article, ‘‘Visa went against American Express without mentioning MasterCard. It was the two of them and it just knocked us out of the game. It was a brilliant strategy.’’ American Express generally ignored Visa’s attacks, although battles occasionally arose. Prior to the 1994 Olympics in Lillehammer, Norway, agreement had been reached between the two companies to refrain from attacking one another in Olympic-related advertising. In addition, because Visa was an official sponsor of the Olympics, AmEx was not to use images or shots from the events in its ads or to imply an affiliation with the Olympic Games. When the Olympics began, however, the agreement crumbled. Visa objected to AmEx television ads that claimed, ‘‘So if you’re traveling to Norway, you’ll need a passport, but you don’t need a visa.’’ The play on words could be confusing, it was charged, and Visa accused AmEx of suggesting that it was connected with the Olympics by emphasizing its history with and presence in Norway. Visa then countered with television ads using its standard anti-AmEx slogan, ‘‘And they don’t take American Express.’’ American Express had long been marketed as a charge card that exemplified prestige and status, and its fees could pack a wallop. In 1995, for example, the standard green card commanded a $55 annual fee. An older marketing campaign embraced the tag line ‘‘Membership has its privileges,’’ which hinted at AmEx’s exclusive reputation. Its promises of privileges and perks, however, were not enough to sustain customer loyalty. Time magazine reported that in the early 1990s more than 2 million AmEx cardholders chose to cancel their membership. Other credit card companies such as Visa and MasterCard offered low interest rates and feefree cards to consumers, and they garnered a lower usage fee from merchants, which made them more attractive to retailers. In 1977, for example, Visa reportedly took a 2 percent fee from purchases, whereas AmEx still took 2.74 percent, down from 3.22 percent in 1990. In 1995 H. Eugene Lockhart, MasterCard’s chief executive officer at the time, told Fortune, ‘‘The consumer today simply doesn’t see the need to pay fees for a card that gives them no greater functionality than anything we or Visa would give them.’’ It appeared that the card of prestige had become the card of the privileged few rather than that of the masses, and, according to Fortune, AmEx’s share of the domestic card market declined from close to 25 percent in 1990 to 16 percent in 1995.

TARGET MARKET
American Express’s clientele had traditionally included those who were financially established and for whom ‘‘membership ha[d] its privileges.’’ AmEx had long been embraced by business travelers and corporate clients, and, according to Time, AmEx customers were ‘‘big spenders who charged an average of $6,000 on their cards in 1996, in contrast to some $3,200 for charges per Visa card.’’ Business charges and travel expenses accounted for the bulk of this spending, however, and customers used AmEx cards infrequently for personal purchases. To remedy this situation and to increase its market share in the competitive credit card arena, AmEx needed to appeal to a broader market. The company thus expanded its target clientele to include not only the upscale crowd but also the credit card-carrying masses. To compete with Visa and MasterCard, AmEx promoted its Optima credit card, which allowed the cardholder to pay off a percentage of the balance each month rather than the entire balance, as with the traditional AmEx charge card. For the ‘‘Competitive’’ campaign American Express took aim at non-AmEx cardholders to inform them of its numerous incentive programs and premiums. While companies such as Visa and MasterCard had long offered a slew of cards and rewards to its cardholders, including discounts on purchases and free airline miles, AmEx had generally refrained from such programs and stuck with its traditional card offerings. But the company learned a lesson, reported Time, during a focus group session in the early 1990s when the holder of a competing card that offered free airline miles stated, ‘‘I want to go with you guys, but you guys are so stupid that you’re not offering this product to me.’’ In a company survey AmEx learned that its cardholders would use their AmEx cards for more purchases if the spending rewarded them with travel, food, and merchandise perks. AmEx thus expanded its small airline mileage program in 1995 to offer a wideranging rewards program. The Membership Rewards program allowed cardholders to earn points by using their AmEx cards, which could later be exchanged for travel rewards, merchandise, gift certificates, and more. AmEx also began to offer a wider variety of cards, including some with no annual fee and some co-branded with other companies, and solicited retailers to increase the number of outfits at which the card could be used. As AmEx president Kenneth Chenault told U.S. News & World Report, ‘‘If our customer wants to use the American Express card at a hot dog stand, we want to be there.’’

HE SAID, SHE SAID
The Better Business Bureau had dealt with American Express and Visa on numerous occasions throughout the 1990s. However, until Visa cried foul over AmEx’s Visa-bashing ‘‘Paris’’ spot, AmEx had been doing all of the complaining.

COMPETITION
Although American Express faced competition from credit card companies, major banks, and other financial service providers, Visa provided the most visible rivalry. According to RAM Research findings reported in Advertising Age, the ubiquitous Visa card dominated the credit card market with a share of 50.5 percent during the first half of 1996. MasterCard followed with 26.4 percent, AmEx with 15.9 percent, and Discover with 7.3 percent. Similar reports by SMR Research in USA Today indicated that AmEx’s share dropped from 20.4 percent in 1992 to 16.4 percent in 1996. Visa’s market share, on the other hand, rose from 45.1 to 49.2 percent, while MasterCard’s share remained essentially steady at 27.6 percent.
American Express’s market share could not match Visa’s, but AmEx showed signs of improvement in 1996 when it finally reversed a decade-long decline in its share of the credit card market. Advertising Age reported that spending on AmEx cards went up 15.6 percent in 1996 from 1995, while Visa’s purchase volume increased 15.5 percent. And according to U.S. News & World Report, 41.5 million AmEx cards were in circulation in 1996, an increase of 8 percent from the previous year. Carl Pascarella, CEO of Visa U.S.A., was not impressed, however, as he told Time: ‘‘They haven’t changed much . . . . Over the past eight or nine years, consumers have been pulling out their Visa card significantly more often than their American Express card.’’ AmEx indeed had a long way to go to catch Visa. There were almost 600 million Visa cards in distribution, and Visa was accepted by more than 14 million retailers globally. Although AmEx had been signing up more businesses to accept its cards and had more than 5 million merchant partners, this was still a far cry from Visa’s 14 million.

MARKETING STRATEGY
The primary purpose of the American Express
‘‘Competitive’’ campaign was to point out the shortcomings of its competitor Visa. The ‘‘Do More’’ campaign of 1996 had laid the groundwork by introducing AmEx’s numerous new services and programs, while also capitalizing on its image of reliability and downplaying its snobbishness. As the company’s Hayes explained in Advertising Age, ‘‘We’re reshaping the American Express brand to fit a wide variety of uses in the next century—we want to have long-term, meaningful relationships with people and we’re going to build them through marketing.’’
The ‘‘Competitive’’ campaign consisted of a print effort and of three television spots that aired on the national networks during prime time. The first spot, ‘‘Paris,’’ began airing in January of 1997 during the National Football League play-offs and implied that many of Visa’s alleged services were nonexistent or unreliable. The spot featured a Visa cardholder embarking on a vacation to Paris. The cardholder had intended to use the free airline miles he had accumulated on his Visa card but discovered at the airport that his miles had expired. He then attempted to charge the plane ticket on his Visa card, only to be told that he had reached his credit limit. The cardholder was forced to pay cash for his ticket, and his troubles did not end there. Upon reaching France, the traveler encountered problems entering the country. He then contacted Visa for traveler assistance but was turned down. Other obstacles lay in wait as well, for when the traveler injured himself and also was arrested for mistakenly declaring himself a spy in French, he was unable to use his Visa’s free medical or legal services. The message AmEx intended to send was that the traveler would not have had such problems had he used an AmEx card.
American Express timed its aggressive campaign to begin shortly after many airlines had cleared out a large number of free airline miles, many of which had accumulated on credit cards. An AmEx spokesperson told Credit Card Management, ‘‘There are a lot of inconsistencies in Visa programs because they vary from issuer to issuer . . . . We feel it is important to set the record straight. And with many frequent-flier miles having just expired, we felt it was a good time to remind people of the benefits of Membership Rewards.’’ AmEx’s free airline miles came with no expiration date.
The print effort, which began in February, declared, ‘‘Visa says they’re everywhere, but isn’t it more important to have a card that helps you with just about everything?’’ One of the print ads showed an American Express card next to a Visa card. The ad listed mocking descriptions of Visa’s services, including ‘‘No medical referrals, but rounded corners for safety.’’
A second television spot, ‘‘Grand Canyon,’’ featured another unlucky traveler. This Visa cardholder was on his way to Las Vegas to see Steve Lawrence and Eydie Gorme but en route encountered problems in the Grand Canyon. He lost his wallet, dropped his camera into the canyon, and then crashed his rental car into a billboard as Lawrence and Gorme passed by on their tour bus, uncorking a bottle of champagne. In this spot American Express challenged Visa’s purchase protection plans, rental car insurance services, and lost card assistance, implying that its own services in these areas were superior.
The spot ‘‘Virtual Reality’’ featured a male, played by the unlucky traveler from the Grand Canyon, standing in a store and wearing a virtual reality headset. In his fantasy he danced with a beautiful woman, but just as they were about to kiss, he was jarred from his dream by a store clerk who informed him that he was over the spending limit on his Visa card and thus could not continue with his virtual reality session. A struggle over the headset ensued, and the police arrived. This ad questioned Visa’s credit limits, in turn emphasizing that American Express cards had no preset spending limits.

OUTCOME
Visa obviously was not pleased with the American Express ‘‘Competitive’’ campaign and in July 1997 filed a complaint with the National Advertising Division (NAD) of the Better Business Bureau, hoping to put a stop to the airing of the ads. Visa claimed that the AmEx spots were misleading because the advertising implied that Visa did not offer any of the services discussed in the campaign. Visa argued that many of its cards offered various services, including medical and legal referrals, purchase protection, and airline mileage programs. David Sandor, a Visa spokesman, told American Banker, ‘‘Millions of Visa cards offer the enhancements AmEx claims Visa doesn’t have.’’ Advertising Age indicated that 85 million Visa Gold cardholders received free medical and legal services as opposed to 40 million AmEx cardholders who benefited from similar programs. The NAD reviewed Visa’s complaints and determined that American Express needed to change only a few words that could be considered confusing. AmEx was required to make it clear that some Visa classic cards did offer medical and legal services and that some cards also offered mileage programs in which the airline miles had no expiration date. AmEx spokesperson Emily Porter indicated to American Banker, ‘‘We are pleased that we just have to make some minor changes . . . . We see this as a victory.’’ Another AmEx spokesperson downplayed Visa’s complaints and explained to Credit Card Management, ‘‘We are not surprised Visa is uneasy with the spot . . . . Visa is not providing its members with products and services consumers want. We want to make it clear that we would like to provide those products to their members.’’
Viewers were not as unhappy as Visa about the ‘‘Competitive’’ campaign. The ‘‘Virtual Reality’’ spot was nominated for a best commercial Emmy Award for 1997, and ‘‘Paris’’ won an award at the 1997 Cannes International Advertising Festival. One cardholder, a victim of the purge of airline miles, said that the American Express ‘‘Paris’’ spot was especially effective. The cardholder told Credit Card Management, ‘‘Losing miles after spending years to build them is a maddening situation . . . . The ad also correctly points out that Visa issuers do little for their cardholders when it comes to travel services.’’ Other viewers may also have been swayed, for, according to Time, AmEx saw its market share increase from 18.3 to 18.9 percent during the first half of 1997, while Visa’s share dropped from 48.88 to 48.85 percent. AmEx stock shares had increased fourfold since 1993, and profits were on the rise.